' The facts necessary for the disposal of this constitution petition are that an ejectment petition was filed by the petitioner seeking eviction of the respondent on the grounds of default and bona fide personal need. The learned Rent Controller after trial accepted the ejectment petition returning finding in favour of the petitioner on the issue relating to bona fide personal need. On appeal, the ejectment order was set aside and the petition was dismissed vide judgment, dated 30-6-1980 of the learned. Additional District Judge, Sargodha. The learned Appellate Authority after appraising the evidence of the parties concluded that bona fide 'good faith of the alleged need we the necessary conditions for seeking ejectment and that the petitioner had failed to prove his bona fide or 'good faith'. It was further observed by him that the landlord had not specifically mentioned in the ejectment petition the r'4ure of the business he wanted to start and that the respondent k had also estaolished on record that the petitioner is running two chakkis and has also a shop of the same character in the same locality.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the appellate order by arguing that it is not necessary for a landlord to specifically plead all the requirements of section 13(3)(a)(it) of the Ordinance; that the ownership of other commercial properties as well as the running of another business does not disentitle a landlord to seek ejectment of a tenant, provided by leading evidence he has shown reasonableness of his need and that a landlord has the right to make his own choice or to select has the shop where he wants to conduct his own business.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued that bona fide and 'good faith' of the requirement has to be established as a matter of fact and as both these elements were not established on record, the learned Appellate Authority was justified in reversing the order of ejectment of the learned Rent Controller and dismissing the petition. Learned counsel for the parties have also taken me through the evidence on record.
4. Having considered the submissions of the parties and having gone through the evidence on record, I am satisfied that the view taken by the Appellant Authority is fully justified. The bona fide of the requirement is to be initially proved by the landlord by producing cogent evidence- In order to establish that he requires the non-residential building in 'good faith' for his own use, a landlord has to come out with the relevant facts and satisfy the Rent Controller that his claim is bona fide. In the instant case, in the eviction petition the assertion made was that he requires the premises in question for his personal need and business. While appearing as his own witness, in examination- in-chief he deposed that he is not doing any work and that he wants to conduct his personal business in the shop in question and that he has no other shop with him except the one in dispute.
He however, admitted that he has a machine. In his cross-examination it was brought out by the respondent that he has another shop adjacent to the shop in dispute and that he is running flour Chakki since 1953-54. He further deposed in the cross-examination that he has only one Chakki and then added that he has another Chakki as well and that he, pays Income-tax and that he has a good business with the grace of God. He, however, denied the suggestion that he does not require the shop for his personal need. He further added that after leaving the business of machines, he wants to do some business in the shop in dispute as the running of machines is expensive and the income which he derives is less. Muhammad Rashid (A. W. 5) stated that the petitioner had told him that he required the shop for personal requirement. Nanak (A. W. 3) in this respect stated that the petitioner requires the disputed shop for his residence, business and self- need. In cross-examination of the aforesaid two witnesses of the petitioner, it was brought out that in the shop adjoining the shop in dispute, Bashir son-in-law of the petitioner was conducting his business. It will, therefore, be noted that the petitioner suppressed material fact that he was the owner of other commercial premises. He in his examination-in-chief stated that he was 'Are{{URDU TEXT}} (not doing any business) and that he had no other shop except the one in dispute These relevant facts were brought out by the respondent in the cross-examination of the petitioner and his witnesses. The suppression of these important facts naturally reflect adversely on the bona fides of the claim of the petitioner and 'good faith' of his requirement.
5. No doubt, a landlord has not to specify in the petition the nature of the business that he intends to conduct in the shop for which ejectment is sought, but that does not mean that the landlord in order to satisfy the Rent Controller has the liberty to suppress the relevant facts before him (the Rent Controller). He has to approach the Rent Controller with clean hands and initial onus to prove the bona fide of his claim and 'good faith' of his requirement rests on him. The burden shifts on to the respondent only when a landlord by leading evidence has prima fice established reasonableness of his, need. The petitioner, in the instant case, suppressed the fact that he was in fact running flour Chakkis and that he owned other properties also. The petitioner in these circumstances should have pleaded these facts and after pleading them, it was open to him to explain that the said premises were not suitable for his need or were not available to him for occupation.
6. The learned Appellate Authority in the circumstances discussed above, was justified in concluding that the 'good faith' of the requirement has not been established. Viewed in this perspective, the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the judgments relied upon by him become irrelevant. Moreover, it cannot be said that the learned Appellate Authority committed any jurisdictional error in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish 'good faith' of the requirement. In arriving at the said conclusion, neither any provision of !Aw nor any principle enunciated by the superior Courts has been violated. No case for interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction has thus been made out. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.