' This writ petition, second on the subject, calls in question an order, dated 4th April, 1982 of respondent No, 1 (hereinafter called the Board) refusing to extend the period for exhibition of the film "Shera The Cheeta" on the ground that they did not have such powers under the new law, namely, the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979.
2. Earlier a similar order passed by the Board on 27th July, 1980 was challenged in Writ Petition No, 8622/80, which was disposed of by my brother Gul Muhammad Khan, J. On 1st December, 1980 declaring the same to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. He was pleased to further clarify that the Federal Government could act under section 11. It appears that the petitioners again approached the Board for granting extension in the matter but they remained adamant whereupon they moved before the same learned Judge Criminal Original No, 220W/81 for action in contempt. It was disposed of on 2nd February, 1982 on an undertaking by the respondents that the petitioners' application, dated 6th July, 1980 shall be placed before the Board for appropriate orders in accordance with law. The result, however, remained the same, namely, the Board expressing their inability for want of powers under the new law and hence this petition.
3. While Mr. Saif-ud-Din Chughtai, for the petitioner, stressed that the question as to whether the Board had or not the powers to grant extension stood settled by the orders of this Court, dated 1st December, 1980, the learned Deputy Attorney-General, on the other hand, contended that even if the plea was accepted, subsection (3) of section 5 of the Ordinance (ibid) still allowed discretion to the Board to grant such a certificate for such area and period as they may by notification in the official Gazette specify in this behalf. It reads as follows : "(3) Subject to the other provisions of this Ordinance a certificate granted under this section shall be valid for such area and period as the Board may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf,"
' According to him, there is no compulsion envisaged in this provision to bind the Board in all events to extend the period of a certificate and that in the case of this film when its period was already extended three times in the past, they could well-refuse its extension any more in the exercise of discretion vested in them by the said provision.
4. If the certificate granted under section 5 "shall be valid for such area and period as the Board may......Specify in this behalf", it essentially confers powers on them to determine the period in their own way and hence refusal to extend it could be attributed to the exercise of such a discretion, but this may not be understood to confer on them unbridled powers, because refusal of extension may in effect, be assimilated to de-certification which had to be regulated by "Principles of guidance" as laid down in section 6. Since the film in question shall be deemed by virtue of section 21 of the Ordinance to have been certified under section B thereof, it did not require any fresh certification as was thought by the Board in their reply. There is some misconception about it. Once its certification was held continuing under section 5, of course, its validity "for such area and period" had to be determined under subsection (3) thereof. The maximum period under rule 17 of the Censorship of Films Rules, 1980, was "not exceeding five years" and evidently it contemplated even broken periods within the said maximum ceiling. It, therefore, involved unavoidably its extensions by the Board from time to time being guided by the principles laid down in section 6. There was no idea in c refusing the extension for lack of power, though it was permissible for reasons enumerated in section 6. The opposite situation may also lead to this conclusion, for, if certification is held valid under section 3, by virtue of the deeming clause contained in section 21, to disallow exhibition of the film without recourse to guiding principles will render the very certification of the film nugatory.
Besides, there being no machinery provision other than section 6, it could not be assumed that the Board had wild powers to act capriciously.
5. On this view of the matter, the writ petition is accepted and the impugned order of the Board is declared null and void and of no legal effect. The petition also prays for action in contempt and rightly too. The respondents are called upon to show cause why they should not be punished as condemners. To be listed after a month preferably before my brother Gul Muhammad Khan, J., whose orders in the previous writ petition and Criminal Original were flouted by them.