' ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J.-The petitioner filed his nomination papers as a candidate to contest the election of Town Committee Nushki from Wards Nos. 7 and 3. The nomination papers of the petitioner were rejected by the Returning Officer, by his order, dated 25th July, 1983 on the ground that he had been Naib-Sardar of defunct-P. P. P. In 1976. The appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of Returning Officer was rejected by the Appellate Authority on 7th August, 1983. It is the contention of the petitioner, which is not disputed by the respondents, that he is a sitting member of Town Committee Nushki and was eligible to contest election. Disqualification of a candidate has been mentioned in section 21 of the Baluchistan Local Government Ordinance, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as Ordinance). Under section 22 of the Ordinance a person shall be disqualified to be a candidate or member of local council if he is at any time on or after 20th December, 1971 was an office-bearer or a member of the executive Committee of any existing or defunct political party, at local Divisional, Provincial or National level. Subsequently the following provisos have been added : -
(1) Provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to a person who is a member of the Federal or Provincial Cabinet or of Federal or Provincial Council or of any Council/Committees.
(2) Provided further that notwithstanding anything contained in clause (f) of section 22, the Government may on its own motion or on a representation made to it, allow any person by an order in writing to be a candidate or a member."
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that in view of the proviso (1) of section 22, the petitioner was entitled to contest election as he is a sitting member of the Town Committee Nushki.
Mr. Basharatullah the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 and 8, has however, stated that the proviso is not applicable to the case of the petitioner, as the proviso does not apply to the members of Local Council i. e. Union, Town Committee or Municipal Committee. According to learned counsel, if the interpretation as propounded by the learned counsel for the petitioner be accepted then the position would be that a sitting member of Municipal Corporation would be disqualified to be a candidate and thus there would be contradiction in the law itself. According to learned counsel, under this proviso only members of Divisional Co-ordination Committee, Islamic Idiology Council and such other statutory bodies are entitled to contest the election. This is a farfetched argument. As we will discuss later the argument made by the learned counsel for the respondents runs contrary to the provision of the Ordinance.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents, has stated that the words stated in the proviso are to be read ejusdem generis. He has referred to Ali Muhummad v. Mirza Muhammad Hussain Beg (1).
The doctrine of ejusdem generis has been explained in para. 9 of the judgment as under :- "The doctrine of ejusdem generis is stated with clarity by Sutherland in sections 4909 and 4910 of his classical work on statutory Construction (Volume 2), to be "a variation of the doctrine of nociture a sociis. Where general words follow specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those subjects enumerated by the preceding specific words. The doctrine applies when the following conditions exists :
(1) the State contains an enumeration by specific words ;
(2) the members of the enumeration constitute a class ;
(3) the clause is not exhausted by the enumeration ;
(4) a general terms follows the enumeration and
(5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires."
He has also referred to Muhammad Ashraf and 2 others (2) which has made reliance on the above-noted Lahore case. The principle underlying this doctrine would attract where specific words are followed by general words. The words council/committee mentioned in the proviso are to be construed in the spirit of the Ordinance. The words council/ committee have no nexus with the Federal or Provincial cabinets or A Federal o Provincial Councils. The Cabinet is distinct from the Federa or Provincial Council. Additionally in this Province there is no Provincial cabinet. The learned counsel has referred to Divisional Co-ordination Committee, which means, a committee constituted under this Ordinance (section 2(11)). The conditions which are necessary for the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis has referred in PLD 1968 Lah. 712 and in the light of such principle it is clear that the reasonable interpret-D-tion is the council or committee means local council under the Ordinance as the status has contained enumeration by specific words.
