' This appeal arises from the decision dated 25th June, 1981, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 1, Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement in service was dismissed.
2. The ground on which the appellant was dismissed was that he had been convicted and sentenced to three months' R. I. By a criminal Court. No charge-sheet was given to him, nor any enquiry was held against him. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since on account of misconduct the appellant was dismissed, following of the procedure given in Standing Order 15
(4) was necessary. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has said that in the order of dismissal Exh. P-1 no misconduct is mentioned, so the order of dismissal is in reality an order of termination. In Exh. P-1 the ground given is that the High Court has rejected the appeal of the appellant preferred against the conviction order by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption. This is manifest that the appellant was alleged to have committed some criminal offence. Commission of criminal offence is nevertheless a misconduct. Since the respondent wanted to take action against the appellant resulting in his dismissal, it was, according to Standing Order 15 (4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, necessary to charge-sheet the appellant and to hold enquiry against him in order to prove the charge and to give the appellant opportunity to defend himself. The Labour Courts while hearing cases of dismissal or termination etc. Act as civil Courts. A civil Court is not bound by the findings of criminal Courts although conversely the criminal Courts are bound by the decision of the civil Courts. If the appellant had been terminated for the reason that the post held by him could not be kept vacant on account of his conviction, there could hardly be any ground to reinstate him. The order of dismissal, therefore, is not maintainable.
3. The learned lower Court has, for holding that the charge-sheet and holding of enquiry were not necessary, relied upon Chapter 5 of Establishment Manual-I, page 547 but it deals with Government servants. The appellant was a WAPDA employee and not a Government servant. He was initially a Government servant being employed in electricity department but his services were transferred to WAPDA and according to the order passed by the Punjab Government, he, after transfer was to be governed by WAPDA Act and rules. After his transfer the provisions of Establishment Manual section 1, ceased to have application upon him. The learned lower Court has also held that even otherwise there is no rule to the effect that in the case of a person convicted by a criminal Court, there is no necessity of giving show-cause notice and holding enquiry. According to Standing Order 15 (4), giving of show-cause notice and holding of enquiry before dismissing a person are necessary and that it does not provide that in the case of a worker convicted by a criminal Court, giving of show-cause notice and holding of enquiry are not necessary. Even according to WAPDA rules, giving of show-cause notice is necessary in every case of misconduct although holding of enquiry is optional. One thing is more astonishing and that is that although the appellant was admittedly a WAPDA employee, yet he was tried and convicted by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption. If he had been a deputationist from Central Government, only then the Anti- Corruption Judge could have jurisdiction.
4. L earned counsel for the appellant has said that the appellant was a deputationist, but this is not the case of the appellant. Neither in the grievance petition nor in his statement the appellant took up any such position. Since the special Judge Anti-Corruption convicted the appellant and since Chapter 5 of Establishment Manual section 1 was pleaded before the learned lower Court, it creates a doubt that the appellant may be a deputationist. If it is so, the WAPDA was not competent to take any action against the appellant and the matter would have been referred to the Government from where he had been sent on deputation.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the appellant was a civil servant, therefore, Labour Courts have no jurisdiction. I have already held in many judgments that only those WAPDA employees are civil servants who come within the purview of the definition of the term `civil servant' as defined in section 2 of the Civil Servants Act. I have discussed Single Bench rulings of the Lahore High Court in many cases. Without understanding the term, we cannot deem any employee as a civil servant. According to section 17 (1-B), only for the purposes of the Services Tribunal Act, WAPDA employees are to be deemed as civil servants. Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the appeals of only those employees who are covered by the definition of civil servant as defined in the Civil Servants Act of 1973. So the said definition cannot be ignored. If we do not look into the definition of civil servant, then .The term as used in section 17 (I-B) will become vague and as weightless as a thing which reaches the vaceum situated between the end of gravity of the earth and start of the gravity of the moon. But so far as the appellant is concerned, he is a civil servant because he is covered by the definition of the term. He does not come within the exceptions contained in section 2 of the Civil Servants Act. He is not employed in the generation, transformation or distribution of electrical energy but is employed as Assistant in the Revenue Department of WAPDA. There is no evidence that he had any connection with the generation, transformation or distribution of electricity. The learned lower Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction.
6. As a result of the finding that the appellant is a civil servant, the appeal is dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.