1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-These 18 petitions have been filed by the Province of East Pakistan for leave to appeal from interim orders passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of East Pakistan an application for stay of execution made in 18 appeals filed in the High Court against awards passed by the Arbitrator, Dacca, under the Town Improvement Act, 1953, in respect of certain lands acquired for the purposes of Government.
2. In each of these applications a rule was first issued and then the High Court disposed of each of the rules by separate orders in the following terms :- "The rule is made absolute on the grounds stated in the petition on condition that the entire decretal dues including costs will be deposited within one month from today in the executing Court.
3. In default the rule will stand discharged. I n case the decretal dues and costs are deposited the opposite-party will be at liberty to withdraw the same on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the executing Court."
4. The Province of East Pakistan seeks leave to appeal from these interim order's on the ground that the High Court's order is self-contradictory. Although it states in the beginning that -the rule is made absolute but towards the end in effect denies the relief earlier granted to the petitioner. If, as stated in the orders, the High Court was satisfied that the grounds stated in the petition were valid grounds for ordering stay of execution, then, it is submitted, the imposition of the condition that the entire award money including costs should be deposited in the executing Court was meaningless, as it had the effect of taking away the relief that was proposed to be granted by making the rule absolute.
5. It is further pointed out that under rule 6 of Order LXI of the Code of Civil Procedure the award- holder could have been asked to furnish security by the executing Court itself if it ordered exe-- cution to issue during the pendency of the appeals. For an order of this nature it was not at all necessary to come to the High Court.
6. It may be that the High Court was not quite accurate in saying that the "rule was made absolute".
7. Perhaps more appro--priately it should have said that the rules were to be disposed of upon the terms imposed by it. Nevertheless, the intent of the order is quite clear. We have to look to the substance of the order and not to its words alone. Looking at it in this way the question that arises is as to whether the orders that have been passed by the High Court are wholly illegal orders or arbitrary or whimsical orders, for, unless we can come to such a conclusion, we would not be justified in interfering with purely interim orders which have not finally adjudicated upon the rights of the parties either one way or the other: Learned counsel has not been able to place before us any authority for the proposition that such an order could not be made. It is, however, patent that the filing of an appeal does not by itself operate as a stay of execution. Stay of execution is an indulgence granted by the Court and such an indulgence can always be granted upon terms. There was nothing wrong, therefore, in the High Court imposing the impugned condition. It has been the common practice not only of the Dacca High Court but of other High Courts as well not to order the stay of execution of money decrees except on the deposit of the whole or substantial part of the decretal amount in Court. Even in this Court orders for stay of execution of decrees have frequently been made on similar condi--tions. It is not possible for us, therefore, to agree that the orders made by the High Court suffer from any legal defect or are based upon unsound judicial principles. We, accordingly, refuse to interfere with these interim orders, particularly, since they have, in no way, prejudiced the rights of the petitioner.
8. The award-- holders have been directed to furnish security to the satisfaction of the executing Court, if they wish to withdraw the award money deposited by the petitioner. This will adequately safeguard the interests of the petitioner in the event of its appeal in the High Court succeeding, for, it is only reasonable to expect that the executing Court will see to it that the securities furnished by such award-holders are not illusory securities and that the interests of the petitioner are not in any way jeopardised.' We have no reason to think that- the securities will not be properly tested.
9. With these observations we dismiss all these petitions, which have been heard together, as they involved a common question of law and were directed against orders which were identically worded.