' GHAZANFAR ALI GONDAL, J.-This is a Regular First Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 12th January, 1980 of Civil Judge, 1st Class, Sheikhupura, whereby he dismissed the spit for possession through pre-emption filed by appellants-plaintiffs.
2. The facts of the case are that in respect of sale, dated 17th January, 1915 of 56 kanals and 14 marlas land, situate in village Murad, Tehsil and District Sheikhupura, the appellants Khuda Bakhsh and another filed a suit for possession through pre-emption on 16th January, 1976. In para. 7 of the plaint it was stated that the value of the suit for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction was Rs, 200, being 15 times of net profits of the land in question and on that sum, court-fee of Rs, 15 was paid.
' After necessary report by the office, the suit came up before the learned Civil Judge on 24th January, 1976, when he passed an order that the appellants should submit a statement of net profits and make up the deficiency in court-fee in accordance with the net profits till 25th March, 1976. This direction was not obeyed nor any application was made in the Court in that respect. Yet on 25th March, 1976, the Court extended time till 20th April, 1976. At the time of this extension, counsel for the respondents was present.
' On 20th April, 1976 the Presiding Officer was on leave and the case was adjourned to 12th May, 1976 On 12th May, 1976 written statement was filed on behalf of the respondents wherein a preliminary objection was taken that the value of the suit for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction was incor rect and no determination of the profits of the last year had been made in the plaint nor any statement of net profits had been caused to be prepared for the determination of the same and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The case was directed to be fixed for 17th June, 1976, for submission of replication by the appellants. On that day viz. 12th May, 1976 too, the appellants did not produce the statement of net profits and submitted that the same was not yet ready and that in the interest of justice another adjournment be granted for making up the deficiency in the court-fee. The Court ordered that deficiency in the court-fee be made uptil the next date of hearing viz. 17th June, 1916.
' On 17th June, 1976 the plaintiffs-appellants complied with the order, submitted the statement of net profits and deposited the court-fee of Rs, 3,660.
' On the pleadings of the parties, following ten issues were framed :-
1. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction ?
O.P.D.
2. If issue No, 1 is proved then what was the correct valuation ? O.P.P.
3. Whether this suit is barred by limitation ? O.P.D.
4. Whether this suit is incompetent based on preliminary objection No, 3 of the written statement ?
O.P.D.
5. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their word and conduct to bring this suit ?
6. Whether this suit is for partial pre-emption, if so, to what effect? O.P.D.
7. Whether plaintiff has superior right of pre-emption as against the defendants.
8. Whether the sale price of Rs, 93,300 was fixed in good faith or actually paid ? O.P.D.
9. If issue No, 8 is not proved then what is the market value of the suit and ? O.P.P.
10. 3137 (10) Relief.
' The parties led evidence on the said issues. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were decided against the appellants, firstly on the ground that net profits had been determined and court-fee had been paid after the expiry of period of limitation and. Therefore, the suit was barred by time and secondly on the ground that net profits had been determined on the basis that 2/5th of the total profits of land fell to the share of vendee-landlord although said net profits should have been calculated on the basis that 1/2 of total profits fell to the share of landlord, as shown on record and that suit was even now under valued and was no suit in the eye of law.
' Issues Nos. 3 to 6 were decided against the defendants and in favour of plaintiffs. On issue No, 7 it was held that plaintiffs have a superior right of pre-emption. On issue No, 8 it was held that the said issue remained unproved. On issues Nos. 9 regarding market price it was held that no evidence was led to prove market value and that only alternative for the Court was to appoint a local Commissioner since suit was to fail on account of adverse decision on issues Nos. 1 and 2, it would not be proper to unnecessarily burden the parties with further costs. On the basis of these findings the suit was dismissed with costs by judgment and decree, dated 12th January 1980 of learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Sheikhupura. It is against this judgment and decree of the said Civil Judge, Sheikhupura, that plaintiffs have come up in appeal.
3. The first point argued by the learned counsel for the appellants is that on 24th January, 1976, the Court had permitted the appellants to make up the deficiency in the court-fee by 25th March, 1976 and had later granted extensions of time for doing so in exercise of its judicial discretion and the appellants having complied with the said order of the Civil Judge and paid the remaining court- fee, the plaint should have been considered to have same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance.
The submission of the learned counsel has no force. Original order directing the appellants to make good the deficiency in Court-fee within the time granted and subsequent extensions of time for doing so were made by the Civil Judge in routine, mechanically and without application of mind.
