1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-This appeal through special leave of this Court is directed against judgment, dated 23-9.1976, of the Lahore High Court; whereby first respondent's Constitutional Petition challenging the award of Rs, 15,000 as compensation to the petitioner for the accidental death of her husband, a workman of respondent, was allowed and it was held that her entitlement to it under Workmen's Compensation At VIII of 1923, was nullified by section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance No, X of 1965.
2. ' Leave to appeal was granted to resolve the conflict between the impugned judgment and the decision of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court in Mst. Lal Jan. v. Messrs Silver Paper Tube Co., Karachi regarding the effect of section 81 of the Ordinance of 1965, on right to compensation under the Act of 1923.
3. ' There is no dispute on facts. Mr. Muhammad Anwar Sheikh, appellant's husband was a secured workman under the Ordinance and the benefits thereunder are available to her. The Tribunal concerned held that the benefits are neither similar to the compensation available under the Act, nor was any inconsistency between the two so as to assume displacement of one by the other. It is also not disputed that the accidental death out of which the case has arisen, had taken place during the course of employment and is covered by both the laws. The appellant's claim, supported as it is by the Karachi Authority, is that she is entitled to both the benefits and that section 81 of the Ordinance has not been correctly interpreted by the Lahore High Court.
4. ' Section 81 reads as follows :- "Supersession of certain laws etc.-Workmen's Compensation and maternity benefit payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923), the Employers' Liability Act, 1938 (XXIV of 1938),1 the Mines Maternity Benefit Act, 1941 (XIX of 1941), the West Pakistan Maternity Benefit Ordinance, 195i (West Pakistan Ordinance XXXII of 1958), or under any other law shall not be payable in respect of any employment, on or after the appointed day in respect of such employment and the enactments and laws aforesaid shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, cease to have effect."
5. ' In the Karachi case, the provisions of. The Ordinance were analysed so as to show that the benefits thereunder in case of death were not the same or even similar to the compensation available under the Act and it was held that death grant, gratuity, or pension granted under the Ordinance are no doubt not synonymous with compensation under the Act. Nevertheless they are not inconsistent with it so as to attract the bar provided in section 81. It was held that to some extent the scope, object and approach to the certain labour problems are not only different in both the laws but are also in addition to each other and not inconsistent inter se. Reliance in this behalf was also placed on the following observation by this Court in Chittaranjan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Staff Union : "The provisions of the two statutes are, in my opinion, not only dissimilar but also inconsistent and incompatible. It is true that more dissimilarity may not be enough to establish incompatibility in substance and in spirit, and not merely in form."
6. ' In short in Karachi case the first part of section 81 providing for non-(Muhammad Altai Zullah, J)' availability of compensation under the Act was not only linked with but made dependent upbn the second part thereof which provided for what was termed as implied repeal of certain parts of the Act if found inconsistent with the Ordinance.
7. ' In the present case a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court disagreeing with the Karachi view in the case of Mst. Lal Jan held that section 81 of the Ordinance is divided into two distinct parts, each independent of the other and that in particular the second part does not control the operation of the first part. Accordingly after applying the first part it was found that no scope was left for the application of the second part so as to look for inconsistency, similarity or dissimilarity of the benefit conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Regarding the second part it was observed that it was not redundant. And that even if the Act is more special law as compared to the Ordinance both the parts of section 81 would continue to operate on the following dictum in Gernett v. Bradley "An act directed towards a special object or special class of objects will not be repealed by a subsequent general. Act embracing in its generality those particular objects, unless some reference be made, directly or by necessary inference, to the preceding special. Act."
