' JUSTICE SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).- The appellant was originally employed under the District Family Planning Board, D. G. Khan. On the abolition of the Provincial Population Board, she was offered an appointment in Grade-18, which she accepted and was continuing to serve in Grade-18 when her services were terminated by office order, dated 17th September, 1981, by invoking the provisions of section 6 of the Population Welfare Planning Programme (Appointment and Termination of Service) Ordinance, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the `Ordinance). After exhausting the departmental remedy, the appellant has come up in appeal before us under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
2. The learned counsel for State raised the same preliminary legal objections with regard to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, which had been raised in Appeal No, 8 (L)/1982 (Riaz Ahmad Baig v.
Secretary, Population Division). A copy of the order in that appeal forms appendix to this order. For the reasons recorded therein, we repel all the preliminary objections.
3. It appears that the appellant was, in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of the Ordinance, made to appear before the Federal Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission), but the Commission did not approve her for appointment in Grade-18, and as a result her services were terminated under section 6 of the Ordinance.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the Ordinance does not apply to the case of the appellant, as she was already a civil servant, and as such, no further law was necessary to give her that status, or -to- make 'it necessary for her to get clearance from the commission for becoming a civil servant. It was urged that an the abolition of the Council and the Board, the appellant was offered on appointment in Grade-18, under the Population Planning Division, which she accepted, and that from the date of acceptance of the post, she became a civil servant, and, therefore, the respondent-department illegally made her appear before the Commission.
Reference was particularly made to the word 'employee', occurring in section 4 of the Ordinance, and it was urged that the word 'employee' does not refer to a person who had already become a civil servant on accepting offer of appointment under the Population Planning Division.
5. The ward 'employee' has been defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance, which clearly shows that a person who was previously employed by the Board or the Council, and was taken on ad hoc on temporary basis in the Pepulation Planning Programme on or after the 30th April, 1977, shall be an employee for the purposes of the Ordinance. The appellant was previously an employee of the Board and when the Board was abolished, she was offered an appointment on temporary basis in the Population Planning Programme after 30th April, 1977. She accepted the same and thus became a civil servant and also an employee for the purposes of the Ordinance.
6. The learned counsel then contended that when the appellant became a civil servant, it was not necessary that her case should have been referred to the Federal Public Service Commission. In this contention, there is no force, because the first appointment on the basis of offer made to her was a temporary appointment, not made on regular basis. The post in Grade-18 being under the purview of the Commission and further having been made subject to the approval of the Commission under the Ordinance, it was necessary that her appointment as a civil servant should be approved by the Commission. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant was not a person, who for obtaining a regular appointment in the Population Planning Division, should be compelled to obtain the approval of the Commission.
7. The learned counsel also argued that the appellant having been accepted to be a civil servant on accepting the offer of appointment could not be removed from service without giving reasonable opportunity of being heard. In this contention, there is no substance, because the termination of the service of the appellant has taken effect under specific provisions of law, namely section 6 of the Ordinance, when she was not selected for appointment by the Commission.
8. The learned counsel also referred to Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides that every citizen of Pakistan has a right to be treated in accordance with law. No doubt, this is so, but the learned counsel could not convince us that the appellant has not been treated according to law.
On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that her case was referred to the Commission under the law, namely the Ordinance, and her services were terminated under the law, namely section 6 of the Ordinance.
5. For the reasons stated above, we find no substance in this appeal and dismiss it with costs of Rs, 100.