' MUPTAKHIR-UD-DIN, J.-By this Constitutional Petition Ghulam Mustafa the husband of Mst. Amina the respondent No, 2 seeks to challenge the decree passed by Qazi Kharan as Family Court Judge in favour of Mst. Amina daughter of Din Muhammad, whereby the suit of Mst. Amina for dissolution of marriage was decreed.
2. The facts material for the disposal of this petition may briefly be stated that Mst. Amina filed a suit for the dissolution of marriage against the petitioner in the Court of Qazi Kharan who is also the Judge of the Family Court under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The dissolution was sought on the grounds of maltreatment and non-payment of maintenance allowance. The learned Qazi Kharan vide his judgment and decree dated 6-5-1982 has orderer. The dissolution of marriage, by holding that the particulars of cruelty furnished by the respondent No, 2 have been proved, and also the fact that Mst. Amina has not been properly maintained. Against this order this Constitutional Petition has been filed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid stress on the following three grounds :-
(1) That the Judge Family Court has not stayed the trial of the suit filed by Mst. Amina which in view of section 10, C. P. C. He was bound to do as the petitioner had filed a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights earlier to the suit filed by Mst. Amina.
(2) that the pre-trial and post-trial proceedings for reconciliation between the parties have not been observed, and
(3) that the decree passed by the Family Court judge is not passed on sufficient evidence.
' We find no force in the contentions and our reasons are that from the perusal of the written statement filed by the petitioner in the suit of dissolution of marriage it has nowhere been mentioned that any suit prior in time has been filed which raises the same issue. The written statement filed by the petitioner being a brief one is being reproduced below :- {{URDU TEXT}} ' It is clear from the above that neither any plea was raised by the petitioner before the Family Court Judge nor it was even disclosed before the Qazi that any suit was filed or was pending on the basis whereof the plea as provided under section 10, C. P. C. Can be legitimately be made, therefore, there could be no occasion for the trial Court to adjudicate upon the same. We are, therefore, clear in our minds that this ground is not available nor the same can be allowed to be raised for the first time before us. Even otherwise the mere fact that the decision of the subsequent suit was largely to be affected by the decision on the previous suit still pending is not sufficient for the application of section 10, C. P. C. Section 10, C. P. C. Does not apply unless every matter in dispute is directly and substantially in issue in the two suits Shamin Fatima v. Ahmadullah Khan (1).
We are clearly of the opinion that the case does not come within four corners of section 10, C. P. C.
As issues have not yet been framed in the suit filed first by the petitioner and it is clear from the circumstances of the two suits that the decision in the first suit cannot dispose of the entire matter in controversy between the parties. The irregularity crept in if any, is mainly due to the non- disclosure of facts by the petitioner himself and is only procedural and is not of jurisdiction. The decree passed contrary to the provisions of section 10, C. P. C. Is not a nullity and cannot be disregarded. The contention of the learned counsel {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1970 Lah. 41 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' About the non-observance of pre-trial and post-trial proceedings stands rebutted by the judgment of the learned Qazi and it has been mentioned in the judgment that the attempt was made for reconciliation between the parties, but it was the defendant (the present petitioner) who did not agree to any agreement or reconciliation. In the concluding portion of the judgment the learned Qazi has considered this aspect also that the defendant was not prepared to this agreement under any circumstances. This being the position of fact we cannot go into the contentions any further and cannot attach any importance to the grounds now being taken in view of the facts mentioned in the judgment. The contention of the learned counsel about the non sufficiency of evidence is equally without force. The learned Qazi in his well-considered judgment has come to the finding of fact on the issues raised before him. The evidence of the parties led before him has been discussed. It has not been shown before us how the judgment was perverse on that evidence. The evidence recorded by the Family Court Judge has also not been placed before us for consideration. In the circumstances of the case it cannot be argued with, any justification that the conclusions drawn by the learned Judge are in any way such which cannot be arrived at. Even assuming for the sake of discussion another view about the evidence is possible it is no ground for our interference. It is well-settled principle that the Tribunal hiving jurisdiction to decide matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that the decision is incorrect or another view is possible does not render the decision as without lawful authority. It has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Hussain Munir's case (I) that it is wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provisions under Article 98 of 1962 Constitution or Article 199 of 1973 Consititution under which provision previously the jurisdiction of the High Court was exercisable) was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or Tribunal of inferior jurisdiction merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would 'make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exercisable in a full-fledgedi appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution makers.
' For the reasons given above it is not possible for us to interfere with the judgment and decree of the respondent No,
1. Consequently the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
(1) PLD 1974 SC 139