' This second appeal arises out of a suit for possession through preemption filed by the appellant on 4-3-1974 to pre-empt the sale made through registered sale-deed. The court-fee affixed, originally on the plaint was of the value of Rs, 375 only. The appellant-plaintiff on 10-2-1975 filed additional court-fee of the value of Rs, 225 on his own without seeking permission of the Court. The suit was contested by the respondents inter alia on the ground that the plaint was undervalued and that the suit had become barred by time on account of non-payment of proper court-fee. The learned trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording evidence of the parties decreed the suit ride judgment and decree dated 13-7-1977. The finding returned on the issues relating to under-valuation of the plaint and limitation that the sale-deed having been entered in the register of the Sub-Registrar on 28-2-1974 despite its execution on 16-1-1974 and presentation for registration on 16-1-1974, the suit had not become barred by time as the full and proper court-fee had been paid and affixed on the plaint before the expiry of the period of limitation. It will be noted that deficiency in the court-fee was made good on 11-2-1975. This finding was, however, reversed by the appellate Court in appeal filed by the respondents ride judgment and decree dated 14-2- 1978. The learned first appellate Court was of the view that there was no justification to calculate limitation in the suit from 28-2-1974 as appellant himself admitted in para. 6 of the plaint that cause of action accrued to him on 16-1-1974. It was observed that if cause of action had accrued to the appellant on 16-1-1974 and the suit is deemed to have been instituted on 10-2-1975 when the deficiency in the court-fee was made good, the suit by then had become hopelessly time-barred.
Hence this second appeal.
2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant has reiterated the position which was accepted by the learned trial Court and argued that the word 'registered in Article 10 Schedule I of the Limitation Act refers to the date on which the endorsement-registerd" is made and not the date on which the document was presented for registration. The language of section 6') of the Registration Act, 1908 admits of no doubt that it is the certificate in compliance with the provisions of this section that makes a document a registered document. The' document cannot be regarded as registered before the certificate is endorsed thereon and signed, sealed and dated in terms of section 60. The aforesaid view has consistently been held since the judgment delivered in case of Karam v. FazI (1). In the instant case the said certificate was admittedly endorsed on 28-2-1974. The period of limitation for filing a suit for pre-emption as such was to commence from the said date. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 4-3-1974 and the deficiency in the court-fee was made good on'10-2-1975. Plaint on this date was admittedly properly stamped. This being the position the plaint was a proper plaint in the eye of law prior to the expiry of the period of limitation. The view of the learned Additional District Judge that the suit had become hopelessly B time-barred because the appellant had himself admitted in para. 6 of the plaint that the case of action accrued to him on 16-1-1974 takes very restricted view of the said para. Contained in the plaint. Para. 6 of the plaint reads as under :- {{URDU TEXT}} The plaint read as a whole also indicates that the sale sought to be pre-empted was made through registered sale-deed. In view of above it is the register.. Ed sale-deed which has to be seen and which will determine the date from C which the period of limitation was to be calculated. A copy of the registered sale-deed was filed alongwith the plaint. Moreover, the clause pertaining to valuation and jurisdiction of the Court are legal clauses and it is the bounden duty of the Court of law to apply the correct law. There can be no binding admission on a point of law. In this view of the matter learned Additional District Judge was wrong in observing that the cause of action accrued to the appellant on 16-1-1974.
3. The net result of the above finding is that the suit was within time and that the learned Additional District Judge erred in law in dismissing the suit as barred by time. The judgment and decree passed by the learned D first appellate Court is therefore set aside, and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is restored. The respondents shall also bear the costs of the appellant.