1. ' The appellant was a driver working in the respondent's organization ; when on the plea of retrenchment his services were terminated on 23rd February, 1983. Thereafter, he was directed by the respondent to collect his dues ; and he did accordingly. As the appellant felt aggrieved by his removal from service, he approached the Labour Court to challenge the same; mainly on the ground that no enquiry of any nature to establish that the so-called retrenchment was called for, for any cogent and reliable reason, was held and consequently the order under reference was bad in law. The Labour Court, however, dismissed the application on 31st May, 1983 on the consideration of the preliminary objection that since the appellant had collected his dues, therefore, he was no more an aggrieved employee and could not, lawfully, agitate the matter before the Labour Court.
2. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant to assail this order.
2. The learned Labour Court has placed reliance on the following cases and Mr. K. N. Kohli, learned counsel for the respondent while supporting the order under appeal, also referred to them :--(i)
3. Abdul Rashid v. Saleh Muhammad , Sheikh Ghulam Nabi etc. v. Ejaz Ghani and others , Haji Muhammad Qasim v. Mehrban Ali . In these cases the employees had accepted the dues after removal from service and, therefore, it was held that they were not entitled to agitate their grievance with regard to removal from service before the Labour Court as after accepting the dues, they were no more aggrieved persons and the law demanded that only the aggrieved persons shall be entitled to move the Labour Court for the redress of their grievances. Apart from the fact that these cases are distinguishable on' facts, another factor in this observation which does not appeal to reason is as to whether a person who feels aggrieved by the order of the1 2 3 termination of his services can be debarred from moving a Court of law only because he had accepted his dues. Apparently the answer should be in the negative. Obviously so, because the cause of action having once accrued, shall subsist as long as the aggrieved person's grievances had not been satisfied outside the Court or in the alternative the Court had finally adjudicated upon the matter. Mr. Afsar Raja, learned counsel for the appellant placed before me cases Mirza Majeed Baig v. Messrs Futehally Chemicals Ltd. , Swedish Pakistan Institute of Technology v.
4. Employees' Union, Production Unit, Swedish Pakistan Institute of Technology , Muhammad Siddique v. Messrs Premier Tobacco Industries Ltd. and Abdul Aziz v. Rahwali Sugar Mills , to support his argument that firstly there was no law prohibiting the employee to challenge his dismissal in the Labour Court after recovering his dues and that the cause of action subsisted as long as the legality or otherwise of the termination of service had not been adjudicated upon by a Labour Court. All these cases relate to the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The point agitated before the Courts was that after the acceptance of the arrears of rent, the landlord had no legal justification to sue the tenant for ejectment on the ground of default in the payment of rent. In these cases, the sum and substance of the argument was that since the grievance of the landlord was with regard to non-payment of rent and such grievance having been satisfied by the acceptance of the rent, the cause of action did not subsist any more to eject the tenant i. e. To say the acceptance of the rent amounted to condoning the lapse on the part of the landlord, but this reasoning did not find favour with the Courts and they were consistently of the view that the acceptance of the rent by the landlord was nothing more than accepting what was his due, therefore, this act could not work as automatically condoning the lapses on the part of the tenant and displacing or eliminating the cause of action which had already accrued with significant consequences attached with it.
5. Accordingly, on this analogy, if the instant case was examined, it will be an inescapable conclusion that the employee who felt aggrieved by the act of his employer removing him from service illegally would be entitled to move a Court of law as long as the grievance had not been satisfied outside the Court or the cause of action had been examined and adjudicated upon by the Court of law. The position would, however, be different if he had settled the dispute outside the Court finally and accepted the dues. So the acceptance of the dues has direct nexus with the question of settlement of dispute, and can be relevantly pleaded if such fact was in controversy, but it would not automatically operate as the waiver of the cause of action, as by this act the employee had only received what was due to him just like a landlord who by accepting the rent does not receive anything more than what was due to him and reserves his right to agitate the grievance of removal from service in a Court of law. The argument of the learned counsel has force.
6. (1)
3. Learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that the cases cited by the Labour Court and relied upon by the respondent's learned (v)' counsel were distinguishable as in these cases the acceptance of the dues was coupled with the settlement of dispute outside the Court ; and that made the whole difference. I would discuss these cases in suitable detail.
7. ' In the first and the last mentioned two cases, a full length enquiry had been made by the employer before removing the aggrieved employee from service ; and finally the employees therein settled the dispute outside the Court and unconditionally accepted the dues. The acceptance of dues unconditionally after an enquiry, was a specific indication of their intention that the employees had settled the dispute with their employers and nothing was left to be done in the matter by the Courts of law. As far as the second mentioned case is concerned, it would be unsafe to rely on it as it does not contain the facts. The law notes in many cases, are misleading.
8. However. It appears that in this case also the employee had settled the dispute finally before coming to the Court of law, and had accepted the dues in token of such settlement.4 5 6 7
9. (1)
4. Raja M. Afsar, learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the appellant had not collected the dues voluntarily but on the ,specific directions of the respondent as he believed that if he did not comply with such directions, he would incur their displeasure and some further complications might also arise. He also submitted that by accepting the dues, the grievance of the appellant with regard to his illegal removal from service had not been condoned or washed away, as the cause of action which had once accrued to him, subsisted as long as his grievance had not been satisfied by the respondent or the Labour Court had adjudicated upon the matter. Although there was no direct case-law on the point but he tried to find support from Forbes Forbes Cambell & Co ; Limited, Karachi v. Habibur Rehman and 2 others wherein, it was held that Labour laws should be liberally construed and should not be used to trap an employee to his detriment. On the strength of this observation, he argued that since there was no direct legal provision on the point that an employee would be non-suited, in case, after removal from service in any manner, he had collected his dues, therefore, such view of the Courts should be held confined to the peculiar circumstances of such cases in which it was expressed. It is correct that there is no law on the point and such embargo has been placed by the case law on the point which I have already discussed.
10. However, it seems that the main idea behind the opinion that once an employee had accepted the dues unconditionally outside the Court, he was not entitled to agitate the matter of removal from service before a Court of law for his reinstatement in service etc. As the act of unconditionally accepting the dues amounted to setting at rest the dispute outside the Court and in such eventuality, an employee should not be allowed to subsequently unearth his grievance and move the Court of law. Such being the position, the question as to whether or not an employee could agitate his grievance with regard to removal from service after he had accepted the dues would very much depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The crux of the matter in each case would be as to whether or not the acceptance of the dues was coupled with a settlement outside the Court specifically indicating that such settlement was arrived at by burying all the disputes and claims, and admitting the fact of removal from service as a bona fide and just act.
11. But in such cases, where the employee had not demanded the dues in token of his having dropped his grievance of removal from service or a final settlement of all ' the disputes it would be deemed that by accepting the dues on the directions of the employer or even on his own demand, but without accepting the act of removal from service as a legal and valid act, he could still agitate the matter successfully before a court of law as the cause of action accruing to him still subsisted.
12. ' For the reasons given above, I allow the appeal and remand the case to the Labour Court with the directions that the case should be decided on merits after hearing both the parties. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 1980 S CM R 506 1982 SC MR 650 1983 SCMR 1205 1973 PLC 297 1974 PLC Note 146 at p. 79 1981 PLC 670 1980 PLC 664 1982 SCM R 65 revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.