' This civil revision has arisen out of a pre-emption suit brought by the respondents, Ghulam Sarwar and others against the petitioner, Ghulam Nabi and four others. On 15th February, 1978, the Civil Judge, Ahmadpur East, District Bahawalpur, ordered the registration of the suit and directed the respondents to deposit Rs, 14,000 as zar-e-panjum (1/5th of the ostensible sale price) before 11 th May, 1978. Summonses for striking issues were also ordered to be issued to the defendants for the above date. Before that date, however, the respondents made an application seeking extension of time for deposit of zar-e-panjum which was allowed by the learned Civil Judge by his order, dated the 8th May, 1978. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has come up in revision to this Court.
2. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Civil Judge could not allow extension to the respondents (plaintiffs) without hearing the petitioner and since he was not heard before making the impugned order, it was liable to be set aside. He cited Riaz Ahmad Khan v.
Faiz Muhammad Khan (1) to support his submission.
(1) PLD 1978 B J 85
3. In reply, it was urged by learned counsel for the respondents that it was not necessary for the trial Court to hear the petitioner before extending time for deposit of zar-e-panjum and, therefore, no legitimate exception could be taken to the order under challenge. The case relied upon by him is reported as Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others v. Murad All Khan (1). Learned counsel for the respondents also invited my attention to an unreported judgment in Allah Ditto etc. v. Khan Muhammad (Civil Revision No, 142 of 1981/BWP).
4. In the case of Riaz Ahmad Khan, relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, it was held by Muhammad Akram, J. Who. Was then a learned Judge of this Court and was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court, that the vendee was entitled to be heard before the grant of extension of time for the deposit of zar-e-panjum. Relevant observations made in the said case read as follows :- "It is evident that the impugned order was passed in the absence of the petitioner without any notice to him. The impugned order was passed in alteration of the original order, dated 7th January, 1974 by this extending time for the deposit. In my opinion the trial Court acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction in not affording an opportunity to the defendant, who was vitally interested in controverting the allegations of the plaintiff opposing his application."
' As regards the case of Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others, cited by learned counsel for the respondents, the question raised in the said case was whether `the Court had power to extend time for deposit of zar-e-panjum and that question was answered by the Supreme Court in the affirmative. The question involved in the present case, namely, whether the defendant was entitled to be heard before allowing extension was not agitated in the case of Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others nor it was precisely adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court. In Niaz Muhammad Khan v.
Mian Fazal Raqib (2), however, it was ruled by the Supreme Court, in unequivocal words that "the vendee has clearly a right to be heard before extension is granted". I have gone through unreported judgment in the case of Allah Ditta etc. To which reference was also made by learned counsel for the respondents. In that case notice was issued to the vendee before extension of time was allowed. Admittedly, no such notice was issued in the case in hand. Thus, the case of Allah Ditto etc. Is distinguishable on facts. In view of the law laid down in the cases of Riaz Ahmad Khan and Niaz Muhammad Khan the petitioner A (defendant) should have been heard before making the order by which the respondents (plaintiffs) were allowed extension in time for depositing of zar- e-panjum but since that was not done, the order suffers from a material irregularity and calls for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
5. Resultantly, I accept this revision petition, set aside the order under challenge and direct the learned trial Court to decide the application for extension of time afresh after hearing the parties and according to law. There shall be no order as to costs.
(1) PLD 1972 SC 69 (2) PLD 1974 SC 134