1. MD. NURUL HUDA (CHAIRMAN). Resident Editor, the Eastern Examiner is 11he petitioner. He has filed this application under section 18 (7) of the East Pakistan Employ--ment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1963 for permission to dismiss the second party workers from their services. It is alleged that on the 7th of January 197(1, the employees resorted to illegal strike at 2: 00 p.m. and continued the same till 7:30 a.m., of 8-1-1970. So, the establishment could not publish the paper, the Eastern Examiner, on the 8 of January 1970. It is further alleged that on some previous occasions also the workers resorted to similar sudden lighting strike. So, on the ground of the illegal strike, resorted to by the workers on the 7th of January 1970, permission' has been sought for the dismissal of the workers.
2. On behalf of the second party workers a written objection has been filed, wherein the allegations of resorting to strike by the ' workers have been denied. It gas been said that on the date fixed for payment of wages, the first party deferred the same alleging some technical difficulties. The second party workers there upon wanted to know the reasons for non-payment of wages on 7-1- 1970, which was the due date. This is said to have infuriated the first Party and the second party put the blame for the non-publication of the paper on 8-1-19'30 on the firs party. The second party has also raised a question of jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the application of the first party under the Standing Orders Act, 1965. It is further contended on behalf of the second party that as the employer proceeded under section .18(1) to 18(6) in the instant case, an application under section 18(7) is not tenable.
3. I broadly- formulate the points - for consideration. They are:th
(1) Has the Court jurisdiction to entertain the application of the petitioner?
(2) Is the petitioner entitled to any permission for dismissal, or for any punishment of the workers, second party men?
4. DECISION For convenience of discussion I propose to deal with both the points together.
5. Section 2(k) of the East Pakistan Employment, of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965 reads as follows: ---Labour Court' means a Court constituted under the industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959."
6. Subsection (3) of section 44 of the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965 reads as follows: "Any reference to the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 in any other law for the time being in force shall be construed to have a reference to this Act."
7. This means that by implication section, 2(k) of the Standing Orders Act stands amended as follows: "'Labour Court' means a Court constituted under the Labour Disputes Act, 1965."
8. The Chittagong Labour Court constituted under the Labour Disputes Act is deemed to have been constituted under the relevant provisions, of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 by virtue - of clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 67 of the Ordinance Considering the entire provisions of law in the matter, saving clauses in the L. D. Act, the I. R. O., and the Repealing and Amending Ordinance, 1966 1 have no manner of doubt that this Labour Court has got every jurisdiction to decide matters under the Standing Orders Act, 1965.
9. Learned Member Mr. Sabur has opined accordingly;' whereas the other learned Member Mr. Meerza has expressed the contrary view. As to matters of merit Mr. Meerza has said nothing inasmuch as according to him the Court has got no jurisdiction to entertain this application. The learned Member Mr. Sabur has opined that the first party failed to prove any strike.
10. Let me now turn to the question of merit; as to whether there was any illegal strike justifying any permission to dismiss or inflict any other punishment.
11. It is an admitted fact that wages are to be paid before the expiry of the 7th day of the month following the month for which the wages are due. This is a mandatory provision of -law as embodied in section 5 of the Payment of Wages - Act, 1936. In the instant case the administration failed to pay the wages on the 7th of January 1970. It is common knowledge that the workers are not economically well of. Any delay in payment of their wages may create some grumbling among the workers. The administration deferred payment violating the mandatory provision of law and if in that circumstances a commotion arose amongst the workers the fault lies not so much with the workers. The explanation, the authority gave for non-payment of wages on the 7th of January 1970, is not so much meaningful to the workers. It is simply said that for technical difficulties the payment was being deferred. Naturally, if the workers insisted on knowing what are the difficulties, there was nothing wrong in their conduct. in the midst, of commotion and reasonable grumbling of workers there might have been temporary cessation B of work. That is not; however, something deliberate and purposeful. It is a fact that although there was no publication of the paper on 8-1-1970, on g.1- 1970 there was publication of 8 pages issue of the paper instead of 6 page usual issue. This shows that the workers either had worked for sometime on 7-1-1970 or that they did more work on 8-1- 1970. . The explanations were called for from the workers and some of the explanations submitted by some of .the workers are in the record. They refute the alleged story of illegal strike and put the blame for the trouble on the management. It is said that on previous occasions also the workers resorted to strike and that they were exonerated. Those things are matters of past and no action is being sought for those alleged dereliction of duty.
12. It has been said that as the administration proceeded under subsections (1) to (6) of section 18, the petitioner cannot make any C prayer under section 18(7). I do not think so for the relief for the employer under subsection (7) of section 18 is independent of what is there in the proceeding subsections of the section.
13. No cogent evidence is there before me to hold that there was an illegal strike as alleged by the petitioner. There might be cessation of work for sometime and that in my view is not D. deliberate and purposeful. I am told that the parties have come to an agreement previously over a charter of demands and amity is prevailing between the employer and the employees. In the context of all these things, I do not think that I should accord permission for dismissal or for any punishment whatsoever in this case. 1, however; feel that the workers should not resort to anything which may have adverse effect on the reputation of the Paper and the Administration will also be conscious about the economic difficulties of the workers and ensure payment of wages in clue time.
14. With the above findings and observations ' I am inclined to disallow the, permission sought for.
15. Hence, ORDERED That the application of the petitioner be dismissed on contest.