' This appeal is directed against the order, dated 12th February, 1983, passed by the learned 1st Sind Labour Court, Karachi., ordering reinstatement of the respondent with full back benefits.
2. The facts leading up to this appeal briefly stated are that the respondent was appointed as a Clerk-cum-Typist by the appellants on a contract basis for 9 months with effect from 22nd December, 1980, on condition that his services could be terminated at any time without notice.
Subsequently, his services were terminated on completion of seven months and twenty days, vide letter, dated 12th August, 1981, as no longer required. He filed a departmental appeal but with no success. He then served a grievance notice on the appellants and his grievance having not been redressed, the filed a grievance petition under section 25-A. I. R.
0., in the 1st Sind Labour Court, Karachi. His case in the learned Labour Court was that there was no class of contractual service provided by Standing Order 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and having been employed in a post of a permanent nature, he was a permanent workman within the meaning of Standing Order 1, and the appellant could not, in view of section 3 of the said Ordinance, contract out of its obligations under the Ordinance, and, therefore, his services could not be terminated except, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
The learned Labour Court by the impugned order, above mentioned, ordered his reinstatement in service with full back benefits. Having been aggrieved by this order, the appellants have came up in this appeal.
3. I have heard the counsel for the parties, Mr. Mazhar Ali B. Chohan for the appellants and Mr. S. P.
Lodhi for the respondent and have also persued the evidence available on the record, the appellant having examined Mr. Ali Ahmed Siddiqui and the respondent having examined himself.
On behalf of the appellants, their learned counsel has raised threefold contentions ; firstly, that the respondent was appointed on a contract basis only for period of 9 months with a condition that his services could be terminated at any time without notice and the order of termination of his services was in accordance with a contract of his service ; secondly, that by virtue of the provision of section 7 of the Road Transport Workers' Ordinance, 1961, the provisions of Standing Order 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, were not attracted to the case of the respondent, and, therefore, he could not be termed as a permanent workman ; and thirdly, that in any case the order of termination of service complied with the provisions of Standing Order 12 (1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, as it clearly states specifically the reasons of termination and, therefore, no exception can possibly be taken to such an order of termination.
4. As regards his first contention, Standing Order 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, classifies the "workmen" as follows :- "1. Classification of work men-(a) workman shall be classified as --
(1) Permanent,
(2) probationers,
(3) badlis,
(4) temporary,
(5) apprentices,
(b) A "permanent workman" is workman who has been engaged on work of permanent nature likely to last more than mine months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months in the same or another occupation in the industrial or commercial establishment..........)7
5. On the admitted facts of the case, the respondent was appointed as a clerk-cum-typist in a post which still is in existence in spite of the services of the respondent having been terminated. Mr. Ali Ahmed Siddiqui examined on behalf of the appellants has admitted in his cross-examination that it was correct that the respondent was working as Junior Clerk and was doing a clerical job on the workshop. He further admits that the workshop is still in existence. He has also admitted that the work which was being done by the appellant is still in existence. In view of the admissions there is no room for doubt that the respondent was appointed in a post of permanent nature and he was a permanent workman within the meaning of Standing Order 1, specially when there is no dispute that the respondent had satisfactorily completed a prabationary period of three months. There is also no dispute that the conditions of the amployment of workmen in all industrial or commercial establishments covered by the Ordinance must be in accordance with the Standing Orders given in the Schedule subject to any modification for the betterment by a collective agreement as provided by section 3 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. Therefore, although the appellants had purported to appoint the respondent on a contract basis, they could not in view of section 3 of the said Ordinance contract out of their statutory obligations under the said Ordinance. Accordingly the letters of appointment showing the contract of service of the respondent would not help the case of the appellants. As already discussed by me on the basis of the evidence available on the record, the respondent was appointed in a post of permanent nature which concept of employment is an essential ingredient of the definition of a permanent workman. The concept of contractual service is not contemplated at all by the classification shown in the Standing Order 1.
The respondent, therefore, was rightly held to be a permanent workman within the meaning of Standing Order 1. Reliance in that respect has also been placed on the authority of the Supreme Court in the case of P. I. A. v. Sind Labour Court No, V and othres . Accordingly, there is no substance is the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the respondent's employment was merely contractual and that he was not a permanent workman.1
6. As regards the second contention raised on behalf of the appellants to the effect that by virtue of section 7 of the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961, the provisions of Standing Order 1 would not be attracted to the case of the respondent for the reason that Standing Order 1 has not been specifically made applicable to the "workers" in road transport service as defined in section 2 (1) of the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, it would suffice to say that the "worker" defined therein means a person engaged on mobile duty and includes, drivers, cleaners and contractors and checkers employed by or in Road Transport Service. The respondent admittedly was appointed as a clerk-cum-typist and was not engaged on a mobile duty and would not be termed as a "worker" within the meaning of the above definition of a "worker" in section 2 (10) of the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961. Therefore, the provisions of the above Ordinance would not be attracted in his case. He would clearly be governed by the provisions of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. It would therefore, appear that he being a workman within the meaning of section 2 (i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standin Orders) Ordinance, 1968, all the provisions of that Ordinance would be applicable to his case. Accordingly, I do not find force even in this contention raised on behalf of the appellants.
7. Confronted with this situation, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised the third contention to the effect that assuming the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, were applicable to the case of the respondent, the appellants have complied with the requirements of Standing Order 12 (3) clearly stating the reasons of termination in writing as disclosed in the order of termination, dated 12th August, 1981, while terminating the services of the respondent. The termination order discloses that the services of the respondent were no longer required with effect from 12th August, 1981. The order, though expressly states the reason, does not disclose the reasonable ground for termination of services of the respondent which in fact appears to be the requirement of Standing Order 12 (3). The order passed is not only unreasonable but also arbitrary, in fact stating no reason except that the services of the respondent were no longer required. This does not seem to be the compliance of the requirements of Standing Order 12 (1) (3) though absence of one month's notice or pay in lieu of notice in the termination order may not invalidate the order. Accordingly, I find that the appellants have not even complied with the requirements of the Standing Order 12 (1) (3) of the Standing Order Ordinance, 1968, while terminating services of the respondent. Therefore, even this contention raised on behalf of the appellants has no force.
8. The result is that the appeal is dismissed. PLD 1980 SC 323