DECISION ' This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned IVth Labour Court, given on 5th September, 1982, dismissing the grievance petition under section 25-A (10), I. R. O. Preferred by the appellant Workers' Union praying for a direction to the respondent-Company to pay bonus equal to one month's wages for the year ending 31st December, 1980 to seven workmen who during the said year had been in the employment of the respondents for more than ninety days but less than twelve months.
2. The appellant is the C. B. A. In the establishment of the respondent Company. It has, on their written request, espoused the cause of seven workers who had been appointed in the respondent- establishment between 14th February, 1980 and 29th September, 1980. The respondent-Company has declared profit for the year ending 31st December, 1980 and has given bonus in respect of the said year to every workman of the company who was in the service of the company during that year for a period of not less than ninety days. It is the case of the appellant that whereas the workmen who had been in the employment of the company for the full year have been paid bonus equal to their wages for one month, the seven workmen, whose names appear in paragraph 2 of the grievance petition, have been given bonus on pro rata basis on account of the fact that they have not been in the service of the respondent-Company during the whole of the year but only for part of the year. It is the case of the appellant that every workman in an establishment to which the provisions of Standing Order 10-C are applicable is entitled to bonus equal to at least one month's wages if he has been in the employment of the establishment during the year for not less than ninety days and further the establishment has made a profit.
3. I have heard Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmed, Advocate, who appeared for the appellant and Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, who represented the respondent-Company. Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmed relied upon the provisions of clauses (1) to (3) of Standing Order 10-C and contended that whereas clause (1) of Standing Order 10-C entitles the seven workmen named in paragraph 2 of the grievance petition to receipt of bonus from the respondent-Company, clause (3) of the Standing Order makes their entitlement at par with the entitlement of the other workers, for the said clause makes no distinction in this behalf between workmen who have put in more than ninety days in an establishment and those who have been for the full year in the establishment. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Mahmood Ghani that Standing Order 10-C was merely a codification of the principles enunciated by the superior Courts in regard to the entitlement of workers to receive bonus and this entitlement was based on two considerations, firstly, that the establishment must have made a profit during the year for which bonus is claimed, and secondly, that the entitlement to bonus would be pro rata depending upon the fact whether a worker was employed in the establishment for whole of the year or a part of the year. The learned counsel submitted that in case a workman, who was employed for only ninety days in an establishment, was considered entitled to full bonus equal to one month's wages theoretically he could get bonus from four different establishments by working in succession in each of those establishments for a period of ninety daye only. This, according to Mr. Mahmood Ghani, could not possibly have been the intention of the Legislature.
4. Since both the learned counsel have relied upon the provisions of clauses (1) to (3) of Standing Order 10-C it would be appropriate to reproduce them in extenso. They read as follows :-- "10-C. Payment of bonus.-(1) Every employer making profit in any year shall pay for that year within three months of the closing of that year to the workman who have been in his employment in that year for a continuous period of not less than ninety days a bonus in addition to the wages payable to such workmen.
(2) The amount of bonus payable shall-
(a) if the amount of the profit is not less than the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen employed, be not less than the amount of such aggregate, subject to the maximum of thirty per cent of such profit :
(iii) Illustration I.-If the profit is Rs, 1,20,000 and the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen is Rs, 30,000 the amount of bonus payable shall be not less than the aggregate of one month's wages, that is to say Rs, 30,000.
Illustration 2.-If the profit is Rs, 30,000 and the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen is also Rs, 30,000 the amount of bonus payable shall be not less than thirty per cent of the profit that is to say, Rs, 9,000.
(b) If the amount of the profit is less than the aggregate 'referred to in paragraph (a), be not less than fifteen per cent of such profit.
(3) The bonus payable to a workmen entitled thereto under clause (1) shall bear to his monthly wages the same proportion as the total bonus payable by the employer bears to the aggregate of the wages referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (2) and shall be paid either in cash or in N. I. T.
Units of equivalent value at the opinion of such workmen."
5. Clause (1) of ,Standing Order 10-C appears to present no difficulty. It enjoins every employer to pay bonus to every workmen employed by him, subject to three conditions, firstly, that the bonus is payable only for the year during which the employer has made a profit, secondly, the bonus is payable only to such workmen who have been in his employment during that year for a continuous period of not less than ninety days, and thirdly, the bonus is payable within three months of the closing of the year. It will, thus, be seen that this clause, indicates the person who is required to pay the bonus as also the workmen entitled to the bonus, lays down the mandatory condition on which the liability to pay bonus accrues and specifies the period within which the bonus is to be paid to the workmen.
6. Clause (2) of Standing Order 10-C, on a first reading, appears to be equally clear. It provides for the total amount of bonus payable by the employer to his workmen. This amount is relatable both to the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen employed and also to the percentage of the profits earned by the employer. If the amount of the pro fit is not less than the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen employed, then the amount of the bonus payable to the workmen is to be not less than the amount of such aggregate, subject further to such amount not exceeding thirty per cent of the amount of the profit earned by the employer, but if the amount of the profit is less than the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen, the amount of bonus payable is not to be less than fifteen per cent of such profit. A closer reading of this clause discloses at least two difficulties which can arise in the implementation of this clause. As already indicated, one of the factors which have to be taken into consideration in computing the total amount of the bonus payable to the workers is the aggregate of one month's wages of the workmen. The question, therefore, that immediately arises is the aggregate of which month's wages of the workmen should be considered. If the number of workmen employed by the employer remains the same throughout the year and also there is no variation in their wages or alternatively even if there is a change in the number of workmen engaged by the employer but the aggregate of their wages during each of the twelve months of the year for which the bonus is payable remains the same, there would be no difficulty. It is, however, common knowledge that workmen in most of the industries, particularly in our most important industry, textile, is mobile and not only moves from one establishment to another establishment in the same industry but also moves from one industry to another industry. Furthermore, partly on account of steep rise in the cost of living, the wages of the workmen are liable to great variations during a single year of accounting through negotiations between the employer and his workmen, voluntary action on the part of the employer or statutory provisions such as modification in the Employees, Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973. To give an example, an employer, whose year commences from 1st of July, employees during the months of July, August and September, one hundred workmen whose aggregate of one month's wages during this period is Rs, 1,00,000. However, as a result of negotiations, the wages of workmen are increased by ten per cent, with effect from 1st December, either in consequence of a settlement or by reason of unilateral action by the employer. The aggregate of the wages for the workmen for one month with effect from Ist December would, thus, increase from Rs, 1,00,000 to Rs, 1,10,000. Subsequently, in the months of March, April, May and June the employer increases his work force from hundred workers to hundred and fifty workmen. The aggregate of the one month's wages for the workmen for the months of March, April, May and June, would, therefore, swell by rupees fifty-five thousand and come to Rs, 1,65,000.
' Finally, if in the month of June, the Government announces an increase of Rs, 50 p. m. In the Employees, Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, and the increase is made effective from Ist April, the aggregate of one month's Wages for the workmen with effect from 1st April would increase by a further amount of Rs, 7,500 raising the aggregate of one month's wages to Rs, 1,72,500. Which aggregate of wages should the employer consider in such cases for the purposes of computing the bonus payable to the workmen. Even if it be considered that the employer should take into consideration that month's aggregate of the wages of the workmen which is most beneficial to the workmen, since Standing Order 10-C is a beneficial piece of legislation, the question will arise which is the aggregate the consideration whereof would be most beneficial to the workmen. This will not always be easy for the employer or even for a Labour Court to determine. If the highest aggregate of any month's wages of the workmen employed by him does not exceed thirty per cent of the profits earned by him there would possibly be no difficulty, but if such aggregate exceeds thirty per cent of his profits, the amount of bonus payable by him to his workmen would immediately drop and would be limited to fifteen per cent of his profit as provided in clause 2 (b) of Standing Order 10-C. In that case all workmen of the said employer would suffer a severe reduction in the amount of bonus payable to them particularly those who have put in a full year's employment with the employer.
