' A.
0. RAZIUR RAHMAN (MEMBRR).--In this case the appellant is Mr. Ghyasuddin Ahmed Siddiqui, former Deputy Director (Legal) of the Karachi Transport Corporation. He was removed from service by an order, dated 12th May, 1980, issued by the Managing Director of the Karachi Transport under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978.. This order was represented against to the President of Pakistan under section 4 of the. Ordinance. The representation was finally rejected and the Appellant informed by the Secretary of the Corporation, through a letter, dated 7th September, 1980. Hence the present appeal,
2. The facts of the case are that the appellant, who took his Law Degree in 1967, was appointed as Prosecuting Sub-Inspector (Grade-7) in the Sind Police in 1972. On 13th August, 1974, he was appointed in the Sind Road Transport Corporation as Deputy Director (Legal), a Grade-18 post. On 1st February, 1977, when the Sind Road Transport Corporation was bifurcated, and the Karachi area placed under the Karachi Transport Corporation, the appellant was taken on the strength of the Karachi Transport Corporation on the same terms and conditions as under the Sind Road Transport Corporation. However, after a little over 2 years, he was removed from service by the order appealed against. Although the order does not explicitly say so it is clear that it was passed under section 3 of the Ordinance, which empowers the President, or a person authorised by him in this behalf, to remove from service, or revert to his lower post or grade, a person in Corporation service appointed or promoted at any time during the period from 1st January, 1272 to 5th July, 1977.
The representation to the President was made by the appellant under section 4 of the Ordinance and the present appeal filed under section 5.
3. The main grounds taken in the appeal are listed below :-
(1) Since the appointment of the appellant as Deputy Director (Legal) was neither political nor for any service rendered to the previous regime but was made after adopting the proper procedure, his removal from service cannot be justified on merit.
(2) Being a permanent employee of the Corporation, his removal without charge-sheet enquiry, and show-cause notice, and the approval of the Government, was irregular and illegal.
(3) The Managing Director of the Corporation was not competent to terminate his services, as under the Ordinance it can be terminated only by the President or a person authorised by him in this behalf.
(4) The order of termination of service being in cyclostyled form, with even the signature of the Managing Director already cyclostyled, it shows that the order purported to have been issued by the Managing Director was of doubtful authenticity and, therefore, should be treated as null and void and consequently inoperative in law.
(5) The action of the Managing Director of the Karachi Transport Corporation in removing the appellant was mala fide. As proof of this, it was pointed out that he was ill-disposed towards his experienced and senior employees, as borne out by the fact that although in July, 1979 the President had excluded employees of Grade-16 from action under the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance the Managing Director had not yet reinstated employees of that grade, whose services had been terminated under the Ordinance.
4. We heard both the parties in detail and perused the relevant record. So far as the authenticity and illegality of impugned order is concerned, we have found that, although the order had been issued over the signature of the Managing Director of the. Corporation, it was actually passed by the Secretary, Ministry of Communications, to whom powers in this behalf were delegated by the President as conveyed to the Ministry, by a D.O. Letter of the Cabinet Secretary, dated 27th August, 1978. We have also found that a Review Board, set up for the purpose of examining all the cases, made its recommendations which were forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry of Communications, who passed orders in respect of, each case. The fact that these decisions were conveyed through office orders on standarised forms, already signed and cyclostyled before the names and designations of the concerned officers were filled in, should not affect the authenticity of the orders or the validity of their contents. This disposes of points at serial (3) and (4) of the objections listed above.
5. As regards the question of merit mentioned at S. No, (0, we are of the view that the officer, who had passed the Law Degree Examination as recently as 1967 and was appointed as a Prosecuting Sub-Inspector in the Sind Police in Grade-7 could not reasonably be considered to be qualified or experienced enough to become a Deputy Director in Grade-18 for dealing with legal matters concerning the Corporation. To all appearances the sudden jump of the officer from Grade-7 to Grade-18 is difficult to justify, when the appointment was made without advertising the post and without considering other candidates or applicants. If, in the circumstances, the Review Board considered the appointment to be incompetent or undeserved, no reasonable person can find fault with this finding and the decision of the competent authority, on the basis of it to terminate the services of the appellant.
6. As regards S. No, (2) of the objection, this is obviously misplaced, because the removal order had been passed under section 3 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance and not under the normal service rules of the Corporation or under the (E 8c D) Rules. The question of charge-sheet, notice, and other procedural requirements is irrelevant and does not merit any consideration.
7. As regards the last point, noted at S. No, (5) above, it is felt that no general inference of mala fide can be drawn from the allegation that the Managing Director failed to implement the President's order excluding Grade-16 officers from the operation of section 3 of the Ordinance, because it is not clear whether the failure, if any, on the part of the Managing Director was deliberate or merely the result of procedural difficulties. Moreover since remedy is available to cure the effect of his failure, it cannot be said that the damage caused to them is irretrievable and of such nature as to lead to the presumption that there was any mala fides on the part of the Managing Director in dealing with those cases and that too of such nature as to make bis conduct suspect in respect of cases relating also to officers of higher grades. We, therefore see no justification for the allegation of mala fide so far as the instant case is concerned.
8. It would be seen from the above that none of the grounds of the appeal is tenable and that so far as the removal of the appellant from service is concerned, it is covered by section 3 of- the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance and having been passed by the competent authority after due consideration and deliberation was both valid and justified. The appeal is therefore, liable to dismissal and it is ordered accordingly.