8. ' The Labour. Appellate Tribunal Sind, in Messrs Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. Rab Nawaz and another did not follow the Karachi case of Mst. Lal Jan. In a case of personal injury it held that from the comparison of the various provisions of two enactments it is plain enough that so far as the question of personal injury is concerned both the laws prescribe different procedure, different authorities and different amount of benefit or compensation, therefore, they were inconsistent with each other. That being so the remedy under Workmen's Compensation Act must give way to the one provided by the Social Security Ordinance. But in another case the same Tribunal followed the Karachi case of Mst. Lai Jan. It 'is Messrs Chempher (Pak.) Ltd., Karachi v. Mst. Ahmedun Nita . In yet another Tribunal case Metal Packages Ltd., Multan v. Inayat All the Labour Appellate (Punjab)
9. Tribunal made reference to the cases of : Messrs Brooke Bond Ltd. ; Mst. Lal Jan; the present case as it was decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and reported in Messrs Crescent Textile Mills Ltd., Lyallpur v. Mst. Sakina Bibi (the High Court judgment is reported in PLJ 1978 Lab. 231) ; and another case namely, Abdul 'Aziz v. Roshan Khan and followed the Karachi view in the case' of Mst. Lai Jan.
10. All the above cases have already been noticed except that of Abdul Aziz. It has been reported in 1975 PLC 634. This case was also decided by the Sind Appellate Tribunal and was considered by2 3 4 5 6 7 the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal as going against the view taken in the case of Messrs Brooke Bond Limited. Two more judgments of the Lahore High Court relied upon by the learned Member, of the Tribunal in the Punjab. Tribunal case of Metal Packages Ltd., also would indirectly support the view. That grant of benefits under both the laws would not be illegal in all cases. They are: Pakistan Western Railway, Lahore through its Vice-Chairman v. Abdul Majid and Anwar Munir Coal Company, Jhelum v. Muhammad Iqbal and another , respectively. In' these cases compensation was awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act. However, they do not in any way resolve the controversy as presented in this case. In Messrs Sind Flour Mill Ltd. v. Mst. Karima , the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal following another Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal case ; namely Sind Alkalis v. Mst. Ghulam Sakina (Appeal No, WCK 5/76, decided on 6-1-1977 (unreported)) (not Mst.
11. Sakina in the present case) declined to follow the Karachi case of Mst. Lai Jan. The Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal again declined to follow the case of Mst. Lal Jan in Said Muhammad v. Messrs Firdous Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi but in this case it was held on merits that tne employee concerned was otherwise also not entitled to compensation. In another case however, namely, Messrs Ahmad Investments Ltd., Karachi v. Mst. Kaman' Begum it made reference to the decision in a Constitutional Petition No, 15 of 1976 unreported-(without giving any other particulars) and clearly followed the Lahore view in Mst. Sakina Bibi and declined to follow the Karachi view in the case of Mst. Lal Jan. The same learned Tribunal followed the same view in two other cases Amin Fabrics Ltd. v. Ranjho Khan and Jamaluddin v. Amir Aliwala Hardware ludustries and another .
12. ' Three more cases need to be noticed. They are:-
(1) Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Kohinoor Workers Union 1975 PLC 269 ;
(2) Western Engg. Works v. Rehmat Khan etc. 1975 PLC 610 and
(3) Messrs Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Akhtar All 1979 PLC 114.
13. ' In the case of Kohinoor Chemical Company, the Sind Appellate Tribunal refused to deny a benefit under the Factories. Act on argument simpliciter that the Social Security Ordinance, 1965 occupied the field. In the second case of Western Engineering Works, the same Tribunal found that the claim of a workman, under Workmen's Compensation Act, who was a contributor (presumably under the unamended Social Security Ordinance, 1965) towards Social Security Scheme was not hit by section 81 of the said Ordinance. Reliance was placed on the case of Mst. Lal Jan. In the third case of Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. The same learned Tribunal adopted the contrary view.
14. ' At this stage it needs to be mentioned that none of the learned counsel appearing for the parties made any serious attempt to survey the case-law in Pakistan nor any cases were cited from any foreign jurisdiction so as to make a comparative study of the laws concerned though according to them similar legislation has been made in other countries. The aforenoted cases, by and large, have been taken out by the staff of the Court. Accordingly no final comment would be made on the general argument raised from the respondent side that in England the Workmen's Compensation Act having been repealed in its entirety, no benifit is now awardable there under the said law.
