1. ' Taluka Naushero Feroz, District Nawabshah. There seems to be some discrepancy in describing the name of the predecessors but the authorities concerned have accepted that the petitioners are the legal heirs of descendant of Ramzan to whom grant was made. This grant was made in the year 1934-35 and was cancelled in 1938 for non-payment of instalment by the original grantee who had died in 1935. One Thore claiming to be the attorney of the Petitioners filed an application in the year 1968-69 for re-grant of the said land to the petitioners. By an order, dated 2nd September, 1970 the Commissioner, Khairpur, the respondent No, 2, re-granted the said land to them. The respondent No, 4 preferred an appeal, which was allowed by the Additional Member. Board of Revenue, Hyderabad. The petitioners challenged this order by filing a Revision before the Full Board of Board of Revenue, Sind Hyderabad, the respondent No,
1. By the impugned order, dated 2nd July, 197 the Full Board held that it had no jurisdiction to revise the order of the 4 Additional Member as the order challenged before it was not passed by a Revenue Court.
2. ' Mr. Imam Ali Kazi, the learned counsel has contended that the dispute between the parties was in respect of tenancy and therefore, the order was passed by a Revenue Court. In this regard the learned counsel has referred to the provisions of section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, but it has no relevancy, as the learned counsel has not been able to establish that the grant was in respect of land in Colony.
3. The dispute between the parties was in respect of grant of land which was made to the predecessor of the Petitioners in the year 1934 and had been cancelled in the year 1938 for non- payment of instalment. The petitioners had applied for re-grant of that land which was opposed by the respondent No,
4. Such a dispute cannot be treated as a dispute relating to the tenancy of the land. In this background, we have now to consider whether the respondent No, 1 had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the Revision Application. Section 164 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 provides that the Board of Revenue may at any time, suo motu or on an application made to it within 90 days of the passing of any order by a Revenue Officer subordinate to it call for the record and pass such order as it may think fit. In this regard reference is made to the provision of West Pakistan.
4. Board of Revenue Act, 1957 which regulates the exercise of the Revisional Jurisdiction of the Board.
5. Section 7 of the said Act provides that any person considering himself aggrieved by any order made or decree passed by a Member in such class of cases as may be specified in the Rules framed under section 9 of this Act may apply to the Board for revision of such order. Rule 5 of West Pakistan Board of Revenue (Conduct of Appeals and Revision) Rules, 1959, framed under section 9 provides as follows : `5. An application for revision under subsection (2) of section 7 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 shall lie to the Full Board only in cases where the order made or decree passed by the Court, subordinate to the Board is reversed or modified by a Member of the Board on appeal."
6. A revision against the order passed by the Member of the Boardic shall lie before the Full Board on fulfilment of the conditions viz. That! The Member has reversed or modified any order and secondly that such order was passed by a Court subordinate to the Board. If the order modified or reversed by the Member has not been passed by a Court subordinate to the Board then such order of the Member is not revisable by the Full Board. In this regard while dismissing petitioner's revision the respondent No, 1 has relied on Allah Ditta v. Salamat Ali (1), where, it was held that :- "the statute clearly required that the right of revision should be restricted The Act itself in a number of cases differentiates expressly between Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts and therefore the confinement of the right of revision to Orders or decrees made by Revenue Courts is sufficient to exclude the competency of a "revision against an order made by a Revenue Officer, in that capacity."
7. ' It is therefore, to be considered whether the order of respondent No, 2 reversed by the Member was passed by a Revenue Court or by a Revenue Officer. The Land Revenue Act has clearly distinguished between a Revenue Court and a Revenue Officer. They have been defined by section 4 (22) and (23) in the following manner : "S. 4 (22) "Revenue Court" means a Court constituted as such under the law relating to tenancy as in force for the time being ; "S. 4 (23) "Revenue Officer" means a Revenue Officer having authority under this Act to discharge the functions of a Revenue Officer ;"
8. This definition clearly postulates that a Revenue Officer cannot act as a Revenue Court unless he is so constituted under the law relating to tenancy as may be in force from time to time. The order of re-grant passed by the Commissioner was an administrative order. In deciding such disputes the Commissioner was not acting as a Revenue Court.
9. ' Mr. Abdul Sattar Shaikh, the learned counsel for the respondents has invited our attention to the case of Ch. Atta Muhammad and 2 others v. The State and another (2). In this case while eviction proceedings were pending a party tiled an application before the Collector for review of mutation, dated 30th July, 1970 made by the Tahsild. In support of his case the applicant had filed a certified copy of mutation, dated 11th October, 1961. The review application was dismissed and Criminal proceedings under section 193, P. P. C. Were ordered to be taken for filing forged copy of mutation, dated 11th October,- 1961. When the petitioner was summoned before the Magistrate he filed petition before the High Court for quashment of the proceedings. It was contended that the proceedings before the Collector were not proceedings before the Court. It was held as follows : "The main question that calls for determination is whether the proceedings in the review petition filed by the petitioner before Collector were proceedings before a Revenue Court or a Revenue Officer. The review petition, to the extent to which it was before the Collector, was for sanction only and was,
(1) PLD 1965 SC 393 (2) 1981 P Cr, L J 55 ' therefore, basically an administrative proceedings. As order granting or refusing sanction is not an appealable order subsection (4) of section 160 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. Even otherwise, in view of the definition of "Revenue Court" and "Revenue Officer" as given in subsections
(22) and (23) of section 4 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, it appears that only Court, constituted as such, under the law relating to tenancy as may be in force from time to time can be treated as Revenue Courts, whereas all officers having authority under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, and performing their functions thereunder, only discharge their functions as Revenue Officers and not as Revenue Courts."
10. ' Mr. Imam Ali Kazi has invited our attention to an observation made in Gore Adamjee Ibrahimjee v.
11. Chief Commissioner, Karachi (1) where it was held that only an express legal provision will make an executive authority a Revenue Court. Considering the definition of "Revenue Court" as given in the Land Revenue Act, 1967 mere exercise of power under it by any officer will not make such officer automatically a,E "Revenue Court" unless he is constituted as a Revenue Court under the law relating to the tenancy. The petitioners have not been able to show that the respondent No, 2 while re-granting the land to them was acting as a Revenue Court constituted under the law relating to tenancy. In these premises no exception can be taken to the order passed by the respondent No, 1.
12. Even otherwise on merits we are not impressed by the case of the petitioners. The land was cancelled in 1935 when according to the petitioners they were minors. They applied for re-grant in 1968. Surely their minority would not have continued for a such a long period of over 30 years. The fact that they have themselves neglected to exercise their right, if any, is sufficient to defeat their claim. Furthermore, the order passed by the additional Member, Board of Revenue is just and proper as two acres of disputed land have been reserved for the Ashaish of the residents of the villagers. Surely public interest should have precedence over individual and private interest. In these circumstances, the petition is dismissed with no order as to cost.
(I) AIR 1950 Kutch. 8