' As in the six appeals, captioned above, same legal question is involved, they, therefore, are being disposed of together through this single judgment. On account of misconduct. The six appellants were terminated from service and they after serving grievance notices challenged the order before the learned labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur. The learned lower Court held that the appellants were not covered by the definition of workman and thus ordered the return of their grievance petitions for presentation to the competent forum.
2. Muhammad Anwar and Muhammad Mansha appellants have been serving in managerial and supervisory capacity before they were terminated but all the appellants at the time their services were terminated, were working as officers-grade-II. According to the evidence brought on record, duties performed by them were neither managerial nor supervisory but only clerical. The mere fact that at one time the appellants had been functioning in the supervisory or managerial capacity is not sufficient to oust them from the definition of workman. The material thing to be seen is as to what were their duties at the time their services were terminated and cause of grievance accrued to them. Since admittedly they were not managers or supervisors at the time of termination, they were not covered by cl (a) to (f ) section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
3. An application for additional evidence has been given in order to bring on record original power- of-attorney executed by the bank in favour of the appellants. Firstly, the application for additional evidence at the appellate stage is to be brought alongwith appeal and secondly, documentary evidence sought to be produced is to be attached to the application for additional evidence. At the appellate stage, only that evidence can be produced which is required for the correct and just decision of the appeal and the parties cannot produce any oral or documentary evidence as a right. Unless the documentary evidence sought to be produced is attached with the application, the Court is not in a position to decide whether such a document is necessary for the correct decision of the appeal. Moreover, the mere production of power-of-attorney, alleged to have been executed by the bank in favour of the appellants is not sufficient and it is also to be proved as a fact that the powers enumerated in the power of attorney were actually being exercised at the time of termination from service. The production of power-of-attorney, therefore, is not necessary for the decision of the appeals. The learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to point out any such evidence on record nor any duty roster was produced. According to the oral evidence, produced by the appellants, they were performing clerical duties and very little duties were of some importance. Needless to say that the main duties are to be considered to decide whether a particular person is or is not covered by the definition of workman. According to the evidence, bulk of duties were clerical and very small duties such as being custodian of keys, putting signatures as 2nd Officer on the cheques were of some importance and responsibility. R. W.
1 admitted in his cross-examination that the appellants had to prepare papers- for opening of accounts and for making correspondence. He also admitted that at the time of termination, the appellants were officers in zonal office. The learned lower Court, therefore, wrongly decided that the appellants were not workmen.
4. As a result of the observations, made above, I accept all the appeals, set aside the decision of the learned lower Court and remand the cases with the direction that the point of workman be decided afresh, taking into consideration the duties performed by the appellants at the time the termination orders were passed. The parties will be at liberty to produce further evidence, if they so like. If the learned lower Court comes to the conclusion that the appellants were covered by the definition of workmen the cases will be decided on merits.