' This appeal is directed against the order, dated 26th April, 1983, passed by the Sind. Labour Court No, V at Karachi, dismissing the application of the appellant filed under section 25-A, I. R.
0., 1969.
2. The facts leading up to the appeal briefly stated are that the appellant was employed by the respondent herein, as Class III Officer and was posted as a programmer in the Computor Division.
He was initially dismissed from service on 27th February, 1980 on charges of misconduct, firstly, that on 2nd January, 1980 he wilfully disobeyed the orders of his immediate superior Younus Umer Khanani and since then has not been taking any interest in work, and secondly, that in his letter, dated 6th January, 1980 addressed to the Senior Vice-President Computor Division and letter, dated 9th January, 1980 addressed to the President of the Bank in his letter, dated 12th January, 1980 addressed to the Senior Vice-President, Computor Division, he used objectionable language and made false allegations against Senior Vice-President Computor Division. He filed a grievance application which was dismissed by the trial Court. He filed an appeal in this Tribunal and vide order, dated 18th January, 1982, he was absolved only of first charge and was directed to be re- instated in service.
' The Tribunal, however, observed that it was open to the respondent-bank to consider the case of the appellant only in respect of the second charge, namely using objectionable language and levelling baseless allegations against Mr. Rizvi, Senior Vice-President, Computor Division, in his letters, dated 6th, 9th and 12th January, 1980, and after affording him an opportunity of hearing in that behalf, to pass orders on the enquiry proceedings in accordance with law. It was further observed that the award of back benefits will depend upon the result of fresh enquiry. A fresh enquiry was held by the respondent bank after re-instating the appellant and after finding him guilty on the second charge stated above, he was dismissed from service vide order, dated 23rd May, 1982. He served a grievance notice, dated 3rd June, 1982 on the respondent-bank and filed a grievance application on 16th August, 1982 before the learned Labour Court. The learned Labour Court dismissed his grievance application, resulting in the present appeal.
3. The learned Labour Court recorded the evidence. The appellant examined himself whereas the respondents examined Syed Kamal Hyder, the enquiry officer, who produced alongwith the other documents, the enquiry proceedings vide Exh. 3/H. I have perused all the evidence recorded before the enquiry officer leading up to the enquiry report and also before the learned Labour Court oral as well as documentary. I have also heard the learned counsel for the parties, Mr. M. L. Shahani for the appellant and Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani for the respondents. Mr. Shahani for the appellant has raised two fold contention : firstly, that the letters, dated 6th January, 1980, 9th January, 1980 and 12th January, 1980 written by the appellant to his superior Senior Vice-President, Computor Division and the President of the respondent-bank do not contain objectionable and derogatory language which would constitute an act subversive of discipline within the meaning of Standing Order 15 (3)
(h) ; secondly that the enquiry held against the appellant was neither just nor proper and that the enquiry report was perverse. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, the learned representative for the respondent-bank has resisted the contentions and has further contended that the grievance application was time-barred. He has Mainly contended that the three letters, dated 6th, 9th and 12th January, 1980, contain objectionable and derogatory language addressed by the appellant to his superiors which would constitute not only wilful insubordination but also an act subversive of discipline, and thus a misconduct within meaning of Standing Order 15 (3) (h) (a). He has also contended that the enquiry proceedings complied with all the requirements of the principle of Natural Justice and the enquiry report based on such proceedings was not at all perverse. As regards the bar of limitation, he has contended that the grievance notice, dated 3rd June, 1982 was withdrawn on 30th June, 1982 and, therefore, no grievance notice was in existence and the application was not maintainable on that account. He has further contended that in any case only one grievance notice, dated 3rd June, 1982 is contemplated by the provisions of section 25-A, I. R.
O., 1969, which was replied and rejected on 8th June, 1982 and computing the period of limitation from that date, the grievance application filed on 16th August, 1982 was definitely time-barred. {{MISS PAGE IN CUT}}
4. Coning to the first contention raised by Mr. M. L. Shahani it would be appropriate to refer to the contents of three letters, dated 6th January, 1980, 9th January, 1980 and 12th January, 1980, as admittedly written by the appellant to his superiors, the Senior Vice-President of the Computor Division of the bank and the President of the Bank. The letter, dated 6th January, 1980 was written by the appellant in reply to the memorandum of instructions bearing No, COMP/Miscellaneous 29/SLB, dated 5th January, 1980 addressed to him by the Senior Vice-President, Computor Division.
