' The facts leading up to this appeal are that the appellant Muhammad Ashraf was working as a permanent Conductor since last about 10 years with the respondent, Karachi Road Transport Corporation. His case is that he was made to work as Traffic Assistant since 16th September, 1980 and was suddenly stopped to work as such on 17th. October, 1981. It is contended by him that he was a permanent regular Traffic Assistant and, therefore, his services could not be legally terminated and the termination was illegal. He served the grievance notice and ultimately filed a grievance application, in the 1st Labour Court, Karachi. The learned Labour Court dismissed his grievance application, vide its order, dated 30th August, 1983. Aggrieved by this order, he has come in this appeal.
2. I have gone through the relevant evidence available on the record of the lower Court and have also heard the learned representatives of the parties. Mr. Yousuf Khan for the appellant Mr. Ghulam Hussain for the respondent, Karachi Transport Corporation. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the appellant was never promoted and appointed as Traffic Assistant on regular basis. In fact, he was made to serve on different occasions temporarily as a stopgap arrangement as usual in absence of the Traffic Assistant. On the admitted case of the parties there is no order in writing of his promotion and appointment as Traffic Assistant. In fact, it is admitted that no such order was issued and it is strange that the appellant was working in the post of Traffic Assistant without such an order in writing for nearly more than one year. Such a course of conduct on his part would clearly show that the stand taken on behalf of the respondent to the effect that he was only being temporarily asked on different occasions in the absence of the Traffic Assistant to work as a stopgap arrangement appears to be correct. What I further find from the record that the order of his promotion as a Traffic Assistant was issued on 18th December, 1982 of which the copy has been made available on his behalf at this appellate stage. The order would clearly show that four other persons senior to him were also promoted alongwith him and there is nothing to show as to whether they were also promoted earlier on 16th September, 1980 when he is said to have been promoted and appointed as Traffic Assistant on regular basis, though there is no order to that effect in writing. It would, therefore, appear that he failed to prove satisfactorily though the burden lay on him to prove that he was promoted and appointed as Traffic Assistant on a regular basis with effect from 16th September, 1980. He has to prove his case affirmatively and has not to base his claim on conjunctures and surmises. In view of the situation the contention raised on his behalf of by learned representative that he should be considered as a permanent Traffic Assistant from the alleged date of his appointment viz., 16th September, 1980, has no force. Accordingly, I find no sufficient and satisfactory evidence in support of his claim and it appears to me that the learned Labour Court has rightly rejected his application under section 25-A, I. R.
0., 1969.
3. The result is that the appeal is dismissed.