DECISION ' the record and proceedings in the case of Muhammad Jamal v. Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah Textile Mills Ltd., under section 25-A, I. R.
0., pending in the learned Second Labour Court, has been called for, in the exercise of the suo motu powers of revision of this Tribunal to examine the legality, correctness and the propriety of an order passed by the learned Second Labour Court therein on 7th Aril, 1983 disallowing Syed Zamirul Hassan to appear in that case for Messrs Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah Textile Mills Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the company. The learned Labour Court, in its order in question, has held that although Syed Zamirul Hassan is not an Advocate and describes himself to be an Industrial Relations Advisor, since he has regularly been found to be conducting cases in and appearing before the Sind Labour Courts, including the Labour Appellate Tribunal, he is deemed to be practising the profession of law in contravention of the provisions of sections 22 and 58 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 and, accordingly, is not entitled to represent the employer in the proceedings before it as provided in section 49, I. R.
0. The said order was passed by the learned Labour Court on an application made by Muhammad Jamal, the petitioner in the application under section 25-A, I. R.
0.
2. I have beard Muhammad Jamal in person, as he was unrepresented and wanted to argue his case himself, and Syed Zamirul Hassan, who is affected by the Order of the learned Labour Court. I have also heard Advocates Mr. M. M. Jillani, Mr. Abdul Hafiz and Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, who requested to be heard as amicus curiae, in view of the importance of the matter and its profound effect upon persons appearing before the Labour Courts either for the employers or the workmen.
3. The main issue which falls to be considered in these proceedings is whether a person who is not enrolled as an Advocate under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, is entitled to appear in proceedings under the I. R. O., on behalf of the employer without obtaining prior permission of the Labour Court. It was submitted by Muhammad Jamal, who, as stated earlier is the petitioner in the application under section 25-A, I. R.
0., pending before the learned Labour Court, that the scheme of section 49, I. R.
0., is that Legal Practitioners are not entitled to appear for employers in proceedings under I. R. O.
Save with the permission of the Labour Court. He further argued that as the expression "Legal Practitioner" had not been defined in the I. R.
0., the definition of this term as contained in the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, has to be followed. The expression "Legal Practitioner" has been defined in section 2(e) of the said Act as follows :- "Legal Practitioner" means an Advocate or a Mukhtar or a Revenue Agent practising as such immediately before the commencement of this Act."
Muhammad Jamal also relied upon the provisions of subsection (1) of section 22 of the Act in support of his contention that except Advocates enrolled under the said Act, no other person is entitled to practice the profession of law. The said subsection reads as follows :- "(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no person shall be entitled to practice the profession of law unless he is an Advocate."
' Muhammad Jamal also relied upon section 58 of the above Act which provides for punishment of imprisonment extending to one year or fine or both on a person who practices the profession of law without being enrolled as an Advocate under the said Act. It was contended by Muhammad Jamal that not only section 49, I. R.
0., debars Syed Zamirul Hassan from practising the profession of law and appearing in Labour Courts without the permission of the Labour Court as provided in that section, but further he is guilty of an offence under section 58 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 by reason of his practising the profession of law in contravention of the provisions of the afore. Said Act.
4. Syed Zamirul Hassan traced the history of the provisions contained in section 49, L R.
0., and compared the said provisions with the provisions contained in section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, predecessor statutes of the I. R.
0. His object in doing so was to indicate the purpose of the Legislature in placing restrictions on the appearance of legal practitioners in proceedings before the Labour Courts and the extent of those restrictions. He further submitted that the application of section 49. I. R.
0. Is restricted to workmen who are parties to an industrial dispute. He relied upon the definition of industrial dispute as given in section 2 (xiii), I. R.
0., and the provisions of section 43 of the said Ordinance, in support of his contention that the proceedings before the learned Labour Court under section 25-A, I.R.O., are not cannot be deemed equated with an industrial dispute. Elaborating his arguments in this behalf, he submitted that although subsection (4) of section 25-A, I. R.
0., provides that a Labour Court is required to give a decision on an application under section 25-A, I. R.