15. ' And for the same reason on account of the above state of assistance it would not be proper in this case to deal with general question of overlapping benefits under different laws in Pakistan except to the extent it is necessary to do so when interpreting section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance..
16. One' such general question has already been dealt with by this Court in Nathey Khan v.
17. Government of West Pakistan .
18. ' Learned counsel for the appellant has in support of the view taken in the Karachi case of Mst. La!
19. Jan submitted a comparative table of the various provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923) and West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance (X of 1965) which make a lengthy reading. It is accordingly being appended as Schedule No, 1 which by no means can otherwise be treated as exhaustive. It can be omitted when the judgment is reported.8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ' Learned counsel for the respondent in his submissions as already noted made reference to the legislative history in England on the subject of benefits to the workmen but has not tried to show whether the language used in the laws of England is par materia to the provisions of the two laws concerned in this case. It was necessary for the purpose of resolving the present controversy. It was omitted perhaps for the reason that, according to him the question posed by such comparative study, would not arise in the present appeal. His argument that "in Pakistan and India, the development though not the same in point but has remained almost the same from the point of view of the pattern" is for the above-stated reason of not much help. But his other general submission that "the displacement (limited) of Workmen's Compensation Act by the Social Security Ordinance, 1965" as would be presently shown, is undoubtedly relevant for interpretation of section 81.
20. ' The learned counsel after making some general comment on sections 53, 54 and 73 of the Ordinance also made a brief comment on the comparative scope of the word "dependent" used in section 2 (6) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the survivors mentioned in section 42 of the Social Security Ordinance with the conclusion that there was an inconsistency in this behalf. The comparative table of the relevant provisions of the two enactments made by the learned counsel for the respondent is also appended to this judgment as Schedule No, II for the same purpose and in the manner adopted for the Schedule No, I submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant.
21. ' It is not necessary to repeat here the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant because he adopted the reasons in the case of Mgt. .Lal Jan which has already been noted in the opening part of this judgment.
22. ' The sum and substance of the submissions made by both the learned counsel and the reasoning in the two . Cases: one, decided by the Sind High Court and the other by the Lahore High Court (of Mst. Ltd Jan and Mat. Sakina Bibi) is that while in accordance with the former view the two parts of section 81 would interact no each other and so as to make it necessary for the Tribunal/Court concerned to discover the inconsistency and construe and apply the same vis-a-vis the first part of section 81, according to the latter view both parts are independent of each other and in particular the second part does not control the first one.
23. Undoubtedly, as observed in the case of Mat. Lal Jan and also felt in the case of Mat. Sakina Bibi, section 81 is not happily worded and it may be added that the two parts thereof are not properly placed. This has given rise to so much confusion.' A direct unambiguous repeal of the relevant provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (as according to the learned counsel for the respondent has been done in some other contries) it' intended, would have definitely mitigated the confusion and hardship being created for' all concerned more particularly those who had to receive the benefits. They have been compelled to litigate unnecessarily for long periods of time before obtaining tangible monetary compensation and/or benefits.
24. ' It is obvious that this Omission of a resort to the method of direct repeal, cannot be considered as being against law or unintentional. Why it has purposely been avoided, is not easy to answer.
25. However, it can be surmised that the stage of development in and evolution of labour laws vis-a- vis the trade union concept and social justice, in Pakistan need not be always contemporaneous with that of other countries. Our concept of social justice and prevailing social conditions might have been treated as different from others.
26. Be that as it may the fact remains that the Legislature in its own wisdom has for the time being decided not to resort to direct repeal in so far as the relevant provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are concerned. Instead indirect method has been adopted namely of interjection of some of the provisions of the Social Security Ordinance, so as to achieve the result of only an indirect repeal; which would have to be construed vis-a-vis each benefit granted under both the legislations when coming up for decision before the forums concerned. It is in this context that the first part of section 81 has to be properly construed otherwise the second part thereof will not only remain vague vis-a-vis the first part but would also make its placement highly cumbersome, if not meaningless; which could not be the intention of the Legislature. Accordingly; following the well-known principle of correction of inadvertent mistakes of Draftsman, this provision would have to be read in such a manner so as to give it the full intended meaning and effect. In view of what has been stated above, both the learned Judges in the two High Courts have in the two cases tried to remove the obvious confusion in section 81. But, with respect, it appears, the controversy could not be resolved by resort to any general assumptions-in one case of both parts re-acting on each other and the other the same remaining independent of each other.
