' Respondent No, 1 had given his shop on rent to the petitioner @ Rs, 40 per month. This shop is situated in Karachi Cantonment area. On 25-2-1975 the respondent filed ejectment application under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) on the ground that the petitioner had committed default for 12 months from January, 1974, to January, 1975, and that he had sublet the shop to one Allah Ditta. The Additional Rent Controller, Cantonment issued notice to the petitioner, who filed his written statement which was to the effect that he had employed Allah Ditta to work at his shop. He denied that the shop was sublet to Allah Ditta. After, recording evidence of the parties the learned Additional Executive Officer, Cantonment, exercising powers of the Rent Controller, allowed the ejectment application on both the counts i. e.
Default in payment of rent as well as subletting. This order, which is dated 10-1-1980, was challenged by the appellant/petitioner in appeal before the District Judge, Karachi in Rent Appeal No, 8 of 1980. The learned District Judge agreed with both the findings of facts of the learned Rent Controller viz. That the petitioner had committed default in payment of rent for 12 months and that he had sublet the shop to one Allah Ditta.
2. A further plea was raised before the learned District Judge that the Additional Executive Officer, Cantonment Board was not specifically invested with powers of Additional Rent Controller under section 6(2) of the said Act and hence she had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the ejectment application under the said Act. Although this plea was not raised before the trial Court, yet the District Judge heard the counsel for the parties on this point and disposed of the same in the following words:- "6. Learned Advocate of the appellant raised a legal objection questioning the jurisdiction of learned Rent Controller. According to him no notification was issued under section 6 of the said Act empowering the learned Rent Controller to a as Rent Controller. This objection was raised by the learned counsel at the earlier stage of this appeal and, therefore, enquiry was made from the learned Rent Controller and she had sent a photostat copy of notification from Ministry of Defence dated 30-11-1977 by which all the executive and Additional Executive Officers were invested with the powers of Rent Controller and since Miss Najma Swaleh was an Additional Executive Officer for Karachi Cantonment she was also Additional Rent Controller for that area. As such this objection of learned counsel has no force."
' In view of the above findings the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal of the appellant by his judgment dated 6-3-1982. The appellant has now filed this constitutional petition challenging the two judgments of the Rent Controller and the District Judge.
3. So far as the legal objection regarding competency of the Additional Executive Officer, Cantonment to exercise the powers of Rent Controller is concerned, the learned appellate Court has made reference to the notification concerned, whereby all Additional Executive Officers have .
Been invested with powers of the Rent Controllers under the said Act. During the arguments Mr. K. A.
Wahab learned counsel for the respondent also produced a letter of the Ministry of Defence dated 30th November, 1977, which states categorically that Executive Officers, holding an additional charge of Cantonment Executive Officers are also invested with the powers of Rent Controller under section 6 of the said Act. In view of the notification referred to above by the appellate Court and the photostat copy produced by the learned counsel for the respondent. I have no reason to take exception to the findings of the lower appellate Court that the Additional Executive Officer, who decided the case of the respondent as Rent Controller, had the power and jurisdiction to decide the same. It is immaterial that the Additional Executive Officer has designated herself as Additional Rent Controller, although by virtue of the notification referred to above, she could have acted as fulfledged Rent Controller and decide the case as such.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that an Additional Rent Controller, under section 6(2) of the said Act, can be appointed only by a separate notification and that no such notification has been Issued by the Ministry of Defence. The argument has no substance because an Additional Executive Officer has got concurrent powers of Rent Controller with Executive Officer. if through inadvertance the Additional Executive Officer in the present case has designated herself as Additional Rent Controller, it would not make her orders in rent matters as coram non judice.
Main question for determination will be whether the Additional Executive Officer in the present case was or was not competent to entertain a rent application under the said Act and decide it as Rent Controller. The notification referred to above leave no doubt as to the fact that she had the powers to entertain and decide ejectment applications under the said Act.
5. The other point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the findings of the two lower Courts regarding default in payment of rent and subletting are based on misreading of evidence. He has led us through the evidence of the parties from which it does not appear that there has been any misreading of evidence. The respondent has categorically stated in his deposition that he did not receive any rent from January, 1974 to January, 1975. Both the Courts have relied upon this statement of the respondent. The respondent has further stated that he used to issue rent receipts and obtain signature of the petitioner on the counterfoils. This statement has also been relied upon by both the Courts. On the contrary the petitioner himself has not come into the witness-box to rebut this evidence. He has only produced Allah Ditta, who according to the respondent, is a Sublette in the shop in question. He has deposed that rent for February, 1975, was paid to the respondent in presence of Sarfaraz Khan, but in his deposition Sarfaraz Khan states something different. He says that the opponent had paid rent for January, 1975, to the applicant i. e.
The present respondent. They have not stated anything about the rent for the period, January, 1974, to January, 1975. The learned District Judge has thoroughly discussed the evidence of the parties on this point and came to a categorical finding that default for 12 months on the part of petitioner was proved.
6. So far as subletting is concerned, the plea of the respondent is that Akhtar Parvez has sublet this shop to Allah Ditta. It is an admitted fact that presently Allah Ditta is running this shop. The claim of the latter is that he is an employee of the petitioner, but in the same breath he states that he is holding power-of-attorney for the petitioner. The power-of-attorney has been rejected by the appellate Court on the ground that the signature of the petitioner appeared to be forged and that the petitioner himself has not appeared in the witness-box to prove the power of attorney or to prove even the fact that Allah Ditta was running the shop as his employee. In view of this state of evidence if the two lower Courts have come to concurrent findings of fact that the petitioner was a defaulter and had also sublet the shop, this Court shall not interfere with those findings in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.
' The petition is dismissed with no orders as to costs. The petitioner is, however, granted two months time to vacate the shop.