0., as if it were in an industrial dispute, the individual grievances to be dealt with under section 25- A, I. R. 0 , cannot be equated with or deemed to be industrial disputes under the I. R.
0. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision of this Tribunal in the cases of Johnson and Johnson (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Zubair Ahmed (1) and Karachi Development Authority v. Abdul1 Rehman . Syed Zamirul Hassan also argued about the connotation of the term "entitled" and "legal practitioner" as used in section 49, I. R.
0. He submitted that the word "entitled" cannot be read to mean that a workman is not entitled to be represented in a manner or by a person other than that specified in section 49(1), I. R.
0., and in support of his contention he relied upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Karachi High Court in the case reported as Afzal Stores v. Sind Labour Court . Syed Zamirul Hassan finally submitted that the obligation to obtain permission from the Labour Court is only in those cases where a party desires to be represented in proceedings relating to an industrial dispute by a legal practitioner. He submitted that as he is not a legal practitioner for the purposes of the Legal Practitioners and the Bar Act, 1973, the requirement of obtaining permission from the Labour Court does not apply to him.
4. Mr. M. M. Jillani, Advocate, submitted that the spirit of the law is to keep the Advocates away as far as possible from proceedings under the I. P.
0. And other Labour Laws, as it was felt that ordinarily workmen would not be able to afford the fees payable to legal practitioners. Like Syed Zamirul Hassan he referred to the history of the Legislature on the subject, particularly section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. He, however, conceded that Syed Zamirul Hassan is not a legal practitioner either for the purposes of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, or section 49, I. R. 0 , and hence the bar contained in the latter section in respect of Legal Practitioners is not applicable to him. In regard to proceedings under section 25-A, I. R.
0. He contended that they are in the nature of an industrial dispute and in support of his argument he relied upon the provisions of subsection (4) of the said section.
5. Mr. Abdul Hafiz submitted that section 49, I. R. 0., regulates the rights of parties to be represented in proceedings before the Labour Courts and not the right of persons to practice before the Labourt Courts. He also relied upon the definition of "Legal Practitioner" as contained in section 2(e) of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, and contended that persons who are not enrolled as Advocates under the said Act are not legal practitioners either for the purposes of the said Act or section 49, I. R. 0. The learned counsel also argued that section 49, I. R.
0., is limited in its application to proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and its application cannot be extended to petitions under section 25-A, I. R. 0., which have to deal with individual grievances only. He posed the question whether an individual could be a party to an industrial dispute and in support of his contention that this was not possible he relied upon a Division Bench decision of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan reported as Jalal Din v. Orient Match Company . He supported the contention of Syed Zamirul Hassan that proceedings under section 25-A, I. R.
0. Are not and cannot be deemed to be industrial disputes for the purposes of the I. R.
0.
6. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani also referred to the history of the law regarding restrictions on the appearances of legal practitioners before Labour Courts and referred to the commentary in this behalf in the Law of Industrial Disputes, Third Edition, Volume I, by Malhotra. The learned counsel further cited a number of authorities interpreting the provisions of section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. He also relied upon the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported as Karachi Union of Employers and others v. Industrial Court, Karachi and Syed Muhammad Hussain v. Messers Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited . Dealing with the prohibition on the appearance of legal practitioners in Labour Courts and the Circular, dated 8th September, 1981 based on the aforesaid two judgments issued by this Tribunal, the learned counsel also relied upon the observations of a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan on the purposes of industrial law and the object of industrial2 3 4 5 6 justice in the case reported as Flour Mills Employees' Union v. Karachi Steam Roller Flour Mills Ltd. and contended that appearances before the Labour Courts are strictly speaking not practising the profession of law as the role of Industrial Advisors and Industrial Disputes Practitioners is wholly different from the role of Advocates and Legal Practitioners appearing in ordinary Courts. The learned counsel further contended that an application for permission to be represented by a legal practitioner and the circumstances necessitating the engaging of a legal practitioner can only be made and brought out by the parties desiring to engage a legal practitioner and not the legal practitioner himself and in support of his contention he relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of the Karachi High Court reported as Pakistan Nation Federation of Trade Unions v.
Chairman, Sind Labour Court No, 1 . Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani finally referred to the definitions of "law" and "profession" as contained in Ballentine's Law Dictionary for the purposes of showing that appearance before Labour Courts is strictly speaking not following the profession of law
7. Since the whole controversy centres upon the interpretation to be placed on the provisions of section 49, I. R.
0., it would be appropriate to set down the whole section in extenso "49. Representation of parties.-(i) A workman who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a collective bargaining agent and subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and subsection (3) any employer who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any such proceeding by a person duly authorised by him.
(2) No party to an Industrial Dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Ordinance.
(3) A party to an Industrial Dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner in any proceeding before the Labour Court or before an Arbitrator, with the permission of the Court or the Arbitrator as the case may be."
' Since some of the learned counsel appearing in this matter have referred to the previous law on the subject, it would be appropriate to compare the wording of section 49, I. R.
0., with the language of section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. Section 36 of the former Act reads as follows :- "36. Representation of parties.-(1) A workman who is a party to an Industrial Dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a registered trade union, and any employer who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be represented in any such proceeding by an officer of an association of employers.
(2) No party to Industrial Dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act.
(3) A party to an Industrial Dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner in any proceeding before a Court or Tribunal.
' The entitlement of a party to an Industrial Dispute to be represented by a legal practitioner in any proceeding before an Industrial Court or Tribunal was severely restricted and made subject to the consent of all the parties to the dispute by section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, which read as follows :- "34. Representation of parties.-(1) A workman who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a registered trade union, and any employer who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any such proceeding by an officer of an association of employers.
(2) No party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings, or, except with the consent of all the parties to the dispute, in any proceedings before a Court adjudicating such dispute."7 8 ' Realising the difficulty of obtaining the consent of all parties to the dispute the Legislature though that the grant of such permission should vest in the Labour Courts and, accordingly, this modification was made in section 49, I. R.
0. Dealing with the history of the legislation on the subject and comparing the provisions in this behalf in various countries, including England, India and Pakistan, the learned Authors of the "Law of Industrial Disputes" by Malhotra, Third Edition, Volume I, page 1547, write as follows :- "Restriction on parties in respect of representation through legal practitioners before industrial tribunals is not a new phenomenon in England. Section 9 of the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo SC 69) provided that except as provided by rules, "no person shall be encitled to appear in any such proceedings by counsel or solicitor". However, rule 8 of the Industrial Courts (Procedure)
Rules, 1930, permits persons to appear by counsel or solicitor with the permission of the Court. Even the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (1971, C-72) did not make any alteration in this Law. In the language of Goswa mi, J., "Industrial law in India did not commence with a show of cold shoulder to lawyers as such. There was an unimpeded entrance of legal practitioners to adjudication halls before Tribunals when the Act first came into force on April 1, 1947". The provisions relating to representation of employers and workmen before the authorities under the Act were contained in the original section 36 of the Act, which provided that in any proceeding under the Act, the workman would be represented by an officer of a registered trade union and the employer would be prepresented by an officer of an association of employers. Though the representation of the parties to an Industrial Dispute by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceeding was completely banned the parties were given the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in any proceeding before a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal. Three years later, a restriction was imposed on the representation of the parties, by Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, by legal practitioners before the Labour Appellate Tribunal without the consent of the parties and the leave of the tribunal. In view of the restriction introduced in the appellate forum, the same was imposed, for the first time, upon representation of the parties by legal practitioners before the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals as well as by substituting the present section for the original one. The original Bill No, 61 of 1949 which was introduced to provide for the establishment of the Appellate Tribunal proposed the provisions by clause 34 of the Bill, to give absolute right to a party to an appeal to be represented by a legal practitioner in any proceeding before the Appellate Tribunal. The clause was substantially similar to the provisions of the original section .36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, the Bill intended to continue the provisions of the original section 36 enabling a party to the dispute to be represented by a legal practitioner before the adjudicatory authorities as well as the Labour Appellate Tribunal. This provision was not, however, accepted by the Parliament. On the contrary, the provisions relating to the rights of a legal practitioner to represent the parties to an "Industrial Dispute" were incorporated in the Act of 1950 as well as in the Schedule which amended section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Act of 1950 was repealed by the Industrial Disputes (Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (Act 36 of 1956). But even after the repeal, section 36 of the Act continues to be in force in spite of repeal of that Act.
There have been two minor changes made by the amending Acts of 1971 and 1972, which have been noted in the body of the section. 'In view of the recent thinking on the matter of providing legal aid to the poor and weaker sections of the people, the Supreme Court in Paradip Port Trust v.
Their Workmen has suggested that it may even be possible that the conditional embargo under section 36 (4) may be lifted or its rigours considerably reduced by leaving the matter "to the tribunal's permission as has been the case under the English Law".
8. Reverting back to section 49, I. R.
0., a bare perusal of the said section makes it clear-
(a) that it is restricted in its application to parties to an industrial dispute, including a workman ;
(b) that the section refers to the entitlement of the parties to representation and does not deal with the rights of a person either to practice before Labour Courts or to appear in proceedings before Labour Courts ; and
(c) that the restriction is limited to entitlement to be represented by a legal practitioner, but such restriction may be overcome by obtaining permission in this behalf from the Labour Court.
' As already indicated. The proceedings in which Syed Zamirul Hassan was appearing and in which he has now been prohibited from appearing by the order in question of the learned Labour Court are in respect of a grievance application under section 25-A, I. R.
0. It has, therefore, to be seen whether those proceedings can be deemed to be an Industrial Dispute and the parties in such application can be deemed to be parties to an Industrial Dispute.
Section 2(xiii),
1. R.
0. Defines "Industrial Dispute" as follows :- "(xiii) "industrial dispute" mean any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the condition of work of any person ; and is not in respect of the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law, other than this Ordinance, or any award or settlement for the time being in force."
It will be seen that the above definition of "Industrial Dispute' expressly excludes from its purview individual grievances under section 25-A, I. R.
0., which are limited to enforcement of rights of individual workmen guaranteed or secured by any law, an award or settlement. Furthermore, section 43, I. R.
0., expressly provides that no industrial dispute shall be deemed to exist unless it has been raised in prescribed manner by a collective bargaining agent or an employer. The manner in which an industrial dispute can be raised is prescribed in sections 26, 30 and 31, I. R.
0. Admittedly the grievance petition before the learned Labour Court was neither by the C. B. A. Nor by the employer. Moreover, the proceedings were not taken in the manner provided in sections 26, 30 and 31, I. R.
0. Finally, the grievance petition was by a single workman. The question whether an individual workman could raise or be a party to an industrial dispute was examined by a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan in the case Jalal Din v. Orient Match Company. Repelled the contention that an individual workman could raise or be a party to an industrial dispute it was held by the Division Bench as follows :- "It is now well-settled that a dispute between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an Industrial Dispute as defined in section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it is taken by a union of the workmen or by a considerable number of workmen. In their view the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the union. The union or those workmen who have by their sponsoring turned the individual dispute into an industrial dispute, can, therefore, claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal.
The same view was taken in Murtaza Ali Khan v. Pakistan Pharmaceutical Industry Ltd. Where it was observed by the Chairman of the Industrial Court of East Pakistan after referring to the definition of industrial dispute: "From the above definition itself it is clear that an industrial dispute connoted a general dispute and not an individual dispute. It is now well-established from a series of decisions of the superior Courts that an individual dispute does not come under the purview of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance and that an industrial dispute can be converted into an industrial dispute only if the case of the individual workman or workmen is taken up by other employees as their own cause.
' Thus the dispute regarding the discharge or dismissal of individual workman is an individual dispute. Such a dispute can become the subject-matter of an industrial dispute only if the body of the workmen in general represented through Union or by a considerable number of them take up his case, who should in virtue of rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1960, authorise in this behalf five of its representatives at a meeting held for the purpose."
9. It is true that subsection (4) of section 25-A, I. R.
0., provides that where a grievance petition is preferred before the Labour Court it is to give a decision on the grievance petition within seven days as if such matter were in an industrial dispute, but this does not make a grievance petition or the proceedings relating thereto an industrial dispute as explained by this Tribunal in the cases as Johnson and Johnson (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Zubair Ahmed and Karachi Development Authority v. Abdul Rehman. In the latter case this Tribunal observed as follows : "A bare perusal of the above subsection shows that where a matter falling under section 25-A, I. R.
0., is taken to the Labour Court, it shall give a decision as if such matter were in an industrial dispute. In other words, only after the matter is properly brought before a Labour Court in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A, I. R.
0., is the Labour Court required to give a decision in the matter as if the matter were in an industrial dispute. It will be seen that the Legislature has not laid down that the matter is deemed to be an industrial but it is to be dealt with as if it were in an industrial dispute. In other words the Legislature was referring to the procedure of the Labour Court in dealing with such grievance petitions. It may be pointed out that subsection (2) of section 36, I. R.
0., confers power of a Civil Court upon a Labour Court only for the purposes of adjudicating and determining an industrial dispute. Apparently it was considered appropriate to confer such power upon the Labour Court while dealing with grievance petitions under section 25-A, I. R.
0., as no other procedure has been prescribed for the disposal by the Labour Court of such applications."
10. It will further be seen that section 49, I. R.
0., deals with entitlement of a party to be represented in proceedings before a Labour Court and not to the right of a person to appear or practice before a Labour Court. The word "entitled" appearing in the said section came up for interpretation before a learned Single Judge of the Karachi High Court in the reported as case Afzal Stores v. Sind Labour Court No, S. It was held in that case as follows :- "In simple dictionary meaning the word "entitled" as defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1952 Edition, means "as having a title to something." The word "title" itself has been defined in the same Dictionary as "that which justifies or substantiates a claim a ground of right ; hence, as alleged or recognized right". Accordingly, it is apparent that what the section confers upon a workman in regard to representation in any proceedings under the Ordinance is a right to be represented through an officer of Collective Bargaining Agent but does not exclude representation through any other person duly authorized by him. There is thus statutory sanction in favour of any officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent to represent a workman in any proceedings under the Ordinance and the words "shall be entitled" cannot be read to mean that a workman is not entitled to be represented otherwise than by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent. The right to be represented solely and exclusively by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent only, if it was so desired, should have been provided specifically as it is provided in sub-clause (2) of section 4' barring representation through a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings. This interpretation further finds support from the consideration that there may be cases where an officer of Collective Bargaining Agent may not at all be available the absence of the existence of a Collective Bargaining Agent in an establishment, who is to be appointed on compliance and fulfilmen of the conditions prescribed under section 22 of the Ordinance Such a workman, thus, having howsoever a pressing grievance would be left without a remedy even though it may be for a short while. Such absurdity and hardship is to be avoided in interpreting a statute. Further on a still narrower interpretation of section 49 it may also be possible to contend that a worker is not eve entitled to represent his case personally because he "shall be entitled to be represented" only by an officer of a Collective Bargaining Agent.
11. In an earlier decision, as Employees' Union v. Khewra Soda Company Ltd., Khewra , the Industrial Court of West Pakistan had held that section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, was neither restrictive nor exhaustive but permissive and appropriate mode of representation by authorised agent was not ruled out. A somewhat similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan in the case Sher Muhammad v. Chairman, Industrial Court of West Pakistan . In that case it was observed by the Division Bench as follows :- "It appears to us that section 34 of the Ordinance does not operate as a complete bar against all the known forms of representations in Court. In subsection of this section it is expressly laid down that no party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings, or except with the consent of all the parties to the dispute, in any proceedings before the Industrial Court. This is the only prohibition introduced by section 34 of Ordinance. In it there is no bar against the other well-accepted modes of representation in Courts by an agent or specially authorised attorney. In our opinion, subsection (1) of section 34 is an enabling provision of law. It is permissive in its extent and its scope is by no means restrictive. It provides that a workman or an employer who is a party to any industrial dispute shall be "entitled" to be represented in such proceedings by an officer of the registered Trade Union or an association of employers, respectively. It does not expressly rule out any other mode of representation for a party in the proceedings under the Ordinance. The subsection is not exhaustive in its implications.
Its purpose is to grant a statutory recognition to an additional mode of representation by the workmen and the employer in the proceedings under the Ordinance to which they are party. So that in any proceedings under the Ordinance the workmen can also be represented by an officer of the registered Trade Union and an employer by an officer of an association of employers under the force of this statute."
12. The view taken by the Indian Courts is similar to the view taken by our Courts. The Bombay High Court case of Khadilkar v. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. , held that the Personnel Officer of the Company, a lawyer by qualifications, being a graduate in law but not enrolled as an Advocate who held a Power of Attorney executed by the company, was entitled to appear and represent the company in an industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal and the objection raised to his.
Appearance by the Workers' Union was overruled.
13. The Indian Supreme Court has also dealt with the issue of representation of parties in industrial adjudication, including the issue of when legal practitioners can appear in such proceedings. In the case reported as Par adip Port Trust v. Their Workmen , it has held that section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not exhaustive in the sense that besides] the persons specified therein there cannot be any other lawful mode of appearance of the parties as such and has taken the view that in the case of companies and corporations they can be represented by their Director or their own officers authorised to act in this behalf. It has further he' that if a legal practitioner is appointed as an officer by a company or a corporation and is in their pay and under their control and is not a practising Advocate the fact that he was earlier a legal practitioner or has a law dagree will not stand in the way of the company being represented by him.
14. Finally I would refer to two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the subject of prohibition on the appearance of legal practitioners in proceedings before a Labour Court. On the basis of these two decisions a Circular on the above subject was also issued by this Tribunal. In the case of Syed Muhammad Hussain v. Pakistan Tobacco Company it was held that the provisions of section 49, I. R.9 10 11 12 0., which prohibit a party to an industrial dispute from being represented by a legal practitioner in any proceeding before a Labour Court save with the permission of the Court override the general provisions enacted in the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973. In the earlier case of the Karachi Union of Employees and others v. Industrial Court, Karachi it was held that legal practitioners are not entitled in the guise of office-bearers of Unions to appear in proceedings before the Industrial Court as the Legislature regards their appearance before such Court as undesirable. It will, thus, appear from the above two decisions by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the provisions of section 49, I. R.
0., is special provision relating to proceedings before the Labour Court override the general provisions contained in the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973.
15. It was also sought to be argued by Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani that appearance before the Labour Courts cannot be equated with practice of law in the ordinary sense as a basic rule of ordinary courts is not to be capitalist or humanitarian or socilalist but to dispense justice according to law while the purpose of industrial law and the object of industrial justice can be taken to establish a balance between the interests of workers and owners of industries so that harmonious relations are achieved and in support of his contention he relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan reported as Flour Mills Employees' Union v.
Karachi Steam Roller Flour Mills but it is not necessary for me to deal with this contention in the present proceedings.
16. The view that I have taken is that the proceedings under section 25-A, I. R.
0., pending before the learned Labour Court are not proceedings relating to a n industrial dispute and that further since Syed Zamirul Hassan is not an Advocate enrolled under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, the restrictions contained in section 49, I. R. O., upon representation of legal practitioners do not apply to him or the cases in which he appears.
17. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would set aside the order, dated 7th April, 1983, passed by the learned Labour Court dis- allowing Syed Zamirul Hassan to appear in the proceedings before it under section 25-A, I. R.
0. And bold that the employer therein is entitled to be represented through Syed Zamirul Hassan. 1980 PLC 622 1983 PLC 91 1977 PLC $78 1968 PLC 137 PLD 1961 SC 57 PLD 1980 SC 80 1964 PLC 593 1972 PLC 299 1962 PLC 731 1967 PLC 147 (1976) 1 L L J 139 (1976) 2 L L J 409