1. ' The controversy in this case relates to a godown property situated at Karachi which was admittedly transferred to respondent on 4-11-1960 by the Settlement Authority. According to the respondent in an action for eviction againt M/s. Dhinghra and Sons which was dismissed by the Rent Controller in respect of the property, it was revealed that since March, 1952 one Shaikh Shaukat Ali was in possession of the godown in dispute. Accordingly the respondent served notice, dated 15-1-1969 on the said Shaukat Ali who by his reply informed her that he had vacated the premises in December, 1958. Thereafter, the respondent is said to have learnt that the godown was in possession of the present appellant. Accordingly notice dated 21-2-1969 was served on the appellant but no response was made to it.
2. ' Thereupon, the respondent filed Suit No, 851/70 against the appellant which is a partnership concern and some of its partners. The appellant filed written statement alleging that it was in possession of the disputed go down since 1958 and since prior to the transfer in favour of the appellant. On this basis the appellant claimed rights as statutory tenant under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and also challenged the maintainability of the suit. After the from of the issues, however, the appellant remained absent and the suit was disposed of on the evidence produced by the respondent. However, the learned Civil Judge dismissed the suit of the respondent reaching the finding from the evidence of the respondent that the appellant was a statutory tenant in the go down in dispute. In appeal however the learned Vth Additional District Judge did not agree with the finding of the Civil Judge and held that on the unrebutted evidence produced by the respondent the appellant had failed to establish its possession of the suit property prior to 1963, and therefore did not enjoy the rights or the protection provided by section 30 of the Displaced Persons Act. The appellant then filed the present appeal which was admitted by a learned Single Judge of this Court by his order, dated 27-1-1979.
3. Alongwith the appeal the present Application No, 165/79 for stay of execution of the decree was also submitted on which by aforesaid order status quo was directed to be maintained. The respondent thereafter has submitted Application No, 1048)80 for vacating the ad interim order passed by this Court.
4. ' It has been contended before me on behalf of the respondent that the ground on which this second appeal has been admitted is not sustainable by record and, therefore the appellant is not entitled to an order of stay of execution. In this behalf it is pointed out that it was contended before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the appellant that it was respondent's own case in paragraph 5 of the plaint that the appellants were in possession of the premises since the year 1958 and, therefore, the finding of the 1st Appellate Court that they were not in possession up to 1963 was against the record. In this connection reference has made to the averments made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the plaint (page 51 of the record) which may be reproduced as under :- "4. That the said Shaukat Ali Shaikh was served with a legal notice, dated 15-1-1969, in reply whereof he informed the plaintiff that he had vacated the premises in December, 1958, and could not say who was actually occupying the same at that time.
5. It then transpired that the defendant No, 1 was in actual and physical possession of the godown premises in question. A legal notice, dated 21-2-1969 was, therefore, served on defendant No, 1, which was received by it on 24th February, 1969 whereby it was called upon to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the said godown premises to the plaintiff. The defendant No, 1, neither vacated the premises nor gave any reply to the said notice."
5. ' Counsel urged that the plain reading of the contents of these paragraphs clearly shows that no admission was made to the effect as contended before the learned Single Judge at the time of admission of this appeal. Additionally it is submitted that there is no evidence whatsoever on record, as none was produced by the appellant before the trial Court, that the appellant was in possession and occupation of the disputed property prior to 21-12-1958, so that he could claim statutory under section. D. P. Act. Appellant shall suffer not only substantial loss but his business will also suffer if the godown is taken away from his possession. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is prepared to furnish security as ordered . By this Court. Fie relied upon AIR 1922 Lah. 185 and AIR 1923 Pat.
597. He further submits that the reading of the paragraphs 4 and 5 of the plaint does show that the respondent admitted that the appellant was in possession of the property since December, 1958. In this connection he also referred to the order of the Settlement Commissioner, Karachi in suo motu .Revision dated 13-7-1967 (Exh. 11) in which upon site inspection the learned ,Settlement Commissioner had found nobody in possession of the disputed property but according to the counsel the appellant was not a party to these proceedings. For the present purpose counsel does not dispute the proposition that in order to claim statutory tenancy it was necessary for the appellant to show that he was in possession and occupation of the property since before 20-12- 1958.
6. After considering the contentions of the learned co unseal I found that prima facie there is no express admission in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the plain relied upon to effect that the appellant was in possession of the premises from the crucial date. It is however clear upon reading the plaint as whole that the case of the respondent was that the appellant is a trespassed and no legal right to occupy or remain in possession of the property. It is well-established principle of law that a document has to be read as who and this rule therefore would apply to the pleadings of parties in a civil suit. No plea contained in a plaint can be read out of context. If paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the plaint are read together, it is quite clean prima facie that the case of the respondent was not of admission that the appellant was statutory tenant. I also find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the words "it then transpired that the defendant No, 1 was in actual and physical possession of the godown premises in question" refer to the point of time after 15-1- 1960 mentioned in para. 4 the of the plaint and apparently have no reference to 20-12-1958. It will be appreciated that no rebuttal evidence was produced by the appellant in the trial Court. The unrequited evidence of the respondent was that the appellant had come into occupation of the premises after 1968. I am sure that if this aspect was pointed out to the learned Judge, he would not have passed the ad interim order.
7. ' In the result I find no prima facie case for grant of stay of execution. I therefore, dismiss the Application (C. M. A. 165/79) and allow the application for vacating the Interim Order (C. M. A.
8. 1048/80).
9. ' It is further clarified that none of the parties will be affected on the merits of the case by any observation made in this order. Mr. Dastgir requested that since the stay has been vacated the main appeal may be ordered to be set down for hearing at an early date. His request is reasonable and is allowed.