1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN. J.-The petitioner was triad along with one, Haralal, for being in possession of Joshi rice (a ration commodity) in excess of tic quantity permitted to be held under a ration card in violation of NotificationNo. 10754 F. D., dated the 24th November 1956, which is an offence punishable under section 6 of the East Pakistan Food (Special Courts) Act, 1956 (X of t 956). The trial was held by a Special Magistrate under the said Act. He convicted him and sentenced him to 20 months' rigorous imprisonment.
2. Since no appeal lay from this order of the Special Magistrate, he invoked the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, but the High Court refused to interfere, as, in its view, this was not a case of no evidence. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal.
3. Learned counsel appearing on his behalf has sought to contend that a violation of the notified order mentioned in the charge could not be punished under section 6 of Act X of 1956, but it appears that this argument has been made under a misconception. The notified order was made in exercise of the powers given by the East Bengal Foodstuffs Price Control Order, 1953, which itself was made in exercise of powers given by the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. This was repealed firstly by the Essential Supplies (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1955, but all orders, notifica--tion etc. Issued under the Act of 1946 were preserved. The said Ordinance of 1955 lapsed and was replaced after the coming into force of the Constitution of 1956 -by East Pakistan (Essential Supplies) Ordinance, 1956, but section 6 of this Ordinance saved any order made or deemed to have been made under in the Essential Supplies (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1955. Then came the East Pakistan (Control of Essential Commodities)
4. Ordinance, 1956 (X of 1956) which repealed the East Pakistan (Essential Supplies) Ordinance, 1956, but again saved any order made or deemed to have been made under the said Ordinance. The latter Ordinance was replaced by an Act, called the East Pakistan (Control of Essential Commodities) Act (I of 1956). This repealed the Ordinance No. X of 1956 but again by section 16(2) saved all orders made or deemed to have been made under the repealed Ordinance 1956. The position, therefore, was that the East Bengal Foodstuffs Price Control and Anti-Hoarding Order, 1953, under which the Notification of the 24th of November 1956, was issued, continuedto remain in operation and, therefore, under the provisions of section 3 of the East Pakistan Food (Special Courts) Act. 1956, a contravention of any notified order in respect of foodstuffs made or deemed to have been made under the East Pakistan Control of Essential Commodities Act, 1956, was triable by a Special Magistrate under Act X of 1956. The trial was, therefore, competently held.
5. Learned counsel next contended on merits that this was a case of no evidence, as there was no evidence that the petitioner was in possession of the commodity. The evidence in this case is that when Haralal, the co-accused, was questioned, he led the police to a godown which is a part of the dispensary of the petitioner separated only by a fencing in between. The key of this godown was in the possession of the petitioner. He supplied the key of the godown from which the Joshi rise was seized. The godown was, therefore, prima facie in his possession and everything that was within that godown was also in his possession.
6. The explanation he offered was that he had let out the godown to Haralal and several other persons and he had nothing to do with the rice business but there was nothing to support such letting out, apart from the oral statement of one oar two of the witnesses-to the effect that they used the godown on hire for sometime. Ainal Mathar P. W. 2 and another witness, called Nabuat Hussain (P. W. 4) made these statements in cross-examination, but the trial Court treated their statements as obliging statements on which no reliance could be placed. It is clear, therefore, that there was some evidence and the evidence had been considered by the Special Magistrate. The High Court was, therefore, right in taking the view that this was not a case of no evidence which could be interfered with under Article 98 of the late Constitution. No exception can, therefore, be taken to the reason given by the High Court for not interfering with the conviction of the petitioner.
7. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed.