' The dispute relates to house bearing No, 1125, Ward No, 6-M, Multan, which was transferred to the appellant by the competent Settlement authority. Allah Ditta, husband of the respondent, filed appeal and revision before the Settlement Authorities concerned against the said order of transfer, but failed to achieve any relief in this regard. After his death, the order passed by the Settlement Authority dismissing his revision petition was challenged by his son Merajud Din in writ petition filed in the High Court, which was also dismissed on 17th March, 1965.
2. After the transfer of the house in his favour, the appellant served Allah Ditta with a notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons. (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and after his death, Merajud Din, his son. The parties admittedly engaged themselves into protracted litigation which ended in the order of ejectment against Merajud Din. The said order was executed and the house was got vacated.
3. Thereafter the respondent Mst. Ramzan Bibi widow of Allah Ditta and mother of Merajud Din, filed objection petition under Order XXI, rule 99/100, C. P. C. With the prayer that the possession of the property in question may be restored in her favour as the same was in her possession in her own right. The said application was accepted by the Controller and the appeal filed against his order was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Multan holding that after the death of Allah Ditta, who was allottee and occupant of the property in question, the tenancy devolved upon his legal heirs and as such Merajud Din was not the only tenant of the premises, but the respondent as well as her other children were also occupying the premises as tenants. It has been held that after the death of Allah Ditta, ejectment petition should have been filed against all of his legal heirs being the tenants in occupation.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued, while relying upon Siraj Din v. Mst. Iqbal Begum
(1) that section 16 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance amply bars the application of the provisions of the C. P. C. As a whole. According to the learned counsel only such provisions are applicable to the proceedings under the Ordinance which have been specifically made applicable in the Ordinance itself. It is contended that since the provision as contained in Order XXI, rule 99/100 has not been made applicable to the
(1) PLD 1968 Lah. 639 ' proceedings under the Ordinance, therefore, the respondent was not competent to make any application under the same and as such the Controller had no jurisdiction to deal with the same. It is provided by section 17 of the Ordinance that every order made under section 10 or 13 and every order passed in appeal under section 15 shall be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. It means that the order of eviction passed by the Controller was to be executed as a decree by the civil Court. The question arises that if it is so then whether the execution proceedings will be governed by the relevant provisions as contained in the C. P. C.
With regard to execution of decrees. When the order of eviction is to be executed as a decree of the civil Court, then the party to be adversely A affected by its execution has a right to approach the Court under the relevant provisions of Order XXI, C. P. C. After the eviction order was being executed as civil court decree the Court of the Rent Controller had become functus officio, as it was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court alone to execute the said order. All the matters pertaining to the execution or otherwise of the same were to be decided by the civil Court and not by the Rent Controller. In this view of the matter the respondent was competent to file her petition under Order XXI, rule 99/100, C. P. C. In order to show that in fact she was in occupation of the premises in her own right and being not party to the ejectment proceedings could not be ejected.
5. According to section 2 (1) of the Ordinance 'tenant' has been defined as a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable of a building or rented land ; and includes (a) a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, and (b) the wife and children of a deceased tenant...In the present case, Allah Ditta being in occupation of the premises in question at the time of the transfer of the property in favour of the appellant became tenant under him by operation of law and after his death his legal heirs i. e., his wife and children, became tenants of the appellant, It is admitted that ejectment petition was filed against Merajud Din son of Allah Ditta alone and not against the other legal heirs of the deceased. Since no ejectment order was passed against the respondent, therefore, she could B not be ejected from the premises on account of the ejectment order passed against her son Merajud Din. This being the position both the Courts below have rightly decided the matter in favour of the respondent.
6. In view of the above, there is no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.