1. ' The appellant named above has preferred this appeal under section 21(2) of the Sirul Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, against an order, dated 19-9-1982 passed by the learned VIth Senior Civil Judge/Controller, Karachi, in Execution Application No,6/75 in Rent Case No,2428/71. The facts in the background are as under:- ' The respondent named above is owner/landlord of a residential premises No,B/15 (Ground Floor), Al-Azam Square, Federal 'B' Area, Karachi. She let out the premises to Dr. Abu Bakar I.Shaikh, at the rent of Rs,165 p.m. exclusive of electricity and water charges, under an agreement of tenancy, dated 21-4-1970. The Landlady filed Rent Case No,2428/71 in the Court of IXth Civil Judge/Controller, Karachi, on 5-10-1971 for ejectment of the tenant Dr. Abu Bakar on the ground that he had made default in payment of rent from 24th February, 1971 and also that she needed the premises for her bona fide use. During the pendency of the proceedings, defence of the tenant Dr. Abu Bakar was struck off and he was directed to put the Landlady in vacant possession of the rented premises by order, dated 30-4-1975. The order was not given effect to and the Landlady filed Execution Application No,6/1975 for possession of the rented premises. Writ for possession of the premises was issued. The execution of order of ejectment was resisted by the appellant herein on the ground that the premises was let out to him by the husband of the Landlady by Oral Agreement and the tenancy had come into effect from 1-9-1974. In the first instance, he made an application under Order XXI, rule 36, C.P.C. This application was dismissed by order, dated 20-10-1975. The appellant thereafter filed another application under Order XXI, rules 99, 100 and 103. He also filed a Civil Suit No,1445/82 and made unsuccessful attempts to obtain interim orders to resist his eviction from the premises in pursuance of the execution application. He yet filed another application under section 151, C.P.C. before the Controller in opposition to the execution proceedings. The applications made by him were dismissed by the impugned order, dated 19-9-1982 and he was evicted from the premises.
2. ' It has been contended that the rented premises was let out to Dr. Abu Bakar and he did not resist the execution proceedings after his defence was struck off by order, dated 30-4-1975.The appellant, who happens to be father of Dr. Abu Bakar, introduced himself as the tenant from 1-9- 1974 by way of alleged Oral Agreement entered into by the husband of the Land lady. His objections were overruled by the learned Controller. The learned counsel representing the appellant urged that the learned Controller did not decide the objections filed by the appellant under Order XXI, rules 99, 100 and 103, C.P.C. and passed impugned order of his ejectment, dated 19-9-1982 on an application under section 151, C.P.C. and the order was bad in law. He made reference to the cases reported in PLD 1966 Pesh. 34 and 1968 SCMR 341. He also cited a case reported in PLD 1983 SC 155 regarding maintainability of the objections. He further urged that the appellant may be restored possession of the rented premises and he relied upon a case reported in PLD 1981 Kar.
82. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the premises was never let out to the appellant and he, being father of the original tenant Dr. Abu Bakar, was living with him and he did not have locus stand to have put up resistance to the execution application.
3. ' The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has been that the objections filed by the appellant in form of an application under Order XXI, rules 99, 100 and 103, C.P.C. were not disposed of before passing the order for his eviction. He made pertinent reference to the opening paragraph of the impugned order reading as "By this order I propose to dispose of the application under section 151, C.P.C. filed by the objector". He then made reference to another passage in the last but two paragraphs of the same order reading as "There is absolutely no merit in all the three applications inasmuch as they pertain to the suit filed by the objector". He built up the argument that the order was passed on an application under section 151, C.P.C. and yet two other applications pending disposal also were dismissed thereunder without affording opportunity for the hearing thereof. He made reference to an application under section 151, C.P.C. dated 15-3-1982, a copy whereof has been filed as annexure 'E' to the memo, of appeal and another application under Order XXI, rules 99, 100 and 103 read with section 151, C.P.C, dated 17-7-1982, a copy whereof is annexure 'F' to the memo. of appeal. But it appears from the record that an application under section 151, C.P.C., dated 18-8-1982 was filed in the Court with prayer that execution proceedings may be disposed of and it was in pursuance of that application that the previous applications also were disposed of simultaneously. Even otherwise, the applications filed by him were misconceived.