In the memo. Above-named, dated 5th January, 1980, he was called upon to explain as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for having refused to follow the instructions issued to him by Mr. Younus Umer Khanani under whose supervision, he was posted to work, as Mr. Khanani had reported against him. While writing, the appellant went to the extent to say "Therefore, the allegation of refusal to follow instrucion of Mr. Khanani on my part is ridiculous and self- defeated. To all appearances, it is a downright fabrication doomed to failure as a lie has legs to stand upon. My compliance report, dated 22nd December, 979 belies the mala fide allegation which finds no corroboration from evidence, direct or indirect, express or implied." In the last paragraph of the letter, he wrote "1, therefore, request that the matter in its entirety be lifted and winnowed out in an impartial and independent enquiry conducted by Computor/Personnel division and the alleged refusal be suitably taken for appropriate action, as being mala fide, mischievous and malicious meet the ends of justice." In letter, dated 8th January, 1980 while citing to the President of the Bank, the appellant said while referring to the enior Vice-President, Computor Division, "He called him in his chamber and appreciated the naked truth of the contents of my written explanation. He xplained to nine that the said memo was issued through grave misundertanding for which he felt sorry. But as fate would have it, as a remedy e did not see his way to withdraw his memo. As a question of his self-ssumed personal dignity, but tried to dissuade me to file an amended explanation pointing out that Mr. Khanani's report about refusal on my part to lbw his instructions was false and baseless, leaving aside other details ached upon in any written explanation, which were seemingly detrimental his interest." He went on to write subsequently "The Senior Vice-resident called me a number of times in his chamber to make me change my mind according to his dictation." In the last paragraph, he went to write to the extent "To meet the ends of justice, I request an impartial d independent enquiry be instituted at a high level for appropriate action the matter." In his letter, dated 12th January, 1980, which was address- by him in reply to the letter, dated 8th January, 1980 addressed by the nor Vice-President to the officers including the appellant, he took an exception to have been addressed without designation.
He wrote "As there can be person without a name, there can be no employee without a specific desertion. It is rather unfortunate that in the letter under reference I am dressed by name without a designation whereas in the Memo. Dated 5th January, 1980 I am addressed by name/Class HI Officer proper address is not choice to it arbitrary discretion, regardless of position high or low.
Psycho gically, the commission of designation is an unholy attempt to humiliate a bona e employee for pleasure's sake." The contents of the three letters taken as a also would clearly indicate that the appellant referred to his superior Yourtusmer Khanani under whom he was working and addressed the Senior Vice-president and the President of the bank in a haughty and objectionable manner. e language used is definitely unparliamentarily, discourteous and impolite while replying to the explanation called for from him he referred to the legations of not following instructions of his superior and behaving in a n-co-operative manner as ridiculous and self- defeated. Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary assigns "Ridicule" a meaning as absurdity, derision mockery, to laugh at, to expose to meriment : to deride, to mock. 'Ridiculous' means, deserving or exciting ridicule, absurd. The appellant by writing the word "ridiculous" to his superior while referring to the allegation made against him definitely tried to mock and laugh at his superior officers. Apart from the writings being objectionable and derogatory, they would tantamount to insubordination as well. The same Dictionary assigns meaning to "insubordinate" as not subordinate or submissive". The same Dictionary says "submit" means, submissive subdued, low- toned." The contents of the letters, on their plain reading can never be considered submissive or low-toned. In letter, dated 9th January, 1980, he has called for an enquiry to be instituted against his Senior Vice-President, Computor Division. In his letter, dated 12th January, 1980, he has taken exception to have not been addressed by his designation. Apart from all that the language of the three letters would clearly indicate that it is from a very hot-headed person. Mr. M. L. Shahani for the appellant has conceded that the language used may be of a haughty person but it was not at all derogatory or objectionable and the charge against him would at best fall under Standing Order 15
(1) (ii) (a) or (b) or (c) as being disregard or disobedience of orders or rules, improper behavior or making false and misleading statements. On the basis of the material available as referred above, I am afraid it would be impossible to agree with him. In support of his contention he has relied on the authority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported in the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Junior Labour Court No, IV etc. (1). In that case, allegations against the employee were unauthorised absence for 5 days from duty, and it was held that it was not an act subversive of discipline and would at the most be covered by the acts or omission falling under subsection (i) (ii) of Standing Order 15 calling for a minor penalty. The facts and circumstances of the case would, on the face of it, be clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstance of the instant case. He has also placed reliance in the case of Punjab Urban Transport Corporation v.
