' This is first rent appeal from the judgment of learned XI Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi in Rent Case No, 2182 of 1981 dated 2nd April, 1982, whereby the learned Rent Controller had dismissed the ejectment application filed by the appellant under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance). The rented premises is a shop situated in Premises No, 3/10, 'C' Area, Liaquatabad, Karachi. A portion of the premises on the above plot is residential in which the appellant is living and using for residential purpose, whereas the rented premises is a shop which was let out to respondent Abul Fazal Kausar @ Rs, 45 per month. The appellant claims to be a privileged person under section 14 of the said Ordinance on the ground that she became widow in the year 1974, that she is also retired Government Servant and that she has also attained the age of 60 years. The other grounds urged, in support of ejectment application namely, default in payment of rent and subletting, have not been pressed in this appeal, nor were pressed before the learned Rent Controller.
2. In support of her case the appellant examined herself in which she stated that she is residing in one portion of the building, whereas the rented premises which is a shop, is required by her for her own use and for the use of her children. In rebuttal there is evidence of the respondent in which he states that the appellant is already in possession of the residential portion of the building, therefore, she is not entitled to get possession of the shop in question.
3. The learned Rent Controller, after considering the evidence of the parties, came to the conclusion that as the appellant was already in possession of a portion of the building, therefore, her case fell within the mischief of subsection (2) of section 14 of the said Ordinance and as such she was not entitled to the possession of the rented premises. In view of this finding, he dismissed the application of the appellant.
4. In support of the appeal Mr. Izhar Haider Rizvi learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the portion of the building in possession of the appellant is residential one, whereas the portion of the building, of which possession is sought, is a shop. The two buildings being of different nature, the claim of the appellant for possession of the shop cannot be defeated on the ground that she is in possession of another building in the locality in terms of subsection (2) of section 14 of the said Ordinance. In support of this argument he has relied on the case of Abdul Majid v. Naimunnisa Begum (1). In the above case it has been held that subsection (2) of section 14 cannot be read in isolation from subsection (1) of section 14. In this case the landlady who was over 60 years of age sought vacant possession of non-residential premises in occupation of her tenant, under section 14(1) of the said Ordinance for her personal use. It was contended that since the landlady was in possession of residential premises hence she was not entitled to possession of the non-residential premises. The contention was repelled by the Supreme Court with the following observations :- "To our mind subsection (2) of section 14 cannot be read in isolation from subsection 0 for there has to be a nexus between the personal use for which the eviction is sought, and the premises said to be owned and possessed by the landlord in any locality referred to in subsection (2). The wide meaning sought to be put by the learned counsel
(1) P D 1981 SC 118 ' to subsection (2) would negate the very intent of the Legislature which is to give the benefit to certain class of persons to obtain summary eviction for personal use only if the other building owned by the landlord was in fact not put to such use or capable of being put to such use for which purpose eviction is sought, the existence of such other building would be irrelevant for the purpose of subsection (1) of section 14. To give an illustration, a landlord may be owner occupant of a godown premises in any locality which premises cannot reasonably be used as residential premises, but if the meaning sought to be given by the learned counsel is accepted, the result will be that such landlord cannot evict a tenant from a residential premises though the same may be required for the personal use of the landlord. The contention, therefore, is without force."
In view of the above law, the residential portion in possession of the appellant shall be irrelevant for the purpose of subsection (1) of section 14 because the purpose for which the portion in possession is being used is different from th purpose for which the possession of rented premises is sought.
' In view of the above legal position, the order of the learned Rent Controller cannot be upheld. It is not denied that the appellant is a privileged person under section 14 of the said Ordinance namely, she has all the three A characters mentioned in the above section. Site is a widow. She is a retired Government Servant. She has also attained the age of 60 years. She is, therefore, entitled to possession of the shop under section 14(1 I irrespective of the fact that she is in possession of a residential portion of the same building. Consequently the appeal is allowed and the respondent is directed to vacate the shop in question and hand over its possession to the appellant within four months.