' The two appeals captioned above arise from the decision, dated 1st November, 1980 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 5, Faisalabad, whereby the grievance petition of Muhammad Amin Bhatti and Shamas Tabrez was accepted and they were ordered to be reinstated in service without back benefits. The Bank has challenged the order of the re- instatement, whereas Muhammad Amin Bhatti and Shamas Tabrez have challenged that portion of the impugned order whereby they where disallowed back benefits. Since both the appeals arise from the same order, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment, in which the Bank will be described as the appellant while Muhammad Amin Bhatti and Shamas Tabrez as the respondents.
2. Muhammad Amin Bhatti was Cashier and Shamas Tabrez a Chowkider in different branches of Habib Bank Limited, Faisalabad. They were transferred to other branches with effect from 16th May, 1978. They did not join their new places of duty. They were treated absent. An enquiry was held against them and they were ultimately dismissed. According to the respondents, they were transferred because they formed a Union of which they were elected office-holders. They challenged the orders of their dismissal on this ground also that although their application for the registration of the Union was pending before the Registrar, of which due information had been given to the Bank, yet without taking any permission from the Registrar, they were dismissed. Their stand is that on account of their trade union activities, they were victimized. It was contended on behalf of the Bank that the Management had no intimation about the election of the respondents as office-bearers and that the application for registration of the Trade Union had been rejected by the Registrar. A person from the office of the Registrar was examined, who deposed that application for registration of the Union was presented on 22nd May, 1978 and the Union was registered on 26th June, 1978. He further stated that the Registration was subsequently withdrawn by the Registrar under the orders of the Administrative Civil Judge, Faisalabad, dated 2nd July, 1978 and that, therefore, the matter was still pending. The respondents relied upon letter Exh. P. 6 sent under postal receipt Exh. P. 30 to the Management for information about their election as office- bearers. In oral evidence produced by the appellant, it was stated that at the time the transfer orders were made on 16th May, 1978 no application for registration was pending and that the Management was never communicated anything about the election. The learned trial Judge relying upon oral and documentary evidence produced by the respondents held that the Management had been duly informed about the election of the office-bearers of the Union vide letter Exh. P. 6, postal receipt Exh. P. 30 and telegram Exh. P-7 and the Registrar had informed the Management about the election vide his letter Exh. P. 2, but he observed that the transfer orders were made prior to that. He, however, decided that at the time the dismissal orders were passed, the application for registration of the Union was still pending, inasmuch as the registration was withdrawn by the Registrar under the order of the Administrative Civil Judge, Faisalabad, dated 2nd July, 1978. No evidence was produced by the appellant that the Registrar had after withdrawing the order of registration dismissed the petition for registration. In the absence of such evidence, the learned trial Judge was justified in holding that the petition was pending at the time the respondents were dismissed. In these circumstances, the learned trial Court was justified in directing the re-instatement of the respondents in service. Since the application for the registration of the union had not been finally disposed of after the withdrawal of registration, it was pending and thus getting of permission from the Registrar as required by section 8-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was necessary.
3.
3. Back benefits were rightly disallowed to the respondents because it was not proved that the transfer orders were made by the Management on account of the fact that the respondents had formed a Union and had been elected as office-holders. The transfer orders being legal should have been complied with and the respondents were not justified in not joining the new stations of their duty. Since on account of technical ground which was that permission was not obtained, the order of reinstatement was passed, the respondents were not entitled to back benefits. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that no second show-cause notice and the copy of the enquiry report was given and for this reason also the orders of dismissal were not maintainable. He relies upon. PLD 1981 SC 176, but this is distinguishable from the present case because it was a service case under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973 of North-West Frontier Province. There may be a provision in the rules applicable to the civil servants serving in the North- West Frontier Province, but no authority has been cited in which ;n respect of Labour cases it may have been held that service of second show-cause notice and the delivery of copy of the enquiry report is necessary. Whereas in PLD 1981 SC 225 it has been observed that neither giving of second show-cause notice nor supplying of enquiry report is a requirement of Rules of natural justice. It has been further observed that in cases where the report of the enquiry officer contains material extraneous to the charges or anything in addition to that is found in the original allegations against the workman or other substantial defects which could have prejudiced his case, second show- cause notice be given affording opportunity to explain the new matter, but this by no means provides a ground in enlarging the scope of the provision so as to include both these requirements.
In the present case there is no question of the inclusion of any extraneous matter during the enquiry. As a result of observations made above, I do not find any force in the two appeals and dismiss them.