Khalid Dad (2). Wherein the facts were that the charge against the bas conductor was of carrying excess cash while on duty. It was held that it would not amount to misconduct, and would at best amount to disregard or disobedience of rules as defined in Standing Order 15 (1) (ii) (a). The third case he has referred is reported in the case of Raja Muhammad Akram v. General Manager, Army Welfare Food Industries, Faisalabad (3), in which case the Despatch Clerk was charged of sending a letter on wrong address and on calling for an explanation from him, he explained that it was an omission due to lack of experience and the learned member of the National Industrial Relations Commission held that he could not be charged for any act subversive of discipline. The other cases cited are not relevant to the issue at all. I would, therefore, find that none of the cases cited by Mr. M. L. Shahani for the appellant would be applicable to the facts and the circumstances of the instant case as they are clearly distinguishable.
5. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani for the respondent has relied on the Supreme Court authority reported in the case of Abdul Rasheed Qureshi v. Industrial Court of West Pakistan, Lahore and Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd., Jhelum, (4). In support of his contention to the effect that the alleged writings' as stated above on the part of appellant would clearly indicate conduct subversive of discipline. In that case, the appellant was employed as a clerk in the Jhelum establishment of Pakistan Tobacco Company and was the General Secretary of the employees union when he addressed to the Director, Labour Welfare, West Pakistan, a letter on behalf of the union making a reply to several matter that had arisen between the company and the employees' union, and in particulars a charge which had been made against the Propaganda Secretary of the Union and a copy of the same was not sent to the Branch Manager of the company at Jhelum. The letter said "it is quite wrong that the union propaganda secretary had some hand in the strike of casual labour and domestic servants. On the other hand it was the personnel Manager who arranged the casual labour strike with the intention to make a public contract with a labour contractor." The Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court observed "There was a direct attack on the probity of a superior executive officer of the company directly concerned in the management of the labour force, and a very grave accusation that this officer was himself engineering trouble among the workmen. There could be no question but that such conduct was calculated to be destructive of discipline. He has also referred to the case decided by the Industrial Appellate Tribunal, West Pakistan in support of his contention reported in the case of Ghulam Rasool Khan v. The District Manager, Government Transport Service, Hyderabad (1) wherein the learned Chairman of the Tribunal held that the term wilful insubordination" is a very wide term and it would include misbehaviour on the part of a workman, and that if a workman acting in a haughty and insulting manner towards his superior, it would be covered up by the term is "wilful insubordination". He has also referred to the cases of this Tribunal of which one is reported in the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Messrs Indus Jute Mills Ltd.
