' The appeal captioned above arises from the decision, dated 1st November, 1980 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 1, Lahore, whereby the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. The respondent was a driver. His services were terminated, on 15th February, 1980 for the reason that they were no more required. However, no reason was given why his services were not required.
In the appointment order it was mentioned that for Suzuki No, LEM-9352 the respondent was taken in service as driver.
3. It has- been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that since the Suzuki had gone out of order, the services of the respondent were no more required and thus were terminated. It has also been said that the respondent was employed on work-charged basis. In the written statement these contentions were made, but in the appointment order it is not stated that on work-charged basis the respondent had been taken in service. The respondent was, therefore, a permanent employee since he remained in service for much more than nine months. There is no evidence that the Suzuki for which the respondent had been employed had gone out of order. The condition that the services of the respondent could be terminated at any time without assigning any reason was illegal being against the provisions of Standing Orders 1 and 12 (3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and thus was not effective. The respondent being permanent employee could be terminated only if he was the junior most his post had been genuinely abolished, or the vehicle for which he had been appointed had ceased to remain in working order and had not been substituted by a new one. Even if the Suzuki had gone out of order and was not substituted with a new one, junior most driver should have been terminated but there is no evidence, nor this is the case of the appellant that the respondent was the junior most driver. Laws are framed t be followed and respected and not for being flately ignored. Termination order Exh. P. 1 is in violation of Standing Order 12 (3) and was thus rightly set aside by the learned lower Court.
4. No objection was raised in the written statement that the appellant was an industry or industrial or commercial establishment but in spite of it the learned lower Court in the absence of any evidence held that it was a commercial establishment. Since no such objection was raised, the parties did not produce any evidence. The, duties and functions of the appellant could show if it is an industry or industrial or commercial establishment. This point, therefore, could not be touched.
Since the termination order was passed in flagrant violation of Standing Order 12 (3),D the respondent was rightly allowed back benefits also.
5. As upshot of the observations made above, I do not find any force in the appeal and dismiss the same.