' ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.-The case of the petitioner as stated by the learned counsel is that the petitioner filed nomination papers for which 7th September, 1983 was given to him as the date for scrutiny. However, on September, 1983 his nomination papers were rejected on the ground that 8th seconder had appeared and stated that he had not seconded the proposal and that he was not prepared to second the nomination papers. The petitioner challenged the order by means of an appeal which was dismissed by the learned appellate Authority, Sargodha on 11th September, 1983 on the ground that "as per order of the Returning Officer, Faiz Abbas seconder refused to second the appellant. Today he has not turned up which indicates that he does not want to second the appellant. Hence, rejected". The petitioner filed Writ Petition No, 4107/83 which was dismissed in limine with the following observation.
"In order to ascertain the fact whether or not Faiz Abbas seconded the name of the petitioner and voluntarily signed the required declaration on the latter's nomination papers a factual inquiry will have to be made which exercise cannot be undertaken by this Court. The petitioner can avail of the alternate remedy of filing election petition before the Election Tribunal. This petition is not maintainable and is dismissed in limine."
' This was vide order, dated 3rd October, 1983. The petitioner then filed an election petition and the same has been dismissed by the learned Election Tribunal on the ground that the same was not maintainable as an election petition can only be filed by a 'candidate' and since the nomination papers of the petitioners were not seconded and were rejected and appeal against that order having failed and the order having become final, the petitioner was not a candidate to maintain the election petition. This was vide order, dated 15th February, 1984. Hence, this writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted with reference to section 2 (1)(a) of the Punjab Local Councils (Election) Rules, 1979, that a candidate is defined to mean, "a person who has been nominated for election as member of a local council from an electoral unit" and it is contended that it does not matter whether the nomination papers had been rejected or not.
3. A perusal of the definition aforequoted would show that a candidate is a person who has been nominated for an election as a member of the local council for an electoral unit, The nomination is, under the law, by a person who proposes another as a candidate and same one seconds him. If there is no proposer or a seconder there is no question of any person being nominated a candidate. In the case in hand, the seconder who was shown to have seconded the nomination papers of the petitioner appeared before the Returning Officer and denied having seconded the petitioner as a candidate. The nomination papers were rejected. Petitioner's appeal against this order was rejected by the appellate authority. The order became final. Therefore, the petitioner was not a nominated person to be a candidate so as to be entitled to file an election petition. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had challenged the orders of rejection of his nomination papers through a Constitutional Petition which was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had an alternate remedy of filing an election petition, therefore, the election petition filed by him needed determination on merits, is not well-founded. The Constitutional Petition had been dismissed on the ground that the contention regarding the seconding of the petitioner by Faiz Abbas was a question, requiring factual inquiry which could not be made by the High Court. This observation that petitioner can avail of the alternate remedy of film election petition before the Election Tribunal", obviously meant that the petitioner can do so if he is otherwise entitled under the law to do. By the ,observation at the preliminary stage while dismissing the petition in limine the learned Division Bench was not conferring a right on the petitioner which he, otherwise, did not possess.
The learned counsel then contended that this petition also relates to challenging the rejection of the nomination papers. The petition has obviously no force because the learned Division Bench previously dealing with the matter had observed that the controversy required factual inquiry which could not be undertaken in the writ jurisdiction. Neither the order, can be reviewed nor factual inquiry undertaken in these proceedings.
4. In view of what has been stated above, this petition is dismissed.