27. It is in the foregoing background that an effort would be made to analyse, the two parts of section
81. And for their harmonious construction it would also be necessary to properly place each of them visa-vis the other. Instead of making the expression this section, that is section 81, as the touchstone for the avoidance of compensation under various laws mentioned in the first part of section 81, the Legislature preferred the phrase this Ordinance. It was with a clear object. And the same is rejected in adding the second part in the section. Otherwise, there was no need for the same. When viewed independently this part would read as follows : "The enactments and laws aforesaid shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance ceases to have effect."
28. ' If this very part would have been a separate section it could have read as follows : "The enactments and laws referred to in the next following section, shall in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, cease to have effect.
29. ' The opening expression regarding laws could also be substituted by the particulars of the laws mentioned in the first part as would be presently demonstrated." - .
30. ' Instead of making it a separate section the Draftsman ineptly tried to combine both the subjects in one section with the detailed particulars of "the enactments and the laws". Nevertheless while making one obvious gain of brevity it suffered the loss namely that of imbalance and confusion.
31. The object of brevity could be achieved by avoiding the confusion also if the second part of section 81 would have been made into a separate subsection thereof by reversing the order; that is by making the second part as such section (1) and the first part (by reversing its order) as subsection
(2) thereof, of course, with the other formal changes mutatis mutandls. Thus, rearranged without violating the intent, section 81 could have read as follows : "(I) The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923), the Employers' Liability Act, 1938 (XXIV of 1938), the Mines Maternit Benefit Act, 1941 (XIX of 1941), the West Pakistan Maternity Benefi Ordinance, 1958 (West Pakistan Ordinance XXXII of 1958), or another law under which compensation and maternity benefit are payable in respect of any employment, or on after the appointed day in respect of. Such employment shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, ceases to have effect; and
(2) The compensation and maternity benefit payable under the aforesaid enactments and laws, in respect of any employee on or after the appointed day in respect of such employment, shall not be payable."
32. ' It is in this context that the addition in the heading and the conjunction "and" therein, of the section 81 of "etc" would become meaningful and also significant. Read in this manner, even if the second part (made as sub section (1) above) remains an independents part of section el as held in this Mst. Sahina's case, the relevant exercise in a particular case would being with the application of that part; wherein it would be seen whether any of the provisions of these laws is inconsistent with the Ordinance. And those which are not inconsistent would not cease to have effect. In other words they will continue to have full operation. Those provisions of the said laws which would thus continue to have full operation would not be deemed to have been repealed in any manner including indirect and would also continue to have effect. Accordingly in so far as the first part of section 81 is concerned it will be read with the second part. To hold otherwise would render one part as shown above, into redundancy. Looking at it more precisely the compensation and benefit, payable under any of the laws mentioned in the first part would be obtainable only if it is saved after going through the exercise relatable to the inconsis-tency referred in the second part.
33. ' In this light, as already observed, if full meaning and effect has to be given to both the parts, the conflict and inconsistency relevant in this behalf would be that of incompatibility as its referred in the case of Chittaranfan Cotton Mills Ltd. In other words if those benefits and compensation which are available under the said "enactments and laws", become incompatible with the benefits obtainable under the Social Security Ordinance then the former would not remain obtainable. For example if the benefit under the said laws is the same, including its nature, as is obtainable, under the Ordinance so as to make both of them synonymous then in the general context of law of compensation they 'would become incompatible thus in consistent. Because in that case the "same" entity being the subject-matter of two laws one on account of the interaction of both the parts of section 81, would give way to the other. If, however, they are not same in the sense of being synonymous and thus not inconsistent to obtain, then both the benefits would remain obtainable in so far as section 81 is concerned. Mere fact that there would be duplication of different benefits for same injury/loss or for that matter addition or in that seance only, overlapping, will not make any difference. Such addition would not be prohibited on any general principle.