4. The Ordinance has been made to provide for the constitution of local Government institutions in the Province. The interpretation clause defines "District Council" means District council constituted under this Ordinance (section 3(10)) ; "Local Area" means area under the jurisdiction of a Local Council (section 3(21)) ; "Local Council" means a Local Council constituted under this Ordinance (section 3(22)) ; "Municipality" means an area declared to be a Municipality under this Ordinance (section 3(31)); "Municipal Corporation" means a Municipal Corporation constituted for a City under this Ordinance. (Section 3(33)) ; "Union" means Union declared under this Ordinance (section 3(66)) "Union Council" means a Union Council constituted under this Ordinance (section 3(67)).
5. Chapter-II deals with Local Areas. Under section 7(1) the Local Area shall be a Union, Tehsil, District Town, Municipality, and a City. Under section 7(2) Government may declare any area :- (a)
A town.
(1) PLD 1968 Lah. 712 (2) PLD 1982 Lab. 520
(b) A Municipality. (c) A City. (d) A Union. (e) A Tehsil. Under section 8, the Government by notification declare any area not including in a town, city, Municipality or cantonment to be a Union. (ii) not included within the Municipality, cantonment or City to. Be Tehsil, and specify the names of Unions comprised therein ; (iii) not included within a Cantonment and which has developed Urban characteristics, to be a Town or Municipality ; (iv) to be a City for constituting a Corporation. Certain characteristics of local areas have been mentioned in section 9. Under section 10 the following local councils may be constituted :-
(a) A Union Council for each Union ;
(b) A Tebsil Council for each Tehsil ;
(c) A Town Committee for each Town ;
(d) A District Council for each District.
(e) A Municipal Committee for each Municipality ; ( f ) A Municipal Corporation for each city. Under section 12 composition of Local Councils have been mentioned. The reading of the provisions mentioned above would clearly indicate that Municipal Corporation is also a Local Council and, therefore, the proviso (1) of section 22 shall apply to a person who is a member of Municipal Corporation.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents has stated that the principle for interpretation of a status is that when the words are plain then there is nothing to be interpreted. He has referred to Goalundo Ice Association Ltd. v. Commissioner of the Rajabari Municipality (1). There is no dispute with this contention. This argument of the learned counsel contradicts his first contention that words council/committee are to be ejusdem generis. The learned counsel has further stated that on the plain interpretation of the proviso we are withholding the benefit of the proviso to the members of Municipal Corporation.
Although the Municipal Corporation has not been specifically mentioned in the proviso but by careful analysis of the various provisions, there is no doubt in our mind that the proviso also applies to the members D of the Municipal Corporation being one of the local councils. We do not see any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner was disqualified to contest the elections and thus there is no reason to differ with our view taken in previous petitions that a sitting member of a local council is not disqualified to contest election, even if there were office-bearers or members of executive committee of any of the defunct political parties.
7. The learned Advocate-General also does not agree with the construction made by the learned counsel for the respondent in this behalf. He submitted that sitting member is not disqualified to contest election.
8. Another preliminary objection was taken by the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 4 and 8 that there were two separate causes of action but the petitioner has filed only one petition. He should have filed two separate constitutional petitions. We do not agree to this contention raised by the learned counsel. Under Order I, rule 3, C. P. C. All 9 persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in
(1) PLD 1952 Dacca 12 ' respect of the same act or transaction is alleged to exist. This implies that though the acts or transactions may be different but they are so connected as to describe one entity which would constitute a cause of action against all the defendants jointly. The general principle regarding the joinder of defendants is that there must be a cause of action in which all the defendants are more or less interested and the relief claimed against all the defendants is the same. So also Order H, rue 3 deals with joinder of action. The principle underlying this rule is to avoid multiple litigation where it could be done without injustice to anyone. The condition precedent for applying this rule is that there must be joint interest. In the present case the private respondents have filed nomination papers against the petitioner from different words. The petitioner and these respondents were candidates for the election of Town Committee Nushki. The petitioner has claimed the same relief against the private respondents. The common question of fact and law is involved in this matter.
The petitioner has a joint interest against all the respondents. Though two separate orders have been passed in this case but them orders are the same and there effect is also the same. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the petition is not bad for joinder o defendants or joinder of causes of action.
9. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petition suffers from laches. The nomination papers were rejected on 25th July, 1983 his appeal was dismissed on 7th August, 1983 the elections were held on 7th September, 1983 and the present petition has been filed on 4th October, 1983. The petitioner on the other hand has stated that after the rejection of his appeal he submitted a representation to the Government as provided under proviso 2 of section 22 of the Ordinance. That representation has not been disposed of. This contention of the petitioner has not been disputed. The learned counsel for the respondents has stated that the representation was not competent as it applies to a case where an order has been made under section 22(f) of the Ordinance. The petitioner has claimed the seat on the basis of his being a sitting member, therefore, no representation could be filed under second proviso of section 22. There is no force in this contention. The petitioner in his petition has stated that he has no concern with any political party. His nomination papers were rejected on the ground that he was an office-bearer of a defunct political party, therefore, his representation was competent. The returning officer or the appellate authority did not consider the fact that the appellant was a member of the Town Committee. Until the presentation of the petition, the represent tion of the petitioner was not disposed. Of by the Government. It cannot be, therefore, urged that the petition was barred on account of laches. Additionally mere delay in prosecuting the case is not a sufficient ground for dismissing the petition. If a petitioner has come to Court within a; reasonable time ; is vigilant of his right : prosecuting it due diligently ; and has not accepted the adverse orders passed against him ; and has taken such steps which are necessary conditions for filing petition in the court; then his petition cannot be dismissed on this technical ground. In S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee Lahore (1) he following observation has been made :- "Additionally to allow the writ after much gross laches would be to (1) 1978 SC M R 367 throw on the tax-payer the consequences of the petitioner's gross negligence in perusing his remedies but as the petitioner relied upon the judgment in his favour by the Letters Patent Bench, I would recall here that the Letters Patent Bench had relied on this Court's judgment in Abdul Qadir's case, but the delay in filing the writ petition in this case was three years, and there can be no comparison between a delay of three years and delay of twelve years. I may, however, point out that this Court had condoned a delay of about eight years in Pakistan v. Sheikh Abdul Hamid. But this was an extreme case. In any event, the law has to draw a line somewhere between delay which can be condoned and delay which cannot be condoned, and as the delay in the instant case was too gross to be condoned, the writ petition of the petitioner had to be dismissed on this ground irrespective of the question whether the impugned order was void or voidable."
In the present case the delay is not too gross. In Mohsan Khan and another v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and others (1) it has been observed as under :- "It is true that mere delay is not by itself a sufficient ground for non-suiting a party in a proceeding of this nature that where the delay is accompanied by such circumstances as indicate a clear negligence on the part of the applicant to persue his remedy with due diligence or conscious acquiescence in the adverse order made against him, then that would be a very good ground for denying this extraordinary remedy. The law assist those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them."
' In the State v. Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore and another (2) it has been held as under :- "Laches has often been defined as such negligence or omission to assert a right, as, taken in conjunction with the great lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to an adverse party. If a person seeking a remedy has not committed such a delay as would cause prejudice to the other side or would amount to waiver or acquiescence on the part of the person seeking the remedy, techncial plea of lathes, by itself, would not be sufficient to bar the remedy."
' In Sahlbxadi Nasima Begum v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (3) it has been held that the accepted principles for applying the bar of aches are (i) Acquiescene of the plaintiff's part,
(ii) Any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. In Athar Rehman v.
