1. ' This revision is directed against the judgment of the Majlis-e-Shoora dated 14-9-1981 passed in appeal filed on behalf of the respondents Jaro son of Katto, and Juma son of Bango whereby the Decree of Qazi Panjgoor dated 20-12-1980 decreeing the suit of the petitioner Gul Muhammad has been set aside and the suit filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The facts material for the disposal of this revision petition are that the petitioner had filed a suit on 6-6-1979 against the respondents 1 and 2 on the averments that the present respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (defendants in the suit had exceeded the boundaries of the lands sold to them and had encroached upon a piece of land known as Cheel to the extent of 50 paces in width and 100 paces in length. The suit was originally filed before the Assistant Commissioner as laid down in the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani Kalat. The defendant No, 1 in his written statement took up the stand that since several years back he had purchased the land from the plaintiff, which was barren and uncultivable from the time of the father of the plaintiff, for a sum of Rs, 450. This land is known as "Cheal of Jhando Khan" (Jhanda Khan is the name of the father of the plaintiff). The land has now been made cultivable. The plaintiff has given him a document of Sanad and that he has not exceeded the boundaries nor had encroached upon any piece of land of the plaintiff and bad asserted that his possession was within the boundaries mentioned in the Sanad executed by the plaintiff. It was asserted in the written statement filed by Juma that he has purchased a piece of land from the defendant Jaro son of Katto and that it is within the boundaries of the lands purchased by Jaro from the laintiff. Upon the pleadings of the parties the Issues were framed on 3- 7-1979 which are reproduced below :-
(1) Whether the defendants have constructed lath (URDU TEXT) over the land other than that belonging to the defendants and on the land of the plaintiff known as Cheel to the extent of 50 x 100 gain (Paces) (onus on the plaintiff and rebuttal on the defendant) ?
(2) Whether the land over which the defendants raised Laths belong to them and is the same which was purchased by the defendants. (Proof on the defendants and rebuttal on the plaintiff) ?
(3) Whether the suit is within limitation ?
(4) What should the relief be on the proof of the plaintiff's right ?
2. From the pleadings it was clear that it was the case of the plaintiff that the defendants have exceeded the. Boundaries of the lands purchased by the defendants. From the pleadings and the orders record- ed by the lower Court (Qazi) it is found that the defendants had relied on a document (Sanad) and,had produced the same in Court on 24-1 i-1974. A copy whereof was retailed by the Qazi on the record after persuing the original and comparing the same with the copy retained. It is interesting to note that one Moulvi Khuda Bakhsh made an application before the Qazi alleging therein that the defendants have also encroached upon his lands and be should be impleaded as plaintiff. This application was allowed and without making any formal amendment or paying any court-fee Moulvi Khuda Bakhsh was allowed to be joined as plaintiff.
3. Another person named Mulla Peer Muhammad was also impleaded as plaintiff though he has not even made any application. On 3-6-1980 the plaintiff declared before the Qazi that he had no witnesses to prove that the defendants have exceeded the limits of the lands as is evident from the words used in the order sheet. {{URUD TEXT}} ' But in spite thereof the defendants were ordered to examine the witnesses on the next date of hearing i, e.
4. 30.6-1980, impliedly on the issue No, 2 which after the declaration of the plaintiff was not necessary.
5. The genuineness of Sanad produced by the defendants was not challenged nor any ambiguity in the writing was pointed out or pleaded in the suit. The learned Qazi however, after recording the statements of the witnesses produced by the defendants and inspection of the site decreed the suit holding that since on his inspection "Iathbandi" appears to be recent, therefore encroachment is proved. The decree in favour of Moulvi Khuda Bakhsh and Mulla Pir Muhammad was also passed.