34. ' Although as noted earlier the learned counsel did not refer to the relevant provisions of the comparable laws in England and in India, their prima facie examination (detailed examination is being avoided for obvious reason of lack of proper assistance) has , not revealed any serious difference from the foregoing approach.
35. ' In England, no doubt, Workmen's Compensation Act, 1946 was repealed by section 89 read with Schedule 9 of National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946; which itself was repealed by the Statutes Law Revision and Consequential Repeal Act, 1965. The said law was however re-enacted and replaced by National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1965. Later on another law namely Industrial Injuries and Diseases (Old Cases) Act, 1967 was enacted. These and other laws are available in Halsbury's Statutes of England, Third Edition (Vol. 23)., From foot-notes under the last mentioned Statutes an impression can be gathered that by operation of the repealing/ saving provisions, some aspects of the Workmen's Compensation Acts were kept in operation.
36. ' Apart of the general note under the subject, "Continuation and Supplementation of Workmen's Compensation" reads as follows "The provisions of this Act, other than the present section (section 1 relating to Continuation of Workmen's Compensation in certain cases), are largely concerned with the 'supplementation of workmen's compensation by additional allowances, and with the payment of allowances or other benefits in respect of industrial diseases, in cases where workmen's compensation continues to be payable. See also the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1965, S. 81, p. 561, ante, concerning the extension of unemployability supplement and attendance allowance to past cases."
37. ' Earlier in the same foot-note the provisos subject to which the Workmen's Compensation Law stood repealed by virtue of section 89 of the Act of 1946 were reproduced with the comment and the case law in support thereof as follows : "It was further provided, by S: 89 (4) (Repealed) of the Act of 1946, that the repeal by that section of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, S. 50 (2), (3), should not affect the application of the Acts repealed by that Act or by the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 to cases to which by virtue of those subsections respectively they were to continue to apply;' and the effect of this provision is also now preserved by the present section (section 1 of the Act of 1967). See also, in particular, S. 15
(7) (b), (c), post, which replaces provisions contained in S. 89 (3) of the Act of 1946; and for decisions in which proviso (a), set out above, has been considered, see Harris v. Rotol, Ltd (1950) 2 K B 573; (1950) 1 All E R 867 (C A) (doubted in Mobberley & Perry Ltd. v. Holloway, infra); Hales v. Botton Leathers Ltd. (195.1) A C 531; (1951) 1 All E R 643 (H L) and Mufobberley and Perry Ltd. v. Holloway (1952) A C 133 ; (1951) 2 All E R 627 (H L)"
38. ' Thus, without a detailed examination of the above prima facie statement regarding law in England the question raised in this appeal could not be resolved with reference only to the developments in English law as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent Because no assistance was rendered on this aspect, we do not feel compelled to examine the same as it might prejudice some other case.
39. ' It may also be observed that the above statement of law in England indicates that in recent times several legislative measures were adopted in the field of social justice. Even if it be assumed that the compensation under the Repealed Workmen's Compensation Laws is available in England in lesser number of cases than it used to be, it cannot be said that the individuals concerned would not be getting multiple benefits under different laws enacted in the said field.
40. ' The laws enacted in India on this subject have not been placed before. Us. The provisions of Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 as amended, are of no help in interpreting the relevant law in Pakistan. Section 53 of the Indian Act as originally enacted provided that an insured person or his dependent, shall not be entitled to obtain any compensation or damages under the Workmen's Compensation /Act, 1923 or any other law in respect of employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee, under the 1948 Act. This was substituted in 1966 by a more elaborate provision. In the substituted section 53 sub-clause (5) reads as follows :- " save as modified by this Act, the obligations and liabilities imposed on an employer by the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, shall continue to apply to him."
