' The seven appeals captioned above emerge from separate decisions, dated 8th March, 1983 passed by the learned Labour Court No, 6, Rawalpindi, whereby separate grievance petitions of the respondents for their re-instatement in service were accepted and they were directed to be re- instated in service with back benefits. As in all the seven appeals the facts and law points are common except this that the question of grievance notice being time-barred is not involved in Appeals Nos, JM-156 and JM-159, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment.
2. The respondents were employed initially for nine months temporarily for the completion of extension of project w. e. f. 10th April, 1978. As the work could not be completed the services of the respondents were extended from time to time according to requirement but never for more than nine months at a stretch. For the last time the services were extended for one month only.
Nowsherwan son of Abdul Rahman and Abdur Rauf continued upto 31st May, 1982 but according to the appellant the remaining respondents served upto 30th April, 1982, No written order of termination at any stage was recorded. The respondents in their petitions urged that they were permanent employees and that work did not come to an end but rather other persons were employed in their places. The appellant controverted these facts in the written statement in all cases except grievance Petitions Nos, 180 and 185 wherein it was contended that services were terminated on 30th April, 1982 and thus the grievance notices served on 7th August, 1982 were time-barred.
3. Let us first dispose of the plea of the appellant that grievance notices given by respondents Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Aslam, Shaukat Hussain, Muhammad Ramzan and Nowsherwan son of Alam Khan were time-barred. This difficulty has arisen because the appellant did not pass any written order of termination. All the five respondents mentioned above stated in their statements before the learned lower Court that on 30th April, 1982 their services were further extended till 31st May, 1982 and they worked till that date. Since the objection of grievance notices being time- barred as raised by the appellant not the record with it the onus was upon it. Needless to say that always best possible evidence is produced. Documentary evidence is the best and in its presence oral evidence has no value. The documents admittedly are with the appellant as it being the paymaster had to maintain the attendance and payment registers but this is astonishing to note that statements of the respondents were tried to be controverted by oral statement of R. W. 1 instead of producing the pay and attendance registers. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the respondents could have summoned the said record. Ex facie this argument has no force, as the onus was upon the appellant. The presumption, therefore, is that if the above- mentioned registers had been produced they would have disproved the objection of the appellant.
The learned lower Court, therefore, rightly held that the grievance notices were within time.
4. On merits also the appellant has no case. The mere fact that initially and on the expiry of every period services we extended for a fixed period temporary is not sufficient to show that the service was temporary. For four years the respondents remained in continuous service. Of course if per chance for some cogent reasons work is not completed and service is extended it remains temporary but in the present case the work obviously was of permanent nature as was to last for more than nine months in all probabilities and only to deprive the respondents from acquiring the rights of permanent service device was made to show them as temporary employees. In the Supreme Court authority cited by the learned counsel that is PLD 1980 SC 323 the facts were quite different.' On account of labour disturbance the work had remained suspended and thus had not been completed. But in the present case there was no labour trouble. It is difficult to say that the work which was liable to be completed within nine months continued upto four long years. I, therefore hold that since the work was to last for more than 9 months and the respondents had on account of continuing in service for four years completed the probationary period had become permanent. Since they were permanent the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has no force that since for the last time the services were extended for one month no order of termination in writing was required. Not only that according to Standing Order (Ordinance) 12 (3) only a written order giving explicit reasons the services of the respondent s could be terminated, they were entitled to one month notice and one month's pay in lieu of notice as required by Standing Orders (Ordinance) 12 (1). Since this was not done the order of termination was quite illegal and did not exit in the eye of C law. In this view of the matter the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant such as 1982 PLC 503, 1982 PLC 936 and PLD 1980 SC 323 are not germane to this case.
' As upshot of the observations made above I do not find any force in the appeals and dismiss the same.