(2). It was held in that case that a false statement against management that it stopped workers from offering prayers would likely excite strong prejudice against management leading even to riot and would amount to misconduct subversive of discipline with penalty of dismissal. In the case reported in Gharo Textile Mills Ltd. v. Muhammad Sultan (3), employee waylaying security incharge on way from rounds of factory to residential quarter within Labour Colony abusing and insulting and assaulting him with reference to his duties and performance, would affect employer on his business seriously prejudicing factory, discipline and in such circumstances it was held that he was rightly charged and dismissed for misconduct of act subversive of discipline. There is no doubt that if a subordinate who misbehaves with his boss is let off, it will become impossible to control and get work from subordinates. Judging the conduct of the appellant in the instant case in the light of the decisions above referred, there appears to me no doubt that in his letters throughout he used derogatory and objectionable language to his superiors for no reason except that an explanation was called from him for his non-co-operative behavior and a circular letter was addressed to him in his name and not by reference to his designation. In my view, he is very clearly guilty of misconduct for acts subversive of discipline as well as insubordination, within the meaning of Standing Order 15 (3) (a) (h) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
' Re-instatement-Head jobber in Textile Mill dismissed for misconduct-Orders challenged on ground of victimization due to being Union office-bearer-Labour Court directed re-instatement with back benefits-Services terminated immediately after re-instatement on ground of post having been abolished - Was again ordered to be re-instated in service--On appe< by employers, Tribunal accepted their plea that duties of Head bber being supervisory in nature, he* was not workman and his grievance petition was not maintainable-Further held, that in circumstances of case appellant could not be compelled to accept employee against posts which stood abolished much earlier. [pp. 1633, 1634]A & B Chairman, Brook Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. General Secretary, Union of Karkunane Brook Bond (Pak.) Ltd., Rawalpindi PLD 1969 Lah. 717 ; Shah Hussain v. Kotri Textile Mills 1981 PLC 871 and Islamabad Club v. Punjab Labour Court No, II etc, PLD 1980 SC 307 ref. Ghulam Hassan for Appellants. Nemo for Respondent.
Date of hearing : 8th December, 1983.
' This appeal is directed against the order, dated 19th October, 1982, passed by the Labour Court No, VI at Hyderabad directing re-instatement of the respondent with back benefits with effect from 17th October, 1981.
2. The facts leading up to the appeal briefly stated are that the respondent was originally appointed as winder in the winding department of the appellant mills in January, 1972.
Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of a checker and after about a few months he was promoted to the post of Head-jobber in the same Department. He was elected as a president of the peoples Union formed in 1972 which subsequently became Collective Bargaining Agent since 12th August, 1975. It is alleged that in the year 1972 as a measure of victimization, the appellants dismissed all the office-bearers of union including the respondent for misconduct on a charge of absence from duty for more than 10 days. The respondent challenged the action of the appellant in a grievance application under section 25-A,
1. R.
0. 1969. The litigation arising out of it lingered on in appeals and Constitutional petitions, ultimately resulting into an order, dated 22nd August, 1978, passed by the Labour Court in appeal, directing re-instatement of the respondent with full back benefits. Constitutional petition was filed against that order by the appellants but it was dismissed on 29th September, 1981. In compliance with the order of re-instatement the appellants reinstated the respondent vide order, dated 17th October, 1981 but under the same order, he was informed about the termination of his services with effect from 18th October, 1981 on account of abolition of his post with effect from 17th April, 1976, vide order of the same date. He was advised to collect his legal dues as a result of the order of termination of his services. He alleged that his services could not, be terminated without offering him a lower post and he also alleged that the post of Head Jobber after the restart of the mills in January, 1977, was re-designated as Shift Jobber, Head Winder and Checker, Winding Jobber and Finishing Jobber etc., and was in fact in existence and there respondent could be reinstated in those posts. He served a grievance notice on the appellants and his grievance having not been redressed he filed an application under section 25-A, I. R.
0., 1969, in the VIth Labour Court at Hyderabad as stated above resulting in his reinstatement with back benefits with effect from 17th October, 1981. Aggrieved by this order the appellants have come in this appeal.
3. I have perused all the evidence recorded before the learned Labour Court and have also heard the learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Ghulam Hussain, whereas the respondent and his counsel Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi remained absent. The respondent's application was resisted in the Labour Court mainly on the pleas that the respondent was not a workman within the meaning of section 2 (i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and that the post of the respondent having been abolished as a result of re-organization on account of financial crises, adverse market condition and continuous losses, the respondent could not be appointed in the post as it did not exist. In view of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence they examined before the learned Labour Court as well as the arguments that were addressed on behalf of the appellants, the questions that would arise for determination for the disposal of this appeal would be firstly, as to whether the respondent was a workman within the meaning of Standing Orders Ordinance or not and secondly, as to whether on reinstatement in service by the order of the learned Labour Court he could be thrusted upon the appellants regardless of the fact that his post stood abolished during the intervening period with effect from 17th April, 1976.