7. Clause (3) of Standing Order 10-C provides that the bonus payable to an entitled workman shall bear to his monthly wages the same proportion as the total bonus payable by the employer bears to the aggregate of one month's wages of the workman. A similar difficulty would arise in the implementation of this clause as in the wording of clause (2), for if the wages of a workman during different months have been different which month's wages are to be considered for the purposes of payment of bonus to him and further if the aggregate of wages of the workman employed by the employer during different months are different then which month's aggregate wages are to be considered. The literal and the primary rule of construction, as enunciated by.
Maxwell in the Inter predation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, page 28, is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their ordinary meaning and further that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. This primary rule of construction has been clarified further by. Maxwell in his above treaties at page 29, as follows ' Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. "The decision in this case," said Lord Morris of Borthy-Gest in a revenue case, "calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. The desirability or the undesirability 'of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision. Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, any- thing is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just and expedient, words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded.
The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands, and to leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others."
8. If, therefore, the language of Standing Order had been plain and admitted of but one meaning there would have been not difficulty and effect would have had to be given to that meaning notwithstanding the fact that it would have resulted in apparent injustice or conferred what may appear to be unreasonable benefits upon some person. However, as pointed out above, since the language employed in the aforesaid Standing. Order would appear to be susceptible of more than one meaning, an interpretation has to be given which will be in harmony with the object of the statute and will be in accord with the intention of the Legislature: Standing Order 10-C, as in fact all the Standing Orders and other industrial legislation are deemed to be beneficial legislation and hence provide a fruitful field for the application of the tendency towards beneficial construction. This tendency rather than the rule, is that where judges are faced with a choice between a wide meaning which carries out what appears to have been the object of the Legislature and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, they will often choose the former. In this behalf it is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. To this end, therefore, a certain extension of the letter of the law would be permissible. If this be the principle of beneficial construction, then it has to be considered which choice has to be adopted in the instant case, the choice of any month according to the will or the whim of the employer, the last month of the year for which the bonus is payable, the month in which there are the maximum number of employees or the month in which the aggregate of the wages of the workmen is the highest. I think that the most reasonable and fair choice would be, while computing the aggregate of the wages of workers for one month, to total the aggregates of the wages of the workmen employer for all the twelve months of the year for which the bonus is payable and to divide it by twelve. The resulting sum will give us the average of the aggregate. In this way not only the difficulty of deciding which month's aggregate wages of workmen is to be considered would be obviated, but further the complication arising from increase or decreases in the wages of workmen during the year would be properly taken care of. Since the only reasonable way of determining the aggregate of one month's wage of workmen for the purposes of. Standing Order 10-C appears to be to calculate the average of the aggregate of one month's wages, it necessarily follows that in considering the monthly wages of a workman for the purposes of computing the actual amount of bonus payable to him, a similar method has to be followed and his average wages for the month have to be considered. In other words, the wages earned by the workman for the twelve months should be totalled up and divided by twelve to arrive at the average monthly wages. If this be the most reasonable and fair interpretation then in the case of a person who has put in more than ninety days but less than a full year's employment with an employer, he will receive bonus on a pro rata basis as has been done in the instant case.
9. If there had been any previous legislation providing for payment of statutory bonus to workmen or if it had been brought to the notice of this Tribunal whether there was any similar legisaion in force in any part of the world, the task of the Tribunal would have simpler or at any rate the Tribunal would have had the advantage of referring to such law and examining the authorities of those countries in which such provisions of law had been interpreted. However, both the learned counsel submitted that they were not aware whether there were any parallel provisions in force in any other country. I have, therefore, attempted to interpret the provisions of Standing Order 10- in accordance with the established principle of construction of beneficial legislation.
10. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would dismiss the appeal.