Muhammad Latif Tahir etc. (4) it has been observed that in proceedings in nature of quo warranty, delay by itself has never been considered sufficient for purpose of defeating a petition. The appeal of the present petitioner was dismissed on 7th August, 1983 his representation is still pending and he filed the present petition on 4th October, 1983 thus the ladies is not too gross, on which the petition could be thrown out. However, the petition cannot be accepted as the petitioner has concealed material facts. His conduct is such which disentitles him to get the relief. The petitioner filed 5 nomination papers to contest the election 1969SCMR 306 (2) 1979 P Cr. L J 1039
(3) 1982 SCMR 913 (4) PLD 1981 Lah. 48 ' from 5 wards of the Town Committee Nushki 1. e. 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9. His paper were rejected from all these wards. He has challenged the rejection of his nomination forms from Wards Nos. 3 and 7 only, and has accepted the findings of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the same point in respect of three other wards (1, 8 and 9). It is, therefore, clear that those order have become final. They have not been challenged by the petitioner. He has accepted the orders of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of these wards. As such the disqualification on the same ground has become conclusive.
Now he wants to seek relief in respect of two other wards which is against equity and fair play.
10. The other ground prevailing against the petitioner is that he has not disclosed in his petition that he filed nomination papers from wards and his papers had been rejected from Wards Nos. 1, 8 and
9. In pars. 2 of the petition he has stated that he was a candidate from Ward Nos. 7 and 3 but he failed to mention that he had filed his nomination papers from three other wards also. The petitioner has not stated as to why he has not challenged the decision made against him in other wards ? And why he has confined himself to two wards only ?
11. The third ground, on which the petitioner is not entitled to the discretionary relief is that though the petitioner has challenged his disqualification from two wards, but at the time of hearing he dropped the relief against respondent No, 4 who was elected from Ward No,
7. Thus, so far respondents 4 to 7 are concerned, they have been dropped in this petition. He has stated that he would contest the election from Ward No, 3, from where the elected member, respondent No, 8 has been elected Chairman of the Town Committee Nushki. The respondents have stated that this has been done with mala fide intention as Wail Muhammad a contesting candidate from Ward No, 3 has been elected from Ward No, 9, this petition has been filed at the instance of said Wali Muhammad. Wali Muhammad has contested the election of the office of the Chairman, and has been defeated by the respondent No,
8. In support of this assertion it is stated that Wali Muhammad was a contesting candidate from Ward No, 3 but he was not impleaded as a party though other contesting candidates from this ward had been made respondents in the present petition. The petitioner had filed nomination papers from Ward No, 9 also. His papers were rejected, and Wali Muhammad has been elected from this ward. The petitioner did not want to disturb the election of Wall Muhammad and he has chosen to contest election against respondent No, 8 who has since been elected Chairman of the Town Committee. These facts have not been challenged by the petitioner. No counter-affidavit has been filed. The overall position is that the legal infirmity against the petitioner in four wards ha reached the finality, From the facts of the case it is clear that the petitioner has not approached the Court with clean breast. The petitioner has not been filed with good intentions. Out of the five wards he picked up only one ward to test his fortune. Another development has occurred after the election. Members of Town Committee have elected member against five special seats. These persons have cast their votes in t election to choose Chairman.
The persons who have been elected against five special seats have not been impleaded as respondents in, the present petition. In case the petition is accepted a pandora's box would opened, Another round of litigation would be started. The election of 5 members elected against 5 special seats might be challenged, as this respondent was a member of electoral college who- had_ elected those members. The respondent No, 8 has been elected Chairman. His election as Chairman has not been challenged as required under Baluchistan Local Councils (Election of Chairman) Rules, 1979. If frees election are ordered in this Ward. The Office of Chairman shall become vacant and this office has to be filed within fifteen days unless the time is extended by the Government as provided in section 28 of the Ordinance. The respondent No, 8 was duly qualified to contest the election against the validly nominated persons and was declared successful. He has been elected as Chairman of the Town Committee. In such circumstances if we set aside the election of the respondent No, 8 it would be unnecessary hardship for him. He was not disqualified to contest election. It is not stated that any election petition has been filed against him. He was no responsible for rejection of the nomination papers of the petitioner. Various steps have been taken after the election which have to be retracted.
' In view of the facts and circumstances of the case stated above the petitioner is not entitled to discretionary relief. The petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
ABDUL QADEEK CHAUDHARY, J.-I agree.