41. Section 61 of the 1948 Act provided that when a person is entitled to any of the benefits provided by that Act he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other enactment. It appears that no consequential amendment was made in section 61, in 1966 after the substitution of the original section 53, in that year. There have been cases in India under section 53 but none has been cited at bar before us by the learned counsel. We accordingly would refrain from making any further comment ; because without assistance in this behalf it would not be proper to do so.
42. It is necessary at this stage to refer to section .73 of West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents. It provides that when a person is entitled to any of the benefits provided by this Ordinane, he shall not be entitled to any `similar benefits' under any other law. It cannot be denied that the scoop of this provision cannot be extended beyond what is provided by the specific provision under the heading "Supersession of. Certain Laws etc" made in section 81 which has been analysed and interpreted with referent to the case-law in Pakistan in the earlier part of this judgment. Morover, section 81 being a later provision would obviously control section 73" in case there is any conflict regarding the scope of both the provisions. But on proper scrutiny none would be discovered because the expression "similar benefit" used in section 73 would be read with, rather subject to, the two expressions : "compensation and maternity benefit" and "in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance" used in section 81. There is no need to repeat here what has been stated earlier when discussing the scope of section 81. Thus, section 73 would have to be read with and subject to section 81 as interpreted above and not independent of if. In the light of the foregoing discussion regarding language used, the reparability and interaction of the two parts of section 31 and their placement (as done in the earlier, reproduction) its provisions become tangible besides being operative in each and every part thereof. Thus, applied the exercise made in the Karachi case of Mst. Lal Jan regarding inconsistencies in the sense of incompatibility, would have to be made in every case of the present type. After doing the same it would be resolved whether or not the benefit and/or compensation available under any of the laws mentioned in the first part of section 81, would not be obtainable in addition to the benefits under the Social Security Ordinance. In this case proper comparison was Made by the special forums constituted in this behalf, on the lines as was done in the Karachi case of Mst. Lal Jan. The compensation available under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the appellant was not found inconsistent/incompatible with the relevant benefits under the Social' Security Ordinance. Accordingly both the benefits under both the laws could be obtained by the appellant. That being so this appeal merits acceptance.
43. Before parting with this judgment, it is necessary to observe that if the controversy would not have admitted the afore-discussed solution; the following well-known rule of interpretation would have been applied with the same conclusion :-when co-ordinate sections are inconsistent with each other and attempt to conciliate them fails, then generally the latter is to override the earlier. In other words applied to the present controversy, the provision regarding implied repeal, will control and override the earlier part regarding non-payment of compensation and the same will operate only subject to the said provision.
44. ' It is also necessary to point out that the foregoing interpretation of section 81 is not affected by section 81 (2) of Employment in Service Act XXII of 1962 relied upon from the respondents' side as according to the learned counsel himself the latter 'is not reflected in the Social Security Ordinance, 1965, which was passed much later. Similarly section 73 of the Ordinance does not make difference because as already analysed, this provision requires the forum concerned to compare the benefits under other laws with the benefits under the Ordinance, 1965. And unless they are incompatible, those under the Ordinance would not displace the benefits under the other laws, in other words,.
45. They are such benefits that they would not be incompatible and thus inconsistent, in the context of section 81, with the benefits under the Ordinance. In his case proper scrutiny has been made by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, a special Tribunal created to deal with such matters. He had scrutinised and reached the conclusion that the benefit (compensation) in question is not inconsistent (in the sense of incompatibility) with the relevant provisions of the Ordinance. This finding was affirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The High Court in the impugned judgment did not disturb it-rather it decided the case on general questions regarding interpretation of section 81 which, with respect, we have not been able to uphold. Accordingly this appeal is allowed.
46. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside with the result that the appellate order of the Punjab Appellate Tribunal dated 14-6-1975 is restored, There shall be no order as to costs. P L d 1374 Kar. 140 P D 1971 SC 197 (1878) 3 A C 944 1975 PLC 497 1975 PLC 780 1975 PLC 827 1975 PLC 615 PLD 1975 Lab. 363 PLD 1975 Lally 367 1979 PLC 166 1979 PLC 467 1979 PLC 477 1980 PLC 608 1982 PLC 813 1980 SCM R 4851 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15