6. Against this judgment and decree the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 preferred an appeal before the Majois-e-Shoora and the judgment and decree of Qazi panjgoor has been set aside and the suit of Gui Muhammad the plaintiff/petitioner has been dismissed. It has been also observed by the learned members of the Majlis-e-Shoora that Mulla Pir Muhammad and Moulvi Khuda Bakhsh may file a fresh suit in accordance with law against Jaro and Juma, the appellants before them, if there is no legal impediment to do so. Against this judgment and decree this revision has been filed in this Court by Gul Muhammad alone.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the learned Members of Majlis-e-Shoora have not properly read the evidence and. Considered its effect. He has also asserted that the plaintiff has discharged the burden of issue No, I which lay on him and since the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had failed to discharge their burden the suit has been improperly dismissed. For the proper appreciation of the contentions it is necessary to mention that at no stage either at the filing of the suit or upto the stage when the defendants started their evidence any objection about the Sanad relied upon by the defendants (respondents Nos. 1 and 2) was taken. The plaintiff himself did not appear in the Court in support of the everments contained in the plaint. The documents relied upon is very clear and no ambiguity-is found nor any pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is also not denied that the transaction of sale as admitted by the plaintiff was not recorded and the Sanad produced by the defendants is not that Sanad. The learned counsel for the respondents has therefore, rightly contended that no oral evidence to explain the contents was admissible or required and the sanad being the primary evidence was enough and its prove was dispensed with in view of the admission of this document by the plaintiff as there was no suggestion that the Sanad produced by the defendants was not genuine. In this connection the provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act were relied upon. Section 91 of the Evidence Act has laid down that when the terms of a contract or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property or of such matter, except the document itself. This section as well as section 92 of the Evidence Act are the illustrations of what is known as best Evidence Rule and are designed to prevent fraud. It is an inflexible rule that whenever written instruments are executed by the parties to be repositories and memorials of truth any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instrument or Contract or alter them because such instruments are in their nature and title entitled to much higher degree of credit than parole evidence and the principle and policy demand that such instruments should not be allowed to be impeached by loose collateral evidence and the rule with regard to writing is that oral proof cannot be substituted for the written evidence of any contract which D the parties themselves have put into writing. Section 91 deals with the exclusiveness of documentary evidence while section 92 deals with the conclusiveness of such evidence, and in other words section 91 deals with the proof of the matters mentioned in that section while section 92 deals with what may, in a sense be called disproof of such matter. It has been pointed out in Haji Rahim Bakhsh and another v. Sajjad Ahmad Chaudhary (I), a Division Bench judgment of Culcutta High Court, that where the true effect of the language used in a document is perfectly clear no reference is permissible to the conduct of the parties, because if according to the true construction the deed says one thing it cannot be said that it means something else. Therefore, the words of the written instrument must be construed according to its natural meaning and nothing can be allowed to alter or qualify words which are plain and unambiguous. The Majlis-e-Shoora has held that the plaintiff/petitioner did not controvert the fact that the land in suit falls within the boundaries mentioned in the Sanad. The obliging statement of Muhammad Karim the scribe of this document that he had made a mistake in the document while describing the Southern boundary makes no difference and cannot discredit the Sanad, when the other attesting witnesses of this Sanad do not support the scribe of the docu ment on this point.
7. The members of Majlis-e-Shoora Kalat have there- F fore, ignored this obliging statement of Abdul Karim and it has been done rightly, because, besides the fact that he is found to be a relation of the plaintiff, the provisions of sections 93 and 94 of the Evidence Act do not permit any such explanation as has been attempted by scribe of the Sanad now after a lapse of seven years. His evidence is unnatural on the face of it. On these premises the judgment of Majlis-e Shoora is unassailable.
5. The Sanad was produced in the Court and was admitted without any objection or demur from the plaintiff. No objection about its ad-missibility or that the mode of proof is irregular or insufficient can be allowed before the appellate Court or before me in the High Court. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Gopal Dass and others v. Sri Thakurji and others (2) 'that such an objection should be taken at the trial before the document is admitted to the record. A party cannot lie until the case Comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the H mode of proof.
8. To the same strain are the judgment of Supreme Court of Pakistan in Abdulla and 3 others v. Abdul Hakeem (3), Malik Din v. Muhammad Aslam (4) may be referred. The document (Sanad) not having been objected to must be held to have been admitted. The Sanad and the declaration of the plaintiff as recorded by the Qazi in the crder dated 3-6-1980 as re- I ferred above has sealed the case of the plaintiff and the claim in suit had come to an end. Any proceedings, thereafter was only an exercise in futility.
9. ' The learned Qazi has, therefore, unnecessarily laboured on the evidence, led by the defendants.
10. The weakness in the evidence of the defen {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 26 I C 428 (2) AIR 1943 P C 83
(3) PLD 1968 SC 140 (4) PLD 1969 SC 136 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' dants, even if found, cannot be used and taken benefit of by the plaintiff. The explanation offered by the witnesses produced by the plaintiff in rebuttal to the contents of the Sanad was righty excluded from consideration by the Majlis-e-Shoora. The evidence led by plaintiff was K not at all admissible and could not be used for the substitution of the, contents of the documents or alter the terms thereof.
11. ' In view of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act the vendor was precluded from going behind the recital in the Sanad, there being no ambiguity and the documents being plain in itself cannot be taken to mean something different from the words used for complied.
12. ' There is yet another aspect of the matter and it is that is a revision under section 115, C. P. C. Which applies to jurisdiction alone, i. e. The irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or illegal assumption of it but is certainly not directed against conclusions of law or facts in which question of jurisdiction is not involved. Jurisdiction under section 115, C. P. C. Is, therefore, not to be lightly exercised. It is an extraordinary jurisdiction and should be used only on appropriate occasion, the present case does not warrant any interference .By this Court in the circumstances of the case. I have also come to the same conclusion as is done by the Majlis e-Shoora though on different grounds. The revision is accordingly dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.