' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Mr. Lqbal-ud-Din Ahmad Siddique filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunal. He has impleaded the Government of Pakistan through Secretay, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi and the Government of the Punjab through the Chief Secretary as respondents.
2. By virtue of this appeal the appellant has prayed that the impugned order, dated 12th March, 1972 retiring the appellant from service be set aside and he be treated continuously in the service of the Punjab as Assistant Commissioner with a direction of consequential benefit of costs.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was retired under Martial Law Regulation 114 and he challenged the same on ground of malice, claiming that he had fallen victim to personal malice of Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the former Governor and the then Chief Minister of the Punjab.
4. It took three long years to conclude the appeal. On 24th July, 1977 this Tribunal vide judgment of the above date dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had failed to establish any mala fides against the competent authority. The matter did not rest at that stage as the appellant filed a C. P. S. L. A. Before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment of this Tribunal. The case was concluded on 13th February, 1982 when the Lordship of the Supreme Court remanded the case for a fresh decision on merits taking into consideration the appellant's service record and other relevant material and set aside the judgment of the Tribunal so appealed against.
5. The appellant relying on the record so produced by him in his earlier appeal before this Tribunal as well as on the evidence recorded by the said Tribunal with regard to the issue of malice made a statement that he would not produce any other witness. So, no further evidence or document was produced before this Tribunal.
6. We summoned the service record of the appellant in order to find whether the retirement of the appellant was justified on the strength of the record so produced by the respondent,
7. We have heard the appellant at length as well as the learned District Attorney on behalf of the respondents ; and have also perused the evidence so produced by him to prove that the retirement of the appellant was due to personal malice of Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar on account of appellant's certain dealings with his relations at Taunsa.
8. So far the evidence of malice is concerned we have assessed its value and have no reasons to disagree with the earlier judgment of this Tribunal that the same was not sufficient to prove malice against the competent authority.
9. As regards his service record which has been examined under the directions of the Lordship of the Supreme Court we find that the entire service record of the appellant is chequered one. Even in 1968, two years before passing of the impugned orders, he earned a bad report. We reproduce below the same for the sake of ready reference :-- "Perseverence and devotion to duty : Below average. Co-operation and tact : Below average, Interest in Social Welfare : Is inclined to treat this aspect of his duty as routine function. Comparing him with other officers of the same grade. He is below average. He is a man of fluctuating temperament. His output as a Magistrate was low. His attitude towards discipline is careless. He lobbied to be transferred out of Minchinabad and on receipt of transfer order he relinquished without permission of the District Magistrate. He should cultivate the habit of discipline and executive temperaments which he lacks."
10. His superiors found him inefficient as well as below average. Even the Sessions Judge before whom certain appeals against the decision of the appellant were filed the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that he as Judicial Officer was also not upto the mark. We have also taken into account the earlier service record and it cannot be said that his earlier service was also unblemished. The appellant earned some good reports as well as bad reports during his career of service.
11. In view of the above we do not feel any justification to set aside the order of his retirement either on grounds of malice or on the strength of his laudable performance. The result is that we do not find any merits in this appeal and dismiss the same. However, parties will bear I their own costs.