' The appeal captioned above emanates from the decision, dated 17th February, 1983 delivered by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 6, Rawalpindi, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his re-instatement in service was dismissed. On behalf of respondent cross- objections have been filed, which are being decided alongwith the appeal.
2. The appellant was previously dismissed from service for absence for more than ten days. He was directed by the learned lower Court to be re-instated in service. He was, thereafter, terminated from service as superfluous. The learned lower Court has dismissed the petition of the appellant on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts is barred by virtue of Essential Services Maintenance Act. On merits it has been held that the order of termination is not legal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the Supreme Court's ruling PLD 1982 SC 113 has been misinterpreted. It is contended by the learned counsel that the Supreme Court has not said that the Labour Courts have no jurisdiction. The argument has no force. The case was for re- instatement in which the Supreme Court held that the remedy was to have recourse under section 7 of the Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. The Supreme Court knew that section 7 provided criminal remedy but in spite of it, it was observed that remedy was under the said section.
If in view of the Supreme Court some other forum had also jurisdiction, it would have, instead of observing that the employees concerned should have taken steps under section 7, said that remedy should have been sought in the proper forum. Unless the Supreme Court itself interprets the ruling to the effect that it was not intended that no other forum would have jurisdiction to grant civil relief, there is no scope to say that the said Court intended that remedy was available otherwise also. So the learned lower Court has rightly held that it has no jurisdiction in the matter.
4. The cross-objections are without force. On merits the order of termination is not sustainable.
There is no evidence that during the absence of the appellant some other person was appointed in his place. If in reality the post could not have been kept vacant after the dismissal of the appellant, someone else would have been appointed in his place, Merely writing in the termination order that permanent arrangement had been made is not sufficient for an order has been challenged has no evil dentiary value.
5. As upshot of the observations made above, I do not find any force in the appeal and the cross- objections and dismiss both of them. Present none of the parties.