' The facts leading up to this suo motu revision briefly stated are that the applicant, Ghulam Mahboob, is the Partner in Al-Mahmood Foundry Workshop and Rerolling Mills alongwith his other partners, some of the co-accused in the complaint under section 53 (1-A),
1. R.
0., filed against them by the respondent Ayub Jan in Labour Court No, II, Karachi. Ayub Jan alleged therein that he was the General-Secretary of the Collective Bargaining Agent, whereas his witnesses Taj Muhammad and Feroze Khan were its President and Treasurer, respectively and were working in the Mills. He further alleged that the applicant Ghulam Mahboob and the co-accused with him in the complaint, made false statements knowing or having reasons to believe the same to be false, in the cases pending between them in the Labour Court No, 11 at Karachi and he served the show-cause notices on Ghulam Mahboob and his co-accused under section 56 of I. R.
0. For filing false statements and as to why they should not be prosecuted. The allegations in the complaint further are that Ghulam Mahboob and his partners having been annoyed on the service of the notices, issued threats to them to withdraw the notices or they will finish up the union.
Subsequently, the applicant and his partners managed to put the motor of the factory out of order with the result that it stopped working and declared lay-off in the Rolling Mills in order to see the workers out of the employment. Ayub Jan made an effort and approached the applicant Ghulam Mahboob and his partners to put the motor in order but they found that instead Ghulam Mahboob and his partners had engaged a contractor who was running the mills. Alleging an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer within the meaning of section 15 of I. R.
0., Ayub Jan filed a complaint against the applicant as well as his partners and others under section 53 (1-A), I. R.
0., in Labour Court No, II at Karachi, on 18th April, 1982. The learned Presiding Officer having secured the attendance of the parties recorded the prosecution evidence of the complainant, Ayub Jan and the witnesses Taj Muhammad and Feroze Khan, whereafter the applicant's representative made an application under section 265 (k) of Cr. P. C. For acquittal of the applicant and his co- accused on the ground that in view of the evidence available on the record, there was no probability of the applicant and his co-accused of being convicted of any offence. The learned Presiding Officer dismissed the application finding the assertion of the learned representative of the applicant and his co-accused without legal justification. This suo mow revision is directed against that order passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court No, II at Karachi.
2. I have gone through the relevant evidence on the record and have also heard the learned representative, Mr. Syed Zamirul Hassan for the applicant and Mr. Mahmood Mubassir for the respondent, Ayub Jan. The contentions raised on behalf of the applicant are two-fold ; firstly, that on the face of it, giving a notice under section 56, I. R.
0., for making false statements would not amount to a trade union activity and no case for unfair labour practice under section 15 of the I. R.
0., would arise out of it, and secondly, that in any case the evidence adduced on bahalf of the respondent for the prosecution is so discrepant that it fails to prove the case against applicant and his co-accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden which heavily lay on the respondent.
3. As regards the first contention, Mt. Zamirul Hassan has relied on sub-clauses (b) and (d) of clause (1) of section 15, I. R.
0., asserting that giving of a notice under section 56 would not amount to trade union activity, ultimately resulting in unfair labour practice, in the circumstances of the present case. In that respect, my attention has been drawn by Mr. Mahmood Mubassir for the respondent to sub-clause
(f) of clause (1) of section 15, I. R.
0., which reads as under :- "15. -(1) No employer or trade union of employers and no person acting on behalf of either shall ( f) compel or attempt to compel any officer of the collective bargaining agent to arrive at a settlement by using intimidation, coercion, pressure, threat, confinement to a place, physical injury, disconnection of water, power and telephone facilities and such other methods."
4. In view of the allegations contained in the complaint and the state meats of the prosecution witnesses, Taj Muhammad and Feroze Khan in support of it, apparently, the applicability of the above mentioned provisions of section 15 (1) ( f) possibly constituting an unfair labour practice in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be safely excluded. The contention of the learned representative appearing on behalf of the applicant, therefore, that assuming the allegations were correct, there is no probability of an unfair labour practice having been committed by the applicant and his co-accused within the meaning of section 15, L R.
0. Has no force.
5. Coming to the second contention to the effect that in any case, the evidence available on the record as adduced by prosecution in all probability would not constitute a criminal offence, is equally without substance. The learned counsel after the respondent Ayub Jan had closed his evidence for prosecution, made an application for acquitting the applicant and his co-accused under section 265 (k) of Criminal Procedure Code without allowing the learned Court to examine the applicant and his co-accused and hearing their evidence if at all examined. The learned representative appearing on behalf of the applicant has in his long arguments mainly relied on the discrepancies in the evidence of the complainant and his prosecution witnesses and has asserted that in view of such discrepant evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove the case against the applicant and his co-accused to the hilt, little realizing that he had moved the lower Court under section 265 (k) of Criminal Procedure Code which reads as follows :- " Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case, if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence."
6. The above provision of section 265 (k) does not require the prosecution case and the evidence in support of it to be subjected to a close scrutiny. The provision does not envisage that the prosecution has to prove its case to the hilt at such earlier stage, when neither the accused had been examined nor their evidence if at all available had been recorded. The learned representative appearing on behalf of the applicant and his co-accused cannot under the abovementioned provisions of section 265 (k) of Criminal Procedure Code at such an earlier stage, require the Court to carry on a close examination of the prosecution evidence keeping in view the pleas of both the parties. The provisions of the section clearly require that the accused could be acquitted at any earlier stage of the Court considered that there was no probability of their conviction for any offence or on the face of it the charge was groundless. Accordingly, I am clear in my mind, without discussing the evidence on record, so that the case of the parties, is not prejudiced, that the learned Labour Court in the circumstances of the case, rightly exercised its discretion within the meaning of section 265 (k) Cr. P. C. By dismissing the application filed on behalf of the applicant and his co-accused.
7. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any substance in both the contentions raised on behalf of the applicant. Accordingly, no interference with the impugned order in this suo motu revision, under section 38 (3-a), I. R.
0., is called for, I, therefore, dismiss it.