4. In the application under section 151, C.P.C., dated 25-3-1982, the prayer was that the Court had no jurisdiction to precede with the execution proceedings. He was not a party to the execution proceedings and he had no locus stand to have taken objection to the execution of the decree. In the other application under Order XXI, rules 99, 100 and 103 read with section 151, C.P.C. , dated 17-7- 1982, his contention was that he was not bound by the decree and the execution application was liable to be dismissed. This application too was not sustainable. Rule 99 of Order XXI, C.P.C. provides that where the Court is satisfied that resistance or obstruction to the execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property is made by a person (other than the judgment-debtor) claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than judgment-debtor, the Court shall make an order dismissing the application of decree holder against the resistance or obstruction put up by such person. In the instant case, the appellant advanced a dishonest claim that the property had been let out to him by the husband of the respondent-Landlady during the pendency of ejectment proceedings against his son. Rule 100 of Order XXI, C.P.C. provides that any person other than the judgment- debtor dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of decree for possession of such property may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession and the Court shall investigate the matter. This prayer C was premature as the eviction of the appellant had not taken place by that time. Rule 103 of Order XXI, C.P.C. provides that all questions arising' as to title, right or interest in, or possession of immovable property between the decree-holder and the other party shall be adjudicated upon and determined by the Court and no separate suit shall lie for the determination of any such matter. In the instant case, the appellant had agitated his claim over the said premises in the civil Court but he could not succeed. The learned Controller taking notice of those facts did not find the appellant's claim tenable and dismissed the application. It appears from the record that the appellant dividedly obstructed the execution of the decree for about seven years from 1975 to 1982 by making frivolous applications that he was in occupation of the premises as a tenant by virtue of an Oral Agreement made by husband of the Landlady.
5. ' Reference may now be made to the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of submissions made by him. The first case referred to by him is that of West Pakistan Province v. Hazrat Gul Khan and another reported in PLD 1966 Pesh.
34. It was held in that case that where jurisdiction of Court is challenged, the question of jurisdiction should be decided before taking further proceedings in the matter. in the instant case, the learned counsel urged that the appellant had made an application under section 151, C.P.C., dated 25-3- 1982, that the Court had no jurisdiction in executing the decree against the appellant who was not a party there to and this application had not been disposed of. The contention raised in the application did not affect the jurisdiction of the learned Court seized of the execution application as the plea advanced by the appellant was that he was not liable to be ejected in pursuance of the decree. It appears that during the pendency of this application, another application under Order XXI, rules 99, 100 and 103 read with section 151, C.P.C., dated 17-7-1982 was filed and both the applications were pending consideration, where the third application under section 151, C.P.C., dated 18-9-1982 was filed that the execution application may be disposed of on the basis of the facts stated therein that the decree-holder had failed to file written statement in the civil suit filed by the objector, the appellant herein; and the learned Judge heard the pending applications and passed the impugned order. It is obvious that the appellant had made a frivolous application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court on untenable grounds. The application was disposed of along with the other applications which were filed one after the other.
6. ' Another case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is that of Mehmood Khan v. Mirza Muhammad Ahmed reported in 1968 SCMR 341. It was held in that case that where execution of decree for possession of immovable property is resisted by a person (other than the judgment- debtor) claiming the property in its own right, the application for execution of a decree be dismissed it has been discussed above that the appellant did not have legitimate claim of possession over the house which was let out to his son and he raised fake claim of tenancy under Oral Agreement.
7. ' The third case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in PLD 1983 SC 155 is that of MessRs,', Bambino Ltd. v. Messer Selmer International Ltd. and another. It was held in that case that Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to proceedings before Rent Controller, nonetheless Rent Controller can follow equitable principles contained in C.P.C. in the execution of order of ejectment and order passed by the Rent Controller in such proceedings is appealable to the High Court. In the instant case, the learned Controller did consider the objections filed by the appellant to the execution of the ejectment order and his order has been appealed against in this Court and the appeal is being disposed of by this order.
8. ' The fourth case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in PLD 1981 Kar. 82 is that of Mst. Zubeda Bai v. Second Rent Controller, City Court, Karachi, and another. It was held in that case that where a tenant has been ejected under an order of a Rent Controller and which order is set aside on appeal, the tenant dispossessed is entitled to the restitution of possession of the rented premises. But that situation has not arisen in this case as the appellant has failed to make out a case that his eviction from the premises under execution of the decree obtained by the respondent is not sustainable under law.
9. ' It follows from the appraisal of the facts of the case and review of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no merit in the appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.