' This judgment shall dispose of three Constitutional Petitions i,e, (1) W. P. No, 1967 of 1982, (2) W. P.
No 2041 of 1982 and (3) W. P. No, 2042 of 1982 as in all these Constitutional Petitions respondents are the same and common questions of law and facts are involved.
2. Respondents Nos. 4 to 18 in these three Writ Petitions are landlords and the petitioners who are one each in these petitions are their tenants.
3. Three Criminal Original matters bearing Nos. 107-W-1982, 108-W1982 and 109-W-1982 are also sought to be disposed of by this judgment as the criminal original matters arise out of these three Constitutional Petitions.
4. The Writ Petitions assail the order dated 5-5-1982 passed in each case by the learned Additional Commissioner, Sargodha Division, Sargodha.
5. The respondents herein filed ejectment suits against the petitioners before the learned Assistant Collector First Grade Chiniot on 14-11-1978. These suits were initially dismissed by the learned A. C.-I.
On 24-2-1979. The appeals were taken before the Collector who accepted the appeals and remanded the cases on 15-5-1979.
6. During the pendency of proceedings before A. C.-I Chiniot, one of the landlords, namely, Manak is alleged to have proposed that if any one of the tenants took oath on Holy Qur'an to say that they had been paying rent to the landlords regularly, the ejectment sults might be dismissed. It is further alleged that the proposed oath was taken. The Assistant Collector-I Chiniot thus recorded this fact in his order dated 31-7-1979 and consequently he dismissed the ejectment suits. Again appeals were preferred before the Collector who accepted the appeals on 30.9-1979 and remanded the cases for decision or merits to A. C.-I. Chiniot. On 30-6-1980, A. C.-I, Chiniot decreed the suits.
Appeals were filed before the Collector which were also dismissed on 30-9-1981. Thereafter the petitioners went in revision before the learned Additional Commissioner who vide his impugned order dated 5-5-1982 dismissed the revision petitions and hence the present Constitutional Petitions.
7. The validity of the impugned order and the earlier orders passed by Assistant Collector-1 Chiniot and the Collector concerned against the petitioners has been challenged on four grounds. Firstly that the decision dated 31-7-1979 made by the Assistant Collector Grade-I Chiniot whereby the ejectment suits of the respondents were dismissed was based on oath taken by the petitioners pursuant to a proposal made by the respondents and, therefore, no appeal against the said decision was competent; secondly that by virtue of the provisions of rule 4(4) of the Ejectment Rules, 1977, it was obligatory for the Assistant Collector Grade-I to dispose of the ejectment suits within sixty days but in this case he failed to do so and, therefore, all the subsequent decisions were illegal and ineffective; thirdly that under section 70 of the Tenancy Act before passing ejectment decree against the petitioners, it was mandatory to determine compensation but in the under consideration cases, no such compensation was determined; and fourthly that the respondents levelled vague allegation of default of payment of rent against the petitioners without specifying any particular harvest for which the default took place.
8. As regards, the first contention it may be observed that as per contents of the records, no statement of any of the respondents has been regarding the proposal of decision on oath. It simply transpires from the order dated 31-7-1979 of the Assistant Collector-I Chiniot that during the course of hearing, Manak, one of the respondents herein proposed that if any one out of the tenants stated on oath on Holy Qur'an that they had been paying rent regularly, the suit of the respondents could be dismissed. It is further recorded in the order that pursuant to this proposal, Malla, one of the tenants made the proposed oath in the mosque. He consequently dismissed the ejectment suits.