4. As regards the question as to whether the respondent is a workman or not within the meaning of Standing Orders, the burden of proof could admittedly lie on the respondent himself. To derermine that question, the true test would be to look to the direct, immediate and the substantial part of the work for which he was employed at the relevant time and not to the sundry duties incidentally performed by him. The true answer to this question, therefore, will depend upon the proved facts of the case. Reference in that respect is invited to the decision in the case of Chairman, Brook Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. General Secretary, Union of Karkunane Brook Bond (Pak.) Ltd., Rawalpindi (1). It would, therefore, be appropriate that this question may be examined in the light of the evidence adduced by the parties before the learned Labour Court. In that respect, there is only a solitary word of the respondent that the nature of the duties that he was performing as Head Jobber were manual and clerical, by handling machines, checking the qualities of the products and helping the workers in the performance of their duties. According to him he was allowed attendance card like other workers of the mills when the supervising and other staff members were not allotted any ticket or card. In his cross-examination, he admitted that as a Head Jobber Winding, he was incharge of all the production by the winders and his responsibility was to see that the production was according to the target. He had also to see if the winders were working properly. He has further admitted that fitters used to remove defects from the machines. It was the duty of the foreman to ask them to remove the defects. He has further admitted that as Head Jobber, it was his duty to see the general position, cleanliness and the size of the Cones of Winding Department. He has further admitted that if any winder did not perform his duties properly, he used to report against him to the Shift Incharge. According to him he was also to see and examine the weight of the Cones. On the basis of all these admissions in his evidence the nature of the duties' that he was performing as a Head Jobber were predominently supervisory in nature rather than manual or clerical. As regards the evidence adduced by appellants in that regard, Mr. Muzaffar Hussain Shah, the Manager of the appellant mills has deposed that the respondent was working as a Head Jobber in all the three shifts and used to supervise the production work of all the three Head- Winders. According to him his work was not manual or clerical, skilled or unskilled. He has further deposed that the Head Winder in the Winding Department as well as the winders used to be supervised in their work so far the volume of the production is concerned, by the Head-Jobber.
These assertions have not at all been challenged in his cross-examination on behalf of the respondent by his learned counsel. Muhammad Iqbal, the Technical Manager of the appellants mill has also deposed that the respondent who was the Head-Jobber winding, used only to check and supervise the work of Head Winder and Winders of the three shifts and in case of any defect in machine, he used to call fitters or head fitters through foreman to remove defects of machines.
According to him further, as Head Jobber Winding, he performed no work with hands and his duties were not manual or clerical. According to him further, his work was to make good shortage of winders and see that the production and quality is according to target. According to him, it was he who used to sanction leave applications of the winders when he was present in the mills and in case any winder did not perform his duty properly, he used to recommend action against him. His version has not been substantially challenged in his cross-examination. He has only stated therein that the Head Jobber has to check the quality and the production given by the winders and that he had to maintain the record of the production in respect of each winder. The next witness Niaz Ahmad who is a Technical Manager of the Indus Textile Mills, Hyderabad, the adjoining mills, has also stated that the duty of the Head Jobber in the textile mills is mainly supervisory and is not at all manual or clerical in nature. His disinterested version has also not been substantially challenged in the cross-examination. All this evidence produced on behalf of the appellants would clearly show that the duties performed by the respondent as Head Jobber were mainly supervisory in nature and not at all manual or clerical. If incidentally, he was maintaining the record of production in respect of each winder, that alone would not affect his status as that may be only incidental to his main duties he was performing as a head-jobber. This over-whelming evidence coupled with admissions that the respondent has made as discussed by me above, would clearly establish that the nature of the duties the respondent was performing were supervisory in nature and not at all manual or clerical. It was also held by this Tribunal in the case of Shah Hussain v. Kotri Textile Mills
(I) that a jobber in textile mills having duty to train workers and supervise their work besides signing production register was not a workman. I fail to understand as to how Head-Jobber performing almost the same type of duties would be considered as a workman in the face of the evidence that has been discussed by me above. Accordingly, I have no doubt that the respondent has failed to establish that he is a workman within the meaning of Standing Orders Ordinance.
