1. ' By this appeal the order, dated 21-12-1980 of the Vllth Senior Civil Judge and Rent COntroller, Karachi, has been impugned. The facts leading to the appeal are these. The respondent MRs, Akhtar Ghazala is a tenant of the appellant MRs, Shakila Khatoon, in respect of the building on Plot No,93-G; Block No,2, P.E.C.H.S., Karachi, on monthly rent of Rs,350 as per agreement, dated 1st September, 1969. By invoking the summary procedure provided in section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) the appellant instituted ejectment proceedings on 26-11-1980, seeking ejectment of the respondent from the said premises on the ground that the former is a widow and she needed the house for her personal use. The ejectment application was opposed by the respondent who denied the appellant being a widow.
2. The respondent also raised other pleas including that the requisite notice to be served on her was defective. The learned Controller after going through the record and hearing the counsel of the parties found that the statutory notice that the appellant was required to serve on the respondent was not in accordance with law and consequently he dismissed the ejectment application on that ground. Reasoning adopted by the learned Controller in support of his finding may be reproduced as under:- "Admittedly the applicant is widow. It is also an admitted position that opponent has been duly served with the notice is required by the statute. The contention of the learned counsel for the opponent is that mandatory provision of that said section with regard to the contents of the notice have not been complied with as the applicant in her notice, dated 5-9-1980 has specified the date of the handing over the possession of the premises to be within 7 days of the receipt of the said notice instead of the said period being not earlier than two months. I have gone through the said notice carefully and find that contention of the opponent is 'correct. She is given only seven days' time to hand over the vacant possession to the landlady. I would not like to go into the merits of the case very notice which is mandatory is defective. This application is bad for want of the proper notice and specified period. However, it is open to her to file a fresh application after serving proper notice as provided under section 14 of the said Ordinance."
3. ' When the parties were called upon to argue the case, both the respondent and her counsel were absent. There was no intimation as to their absence nor did they apply for adjournment of the case. In fact the case was taken up in the last on the day, to provide time if it was ever needed by the respondent and her counsel but none appeared on her behalf. In the circumstances I had no option but to hear the arguments of the appellant's counsel.
4. ' The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the findings arrived at by the learned Controller with regard to the defective notice are based on misreading of the text of the notice.
5. Drawing my attention to para. 7 of the notice, the learned counsel pointed out that it was clear from the para. that the notice was to expire after two months from the receipt thereof. This is precisely the requirement of subsection (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance. In order to appreciate his assertions, it may be useful to reproduce para.
7. It reads as under:- "That you are, therefore, hereby called upon to pay all arrears of rent to my clients and hand over vacant possession of the aforesaid premises to my clients within seven days of receipt of this notice, failing my client shall be constrained to institute necessary legal proceedings for your eviction from the aforesaid premises at your risk as to costs and consequences which please note.
6. This notice requiring you to vacate aforesaid premises on the ground stated in paragraph 6 hereinabove shall expire on completion of two months from the date of receipt of this notice by you."
7. It would appear that although the notice is not happily worded, it does fulfill the requirements of the law. The last three lines make it clear that the notice was intended to expire after two months from the date of its receipt. This being the position, the finding arrived at by the learned Controller with regard to the validity of the notice is not correct. The notice served on the respondent satisfied the legal requirements and no exception can be taken to it.
8. ' On the question of the notice, reference may also be made to the case reported as Younus v. MRs, Hameeda 1982 CLC 580. In this case my brother Ajmal Mian, J. observed as follows:- "It is also clear that section 14 of the Ordinance seems to provide an expeditious summary remedy to a widow, orphan, to a person, who has retired from the service or who has attained the age of 60 years, If technicalities are to be strictly enforced, the very object of the above provision will be frustrated. I am inclined to hold that the Court is to see, whether there has been sub stantial compliance of the above section. The spirit of section 14, seems to be that a tenant is to be provided 2 months' period prior to ordering of ejectment summarily under the above provision. In the instant case the notice, dated 30-1-1980 under section 14 was served in or about first week of February, 1980, whereas the ejectment order was passed on 19-4-1981 i.e, after the expiry of more than one year. Since the rent case was filed on 2-3-1980, the Rent Controller could not have passed an ejectment order immediately on receipt of the application for ejectment, as the two months period had not expired by then. However, during the pendency of the rent application the cause of action matured as admittedly on the date of the passing of the ejectment order, more than one year expired from the date of service of the notice and from the date of filing of the ejectment case."
9. ' Viewed in the light of above observations, the case of the appellant stands on better footing. In the instant case clear two months had elapsed between the notice and the institution of the case of the ,ejectment, as the notice was given on 15th September, 1980, and the ejectment proceedings were filed on 26-11-1980. However, in the above reported case, the notice period of two months had matured during pendency of the case. The Supreme Court has more or less taken similar view in the cases (1) PLD 1978 SC 220, (2) 1980 SCMR 339 which have been referred to in the aforesaid case of this Court. In the first case although the ejectment case was filed before expiry of three months period , provided in section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, yet the Supreme Court upheld the order of ejectment on the ground that during pendency of the rent application, the cause of action had matured. In the second case the Supreme Court observed that the forum acting under the Rent Restriction. Ordinance is not precluded to take notice of the events taken place during the course of the proceedings after the institution of an ejectriaint petition, so as to suitably mound the relief on the basis of altered circumstances in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to shorten the proceeding.
10. Keeping the above authorities in mind, it would be noticed that by this time nearly two years have passed since the date of the notice required to be served under section 14(1) of the Ordinance and as such the objection to the sufficiency of the notice has completely lost its force.
11. As for fulfillment of others conditions, the learned Controller has observed in course of his reasoning reproduced above that the appellant is admittedly a widow. Further that she needs the house of tier personal use and is not in occupation of the premises owned by her is borne out both by the notice served on the respondent and the ejectment application. There is nothing to show that the appellant's statement to this effect is not true. Reverting to the above reported case, it would be useful to refer to the observations made in relation to requiring the house for personal use. They are in these terms:- "on my view the question of bona fides cannot be investigated into by the Court in an application under section 14 of the Ordinance in view of the difference in the language employed in sections 14 and 15(2)(viii) whereas in the former section the words 'in good faith' have been deliberately omitted, yet in the latter section the same have been provided fur. In order to apply under the latter section a landlord is required to prove that he requires the tenement concerned for his personal require ment in good faith, whereas no such burden of proof is cast on a person applying for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement under the former section i.e, under section 14."
12. I am in complete agreement with the views expressed above, holding that bona fide of the appellant's statement to the effect that she required the house for her personal use and that she is not in occupation of any premises owned by her cannot be doubted. As stated above, even otherwise the respondent has failed to successfully rebut the appellant's version in this connection.
13. For the above reasons appeal is allowed and the impugned order, dated 21-12-1980 of the learned Controller is set aside with no order as to costs. The respondent will deliver the vacant possession of the disputed premises within 90 days of this order.