Even it be assumed that oath was proposed by Manak, one of the respondents herein and the proposed oath was made by Malla, one of the petitioners herein, as recorded by A. C.-I. Chiniot in his order dated 31-7-1979 even then the proposal and the oath do not have any legal and binding effect in these cases. Manak certainly had no authority to propose decision on oath on behalf of 17 other respondents. He himself can be held liable to the extent of his share for his proposal but the land of all the 18 respondents admittedly is joint and every share-holder has interest in each inch of the land. His proposal, therefore, has no adverse effect whatsoever so far as rights of the respondents are concerned. It is, however, noteworthy that Manak as well as the counsel of the respondents have sworn affidavits that no such proposal was made by Manak and that no proceedings had in fact taken place as have been recorded in the order dated 31-7-1979 passed by A. C.-I. Chiniot. Regarding the second objection pertaining to the disregard of the provisions of rule 4(4) of the Ejectment Rules, 1977, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that these provisions are not mandatory in nature but are directory and therefore, the disregard of these provisions cannot have any adverse effect as against the respondents. It is provided in sub-rule
(5) of rule 4 (ibid) that if the Assistant Collector of the First Grade fails to decide a case within the stipulated period of sixty days, the stipulated period of sixty days, the case shall stand transferred to the Court of Collector concerned to be tried in the same manner as the original Court. In the circumstances of the present case, it is true that originally the Assistant Collector Grade-I did not dispose of the cases within sixty days of their institution and instead he dismissed all these cases on 24-2-1979. Thus he did not pass any order of ejectment against the petitioners in violation of rule 4(4) of the Ejectment Rules, 1977. He rather passed order in their favour, although after the expiry of the stipulated period. Subsequently, however, in appeal the order made in favour of the petitioners was set aside and the case was remanded. In the subsequent proceedings rule 4(4)
(ibid) has no application. It is, therefore, concluded that no adverse order in violation of the provisions of rule 4(4) of the Ejectment Rules, 1977 has been passed against the petitioners and, therefore, they cannot avail of this plea.
9. No compensation has been claimed by any of the petitioners in their written statements. They have also led no evidence about the compensation. At the time of execution of ejectment decree, compensation in respect of the standing crops was determined and had been duly deposited in Court for payment to the petitioners as transpires from the contents of reports Nos. 251, 252 and 253, dated 11-5-1982 of Patwari's Roznamcha Waqiati. In fact the question of claim of compensation in the circumstances of the under consideration cases does not arise because admittedly the petitioners have filed declaratory suits before the Civil Court claiming title and denying the status of the respondents as their landlords.
10. Similarly, in view of the petitioners' claim re: title the respondents could not specify the default of the petitioners in regard to any particular crop. The petitioners did not pay them rent at all for any crop.
11. The Revenue Courts which are Courts of competent jurisdiction so far as ejectment suits against tenants are concerned, have come to unanimous findings in the under consideration cases that the petitioners were tenants under the respondents in respect of the lands comprised in their respective tenancy and that they failed to pay rent to the landlord and were thus liable to be evicted. These findings which have been record by Courts of competent jurisdiction cannot be called in question by invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. In Muhammad Hussai Muneer and others v. Sikandar and others (I), it has been held that: "It I wholly wrong to consider that the Constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or Tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion, the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exercisable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution- makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction on to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction."
12. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in the under consideration Constitutional Petitions which are, therefore, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
13. As for the Criminal Originals, it is alleged that the respondents in violation of the stay order issued by this Court dispossessed the petitioners from the land under their occupation. In case of Writ Petition No, 1967 of 1982, an order was passed on 29-5.1982 directing that status quo would be maintained meanwhile. Similarly, in the other two Writ Petitions, orders for the maintenance of status quo were passed on 2-6-1982. It is alleged in the Criminal Originals that after the passing of the status quo order, the petitioners were dispossessed forcibly and their cattle's were driven away from the land under their respective possession. No date has been specified in the Criminal Originals when the petitioners were allegedly dispossessed forcibly in spite of the order of status quo passed by this Court. The respondents have produced copies of reports Nos. 251, 252 and 253, dated 11-5-1982 of Patwari's Roznamcha Waqiati, contents whereof are indicative of the fact that in execution of the ejectment warrants issued by the Collector Grade-I Chiniot,
(1) PLD 1974 SC 139 ' the petitioners were evicted from the land under their respective tenancy on 11-5 1982. It is thus proved that actually the ejectment of the petitioners had already taken place before the orders regarding maintenance of status quo were passed by this Court on 29-5-1982 and 2-6-1982. No violation of any order passed by this Court has thus taken place and, therefore, there is no substance in the allegation contained in the under consideration Criminal Originals. The same are accordingly dismissed.