5. It has been contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that there is no estoppel against Law and that the present grievance application arises out of new and fresh cause of action on account of abolition of the post. He has, therefore, contended that if the status of the respondent to the effect that he was not a workman was not {{FOOTNOTE}}
(1) 1981 PLC 871 ' challenged in an earlier litigation that factor alone would not determine that he was a workman. It is clear to me that the present grievance application arises out of new and fresh cause of action on account of abolition of the post and it does not seem to have any concern with the earlier litigation so far this issue is concerned and that the respondent cannot be said to be a workman on that score alone when he is proved otherwise on the basis of the positive evidence adduced by the parties. Accordingly, considering all the evidence and the circumstances in the case, I find that the respondent is" not a workman within the meaning of Standing Orders and his grievance application is not maintainable on that account alone.
6. As regards the second question as to whether the respondent on his reinstatement in service could be thrusted upon the employer regardless of the fact that his post stood abolished during the intervening period, there is no dispute that it was a right of the employer to reorganize the establishment on account of financial crises and even abolish the posts. The only question that would arise for determination is as to whether the action of the employer was bona fide or not. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the respondent remained out of the job on account of his dismissal during the period 22nd June, 1975 to 22nd August, 1978. His post alongwith 6 others was abolished on account of general retrenchment due to financial crises, whereby even 45% of the working force was also retrenched from service. Office order, dated 17th April, 1976 and a letter on the subject of retrenchment, dated 17th April, 1976 produced on behalf of the appellants support their contention in that regard. These orders and letters have not been challenged. The posts including that of the respondent were abolished on 17th April, 1976 when order of his re-instatement was finally upheld by the High Court on 29th September, 1981 when the Constitutional Petition of the appellants was dismissed. It would hardly be fair to say that the appellants could foresee the result of the litigation with the respondent in the year 1976, so that they carried on re-organization resulting in abolition of the post of the respondent alongwith 6 others and retrenchment of the working force to the extent of 45%. It is admitted by the respondent that the work in the mills was suspended in the year 1976 and was again revived in the year 1977. In view of this evidence on the record, there is no doubt that the re-organization by the appellants which resulted in the abolition of the posts including that of the respondent and the retrenchment of the working force to the extent of 45% was bona fide I find no evidence or circumstance at all to indicate that their action was mala fide. Confronted with this situation, the respondent has contended that the post of Head Jobber and that of a Checker were re-designated and given different names and they actually existed and he could be provided either in the post of a Head Jobber or the lower post of a Checker. The allegations have been denied on behalf of the appellants. Muzaffar Hussain Shah the Factory Manager as well as Muhammad Iqbal, Technical Manager have deposed that the post of Head Jobber and Checker were abolished and they no more existed and they were not re- designated and given different name. Their assertions have not been challenged in their cross- examination. In view of this evidence on the record, I find that neither the action of the appellants in abolishing the post as a result of reorganizations was mala fide nor they redesignated the posts and changed their names and that in fact they did not exist. There is also no force in the contention that the order of re-instatement of the respondent revived the abolished post of a Head Jobber.
Reference in that respect is invited to the authority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Islamabad Club v. Punjab Labour Court No, II etc. (1). The contention that the respondent could be provided in the lowest post of winder in which he had originally joined, has also no force, for the simple reason that no such assertion was made either in the grievance application or any where else. The respondent and his counsel have not contested this appeal and no such assertion has been made even in these appeal proceedings. The respondent was asked to collect his dues and was sent cheque of Rs, 32,268.66 but it appears he has returned the same on the plea that the calculations are not correct. However, it has been offered that whatever legal and correct dues the appellants would be ready and willing to pay. Accordingly, there appears no force in the contention to the effect that the post of the respondent abolished on account of a bona fide reorganisation would be revived by an order of re-instatement passed by the learned Labour Court. In this view of the matter, the appellants cannot be compelled to accept the respondent in the post of Head Jobber as well as the-lower post of Checker, as both the posts stood abolished on 17th April, 1976.
7. The result is that the impugned order, dated 19th October, 1982 passed by the learned Labour Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
(1) PLD 1978 SC 239
(2) 1980 PLC 930
(3) 1981 PLC 454
(4) 1967 PLC 525
(1) 1970 PLC 356
(2) 1980 PLC 972
(3) 1980 PLC 999
(1) PLD 1969 Lab. 717
(1) 1981 PLC 871
(1) PLD 1980 SC 307