' The petitioner filed an application against the two depot-holders, respondents Nos. 4 and 5. After enquiry the District Food Controller, Sargodha, vide order, dated 9th May, 1983 cancelled their authorization. Their appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Director Food, Sargodha Region, Sargodha vide order, dated 22nd May, 1983. On their revision, the Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Food Department, Lahore vide order, dated 11th January, 1984 passed the following order :- " I feel that the extreme penalty of cancellation of depot authorization/ nomination was not called for in the circumstances of the case, especially when the presence of party faction as pointed out in the Inquiry Report of the Assistant Commissioner cannot be ruled out. I think forfeiture of whole of the cash security deposited by the depot-holders, will meet the ends of justice. I order accordingly."
' This is challenged by the petitioner through the afore-titled Constitutional petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under the West Pakistan Wheat, Wheat-Atta, Maize, Rice and Sugar Distribution Order, 1967 vide section 6 (1) it is provided that the relevant officers "may for reasons to be recorded in writing, pass an order suspending or cancelling an authorization and direct that the security deposited or any part there of may be forfeited to Government." Therefore, he contends, cancellation of authorization and direction for forfeiture of security should go together.' Only forfeiture could not have been ordered by the Secretary as the allegations had been proved.
3. The contention is without force. The subsection (3) of the same' section quoted above, the Government is authorised to pass any order "as c it may think fit". It is open to a revisional authority to modify an order or reduce the liability. The emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the officers "may pass an order suspending or cancelling the authorization and direct that the security deposited or any part thereof may be forfeited to the Government", envisages that the suspension or cancellation of an authorisation must be there if security is forfeited because the former is joined by the word "and" with the latter. The argument -is usual that word "and" is conjunctive and not disjunctive. But it is not always so. It depends on the context. It is pointed out in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 2nd Edition p. 82 that "where a lessee underlet, with a proviso, on breach of covenant, enabling him and his lessor to re-enter ; held that he or his lessor might re- enter, on breach,-. 'And' may be relative as well ask copulative." Words have meaning in the context and the purpose for which they are employed. Collection of letters put together have no life of their own. It is only when the user employs them to convey an idea to be understood by another in the given context. Courts interpret words as usually understood. They adhere to what is stated to be strict literal interpretation. But if such adherence is destructive of the object of the enactment or diminutive of the authority conferred by the statute or otherwise leads to anomalies and absurdities, it is fair to assume that the legislature did not use the words in that sense and in such a case the conversion of "and" into disjunctive "or" is permissible. Under the Disabled Soldiers Act, 1801 where property was to be employed for the maintenance of "sick and maimed soldiers" it was held in R.-V. Brixton Prison Governor, exporter Bidwell (1) that the property could be employed for either sick or maimed soldiers and it was not necessary that they should be both `sick and maimed' because of use of word "and" between sick and maimed. Similarly in R. V. Newbould (2) it was held that "the expression" local and public authorities in section 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruptions Act, 1916 did not "mean authorities which are both local and public......(but) authorities which are either local or public". In the case of Muhammad Hussain v. He Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (3) a question arose whether an appeal under section 17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 wherein it was provided that an appeal would lie "if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds Rs, 300", was competent if the amount did not comprise of both wages and compensation. It was held by a learned Division Bench in which the judgment was delivered by a very acute learned Judge Mr. Justice Muhammad Gul, if I may say so with great respect, that the word 'and' in between wages and compensation did not mean that both together must exceed the limit of Rs, 300. If either was above that limit, the appeal would be competent. The word "and" was interpreted to mean "or". In a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of L. H. Sugar Factory Pilibhit v. Moti (4) where section 40 of Agriculturists Relief Act provided that "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Stamp Act II of 1899 and the
(1) (1937) 1 K B 305 (2) (1962) 2 K B 102
(3) PLD 1966 Lah. 128 (4) AIR 1941 All. 243 rules made under the Registration Act XVI of 1908 the stamp duty and the registration and the copying fees on bonds, value or amount not exceeding Rs, 3,000 executed by an agriculturist and registered under Registration Act shall be as laid down in Sch. 5", the question involved was whether the bond should be such as has been "executed by an agriculturist and registered under the Registration Act" for the applicability of the proviso or simply executed by an agriculturist or registered under the Registration Act. The words "and" in between "executed by an agriculturist "and" registered under the Registration Act", was interpreted to mean "or" in the Context of the provision. In the case in hand, it has to be noticed that after setting aside the cancellation of the authorization, the Secretary had directed the forfeiture of the security deposited by the respondents. It was the latter who were affected. They do not complain. The petitioner has no right.
The matter was between the authorized agent and the principal. For the default of the agent, the principal may take any action more or less. Third party has no locus standi to say that the principal should have punished his agent more severely.
4. In view of what has been stated above, there is no merit or force in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.