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1984 PLC 1484

MUHAMM AD RAMZAN vs SIND LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND 2 OTHERS

Citation1984 PLC 1484
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Miscellaneous Application No, 243 and Constitutional Petition No, D-422 of
Date1983-10-04
Judge(s)Abdul Hayee Qureshi, Abdul Razzaq A. Thaim
ResultPetition dismissed

ORDER

1. ' ABDUL HAYEE KURESHI, C. J.-The brief facts are that the petitioner was an employee of Messrs Aspro Nicholas (Pakistan) Limited. He was working as a Security Assistant. It seems that, on 8th September, 1980 the petitioner assaulted a co-employee with an iron rod on his head, causing injuries to the skull. The injured was sent to the Medical Officer for examination, who certified that he had two injuries on his person. The petitioner was given a show-cause notice, and, on 17th September, 1980 he submitted an explanation, which substantially was to the effect that it was Muhammad Ilyas, the other injured employee, who had started the quarrel, had caught hold of him by the Collar, and, on being pushed, had received head injury, owing to compact with the table, or, the wall. An enquiry was held, at which injured Muhammad Ilyas, Miss Josephene, Fazal Rehman, and Rahimullah were examined. The petitioner also examined Shafi Ahmad Khan, Ghulam Sarwar Khan, Muhammad Ameen, Haider Zaman and Subhan Khan in his defence. The domestic enquirywas decided adversely to the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer, who, by a report, dated 30th November, 1980 recorded findings that the petitioner had voluntarily assaulted Muhammad Ilyas, and was, as such, guilty of disorderly conduct while on duty.

2. ' The employer accepted the report, and gave a show-cause notice to the petitioner, alongwith a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, Such notice was replied to by the petitioner, and, after being given an opportunity of personal hearing, the petitioner was dismissed.

3. ' The petitioner challenged the order of dismissal before the Third Labour Court, Karachi. The respondent No, 3 resisted the proceedings before the Labour Court on several grounds, one of which was that the grievance petition had not been submitted by the petitioner, as required by section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. It was also averred that the petitioner was not a workman, and therefore, not entitled to relief under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. On merits, it was averred that a fair and impartial domestic enquiry had been held, in which he had been held to be guilty. There were oscillations in the proceedings before the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal on the point, whether the petitioner was such an employee, who could be termed to be doing manual, or, clerical work. A finding of fact was recorded by the Labour Court, which was accepted by the Tribunal, that the petitioner was performing clerical duties, and therefore, the Labour Court had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Labour Court, on going into all the facts of the case, came to the conclusion that there was overwhelming evidence to establish the misconduct of the petitioner. Such decision was affirmed by the learned Chairman of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner, being aggrieved by such concurrent orders of the Labour Court and the Tribunal, invokes the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

4. ' Mr. S. Safdar Hussain has relied on some rules framed by respondent No, 3 in regard to disciplinary proceedings. A copy of these rules has not been placed on the record. Inability is sought to be explained on the ground that there was only one copy available as if copies from the same could not be made. However, we have looked into these rules. Mr. S. Safdar Hussain has invited our attention to rules, which are contained in paragraphs 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. The first paragraph concerns a second show-cause notice, and, in this case, a second show-cause notice was, indeed, given after the enquiry was concluded. Paragraph 5.6 states that, after a second show-cause notice, a personal hearing has to be given. The order of the Tribunal clearly states that a personal hearing was also given. Paragraph 5.7 states that the Chief Executive will, after hearing the accused in person, issue written orders inflicting punishment. Mr. S. Safdar Hussain states that the Chief Executive had not heard him. Such point had not been raised before the Appellate Tribunal. In fact, the established position is that, after the second show-cause notice, the petitioner was heard, and we will, therefore, assume that rules have been followed.

5. ' In regard to the second show-cause notice, we are also reminded that the Supreme Court, in some of its recent pronouncements, has held that a second show-cause notice, after the conclusion of the enquiry, is not necessary, as such a requirement is not spelt out from the terms of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. However, Mr. S, Safdar Hussain perhaps wishes to convey, that, if the rules had not been followed, the terms and conditions of services had been violated. In any case. There is ample evidence on the record to show that, after the second show- cause notice, the petitioner was heard before the punishment was inflicted.

6. ' The next contention of Mr. S. Safdar Hussain was that the enquiry was neither fair nor full. He states that even the person, who was assaulted by the petitioner, should have been charge-sheeted. We cannot possibly agree with such a contention, because the established position is that it was that person, who received injuries at the hands of the petitioner, and it would have been absolutely unjust to give any show-cause notice to such person, who had suffered injuries at the hands of the petitioner. This would amount to injustice being added to injury. On facts, we find that the Labour Court as well as the learned Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal have considered all the evidence in full details and arrived at findings of fact to the effect that the guilt of the petitioner was proved.

7. No grievance is made that evidence has been overlooked, or, that the findings were incorrect, what to speak of finding being so absurd as would persuade this Court to exercise constitutional jurisdiction, despite traditional loathe of the High Court to interfere on facts in these proceedings.

8. We see no substance in this petition, which we dismiss in limine.

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