' This appeal arises from the decision, dated 13th October, 1979 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 1, Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his re- instatement was dismissed.
2. The appellant was posted as Cashier in Daska Branch of the respondent-Bank. He was residing in a portion on the upper storey of the Bank premises. He brought at about mid-night a man and a woman with him and wanted to take them to the place of his residence on the upper storey, but was stopped by the gunman on duty. During the altercation some persons' were attracted outside the Bank. However, the appellant forcibly took the couple to the place of his residence on the upper storey. The gunman reported the matter to the Manager of the Bank, who came to the spot. The Manager contacted the appellant who told him that the couple was his guest. The Manager asked the appellant to turn out the said persons on the ground that they were of doubtful character. The couple, accordingly, was turned out of the Bank by the appellant. A preliminary enquiry was held by the Manager thereafter, as a result of which the appellant was charge-sheeted. An enquiry was held against him, which culminated in his dismissal. The charge-sheet, besides the charge mentioned above, contains the other charges also which pertain to the conduct of the appellant while he was posted at Sialkot. But he was found guilty in respect of only one charge which is 6-A, which pertains to the incident in dispute.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that on account of admitted enmity, the appellant was found guilty and dismissed. He says that the woman was the sister of the appellant and the male was the husband of the said woman. According to the learned counsel, only on suspicion that the couple was of doubtful character, the appellant could not be dismissed. He also says that the misconduct was not proved and that the allegation did not amount to misconduct.
So far as the contention of the learned counsel with regard to the element of enmity is concerned, he has made reference to the enquiry report and has argued that the very Enquiry Officer has admitted the internal enmity. But that enmity was existing between the appellant and the other employees of Sialkot when the appellant was posted there. There is no mention of any enmity between the appellant and the establishment at Daska, nor any enmity between him on one side and the gunman and the Manager of Daska, who appeared as witnesses against him, on the other.
The appellant did not participate in the enquiry, therefore, no element of enmity could come on the record of the enquiry. So far as the evidence produced before the lower Court is concerned, neither the brother-in-law of the appellant was examined nor the appellant himself stated anything with regard to any enmity so far as his posting at Daska is concerned. The evidence produced against the appellant, therefore, cannot be discarded.
4. The other point argued by the learned counsel is that it was not proved that the woman and the man were of doubtful character, or that the appellant had brought the woman for the commission of any offence of moral turpitude and that at the best there could be a case of suspicion. No doubt in the beginning there was only a suspicion, because the gunman did not know who the couple was, but it cannot be said that after preliminary enquiry and regular enquiry still there remained suspicion and nothing more was proved. In such cases the woman brought for illicit intercourse cannot be known to the witnesses, therefore, without investigation they are not in a position to say definitely about her character. In some cases even direct evidence is not possible and circumstantial evidence is to be produced. In the present case the fact that the appellant did not say from the very outset that the woman was his sister and that the other male was the husband of the woman is significant. He said that they were his guests. So he said to the Manager, but during preliminary enquiry he for the first time urged that the woman was his sister and the man was his brother-in-law. The intention of the appellant obviously was to take the couple upward to the place where he was residing but the gunman was resisting him and not allowing him to take the couple upward. If the woman had been in reality his sister and the other man his brother-in- law, he would have disclosed his relationship with the couple. Obviously the appellant told the gunman that the couple was his guests in order to satisfy the gunman that there was nothing objectionable, otherwise he had no need to say that the couple was his friend. Since he wanted to satisfy the gunman, so he was bound to say something convincing. His non-disclosure to the gunman that the couple was related to him clearly shows that the woman was not his sister. For the first time he stated that the woman was his sister and the man his brother-in-law in the preliminary enquiry obviously for the reason that he realised that if the enquiry resulted against him some serious action may be taken against him. The examination of the woman and the man during the enquiry does not arise because the appellant did not participate in the enquiry. Before the lower Court the woman was not produced, but one Mr. Ibrahim was examined, who said that the woman was his wife and sister of the appellant, but the Manager, who was examined as R. W.-1 said that he knew the sister's husband of the appellant and that he was not with that girl on the night of the incident. He also said that the ages of the girl and her companion were about 20 or 21 years. Mr. Ibrahim (P. W.-1) gave his age as 52 years before the lower Court. It is thus apparent that according to the statement of R. W.-1, Muhammad Ibrahim (P. W.-I) was not accompanying the girl and some other person was with her and that the said person not being Muhammad Ibrahim was neither the brother-in-law of the appellant, nor the girl was the sister of the appellant. So the solitary statement of the appellant in this respect stood controverted and rebutted by the statement of the Manager. The Manager had seen the gentlemen on the night of the incident, therefore, was in a position to say whether he was or was not the same person. It is thus obvious that not that person who was brought by the appellant to the bank on the night of the incident, but some different person was examined by him before the lower Court. Since the appellant wrongly stated that the woman was his sister and the man his brother-in-law the only inference is that the woman was brought by the appellant and the other person for illicit purpose at the odd hour of the night i. e.
11.00 or 11.30 p. m. This is also noteworthy that the couple had not gone to the Bank of their own accord, but rather were brought by the appellant. If the appellant had already been present upward and the couple had reached the gate of the Bank in order to see the appellant, it could be said that they were relatives or guests of the appellant. The evidence is that at about 9.00 or 9.30 p. m. The appellant went out of the Bank and at about 11.00 or 11.30 p. m. Brought a woman and the man to the Bank and wanted to take them to the place where he was residing. If it had been proved that the couple in reality was related, to the appellant, there could be no objection to it. He failed to prove it, therefore, the only inference is that the woman was brought by the appellant and the other man for being enjoyed illegally I n the Bank premises. The charge of misconduct, therefore, was amply prove d. I do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel that this was a case of suspicion only. The authority cited by the learned counsel i. e. 1974 SCMR 368, is not helpful. The facts of the case from which the authority arose were that one Sher Muhammad wanted to get some property transferred to him from the settlement authorities, but it was refused on the ground that he had made interpolations in the record: The High Court endorsed the view of the settlement authorities but the Supreme Court held that there was no proof of making the alleged interpolations by Sher Muhammad and that it could be a case of suspicion only and that merely on the ground of suspicion, the right to transfer the property could not be denied. In the present case no question of suspicion arises but as discussed above, since the appellant failed to establish that the woman was his sister, it was obvious that for illicit purpose the woman was brought by the appellant and other man. If Ibrahim examined by the appellant before the lower Court had been identified to be the same person, who had come with a woman and the appellant at the Bank at the time of the incident, of course his statement that the woman was the sister of the appellant and that he was the husband of the sister of the appellant, would have been believed and it could not have been held that the appellant did not commit any misconduct.
5. The other argument of the learned counsel is that the allegation made against the appellant did not amount to misconduct. After the appellant had brought the woman and the man only at the gate of the Bank and either had no intention to take them to the place of his residence inside the Bank, or when the gunman had objected to it, he had sent back the woman and the man and had alone gone to the place of his residence, it could be said that the misconduct had not been committed or completed. Even bringing of the woman for illicit purpose at the Bank is objectionable but if the appellant had not insisted to take the woman upward and had not actually taken her up, his act could not have been very much objectionable. But the evidence is that he took the woman and the man upward and when the Manager came to the Bank, on his asking the appellant brought down the couple. Thus the allegation amounted to misconduct and the misconduct had become complete.
6. The learned trial Court rightly dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant. There is no force in the appeal, which too is dismissed.