There was no reasonable cause before the learned Civil Judge to direct the plaintiffs to complete, the court-fee. No application had been filed by the plaintiffs giving reasons for permission to make4 good the deficiency. The suit had been filed only a day before expiry of limitation and when on 24th January, 1976, order directing the plaintiffs-appellants to complete the court-fee in accordance with net profits was made, the period of limitation of this suit had expired on account of which valuable right had accrued in favour of the defendants-vendees which could not be taken away without hearing them. The original order for making good the deficiency was passed ex parte and was subject to exceptions which might be taken by defendants-respondents later. There was no reason on record for extensions of time granted by Civil Judge to complete the court-fee. The only reason shown for one of the extensions granted on 12th May, 1976 was that statement of net profits had not yet been prepared by the concerned revenue official. However, there was no material available on the record to show that it was the revenue official who had delayed the preparation of statement of net profits. The statement of net profits available on the record of trial Court does not bear any date. On the other hand, there is intrinsic evidence available on record that the plaintiffs-appellants were themselves intentionally delaying matters. The first order for getting the statement of net profits prepared was made on 24th January, 1976, but the application for permission to get the net profits prepared from Moharrir Patwari was filed in the Court of Civil Judge on 1st March, 1976 i. e. After a period of more than one month. There is no explanation on record for this colossal delay of about 37 days in taking active steps to get the Fard Khalis Munafa prepared and pay the remaining court-fee. Further, lower Court record shows that on objection, dated 25th March, 1976 of Moharrir Patwari that Girdawari appended did not show Chak Taskhees and it was not possible to prepare the Fard Khalis Munafa without getting such entry made in Khasra Girdawari, the Deputy Commissioner directed the return of the papers to petitioner by his order, dated 5th April, 1976. Much time was not required thereafter in getting an entry of Chak Tashkees made in Khasra Girdawari nor much time was required by Moharrir to prepare the said statement and there was no valid reason that statement should not have been prepared even by 12th May, 1976 when the adjournment was obtained on the ground of inability of revenue department in getting said Fard prepared, From these facts and earlier conduct of the plaintiffs- appellants it appears therefore that the statement of net profits has been prepared sometimes in April, 1976 and the plaintiffs were avoiding to receive the same from the revenue official concerned, so that they might be in a position in the meantime to collec money necessary for the payment of remaining court-fee leviable on the B suit. No reliance could, therefore, have been placed on the original ex parte order of Civil Judge directing plaintiffs-appellants to make good the deficiency in court-fee and subsequent extensions of time granted by the learned Civil Judge.
' Learned counsel for the appellants then argued that the Civil Judge erred in law in holding that original order directing plaintiffs-appellants to make up the deficiency in court-fee and later orders extending time for same bad been passed ex parte inasmuch as learned counsel for the defendants was recorded in the order to be present on 25th March, 1976, when the Civil Judge extended the time till 24th April, 1976. He further submitted that the learned counsel for the defendants was available on 12th May, 1976 and submitted his written statement when another extension was granted by the Civil Judge for making up the deficiency in the court-fee. This argument is also of no avail. It is true that on both these dates, learned counsel for the defendants- respondents was present in the Court but it cannot be said that the interlocutory orders made on those dates had been passed after giving notice and hearing the defendants of their counsel. No notice was given to, no reply was sought from and no opportunity of hearing had been granted to defendants or their counsel on the question of property of grant of extension of time for making up deficiency in the court-fee. The Court was making suo motu extension without bringing the matter to the notice of defendants or the learned counsel and, therefore, more presence of defendants' counsel was of no consequence especially on 12th May, 1976, when the learned counsel for defendants submitted written statement, wherein a clear plea had been taken that the value of the suit for the purpose of court-fee was totally incorrect and the suit was liable to dismissal on that ground.
' Learned counsel then raised the question that decision of learned Civil Judge on issues Nos. 1 and 2 was tantamounts to a review of orders of his predecessor Judge, which he had passed on 24th January, 1976, 25th March, 1976 and 12th May, 1976 and the successor Judge had no jurisdiction to review the said order. The plea is of no force. The said orders had been passed ex parte without giving notice to and without hearing defendants-appellants who were vitally interested in the matter. The orders could not be regarded as final order qua defendants-respondents, who had after coming into the field raised an objection that suit had been deficiently stamped and was liable to be dismissed on account of expiry of period of limitation, and the successor of the said Judge sitting in same Court could reverse the said ex parte orders and pass a fresh order after hearing the other party. The order of learned Civil Judge was not one in review of the orders made by the predecessor but an order made properly after hearing the other party, which contested the matter. Attention in this respect is invited to law laid down by Supreme Court in Fateh Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh (1).
' Further learned counsel has not been able to explain as to why on the date of the institution of the suit the appellants had assessed the 15 times of the net profits of land in suit at so paltry a sum of Rs, 200 and why they had paid so ridiculously low a court-fee Rs, 15 on the suit. The land involved in this suit measured 56 kanals and 14 marlas and according to Exh. P. 2 Register Haqdaran Zamin and Exh. P. 3 Khasra Girdawari. It was all Nehri land. Calculation of 15 times of net profits at a sum cf Rs, 200 would mean that nearly Rs, 13 were its net profits for the previous year or in other words about Re. 1 per month were its profits during the last year. This was obviously a ridicul )us assessm ent of the net profits when considered in the light of the vastness of area of the land, the classification of whole of this land a Nehri and so big an amount of Rs, 93,000 as its sale price, the whole of which was shown to have been paid before Sub-Regisrar. Ridiculous court-fee had been paid by plaintiffs-appellants on the said suit which showed that they were actuated by mala fides in filing this suit. They could not therefore be permitted to make good the deficiency in court-fee after expiry of period of limitation. We are fortified in this view of ours by the observations made by Mr. Justice K. E. Chauhan in case of Walayat Khatoon v. Khalil Khan (2) that where a plaintiff puts ridiculously low court-fee, then a Court will not be justified in allowing time for validating such a plaint and destroying the plea of limitation which may have been perfected in favour of a defendant and that a plaintiff who is guilty of contumacy and positive mala fides or lack of bona fides will not be entitled to any indulgence. This Court (Aftab Hussain, J.) has also in Sohara v.
Rashid Ahmad and others (3) held that the circumstances that suit had been filed on the last date of limitation and ridiculously low court-fee had been paid on the suit which was wholly incompatible with area, classification and sale price of the land, impinge seriously upon the bona fides of the plaintiff and in such a case it should be considered that the suit is actuated by mala fides. In these circumstances the plaintiff-appellant could not have been shown any indulgence by the Court and E Civil Judge had rightly decided issues Nos. 1 and 2 against plaintiff-appellant.
(1) PLD 1953 SC 311 (2) PLD 1979 SC 821
(3) PLD 1981 Lah. 261 ' In view of this, there is no force in this appeal which is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.