1. ' ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, J.-The facts leading to this appeal are that lands of the respondents were acquired by the Government for construction of Chillo Drain. The Collector, Nowshera delivered the award by his order dated 15-5-1969, fixing the amount of compensation. But he awarded only 'simple interest' at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of compensation awarded to the respondents. It, however, transpired that when the Collector delivered the above-mentioned award the law relating to the amount of interest admissible to the land-owners had already been amended by the Land Acquisition (West Pakistan) Amendment Act (Act III) of 1969. Which had come into force two months earlier, w. e. f. 15-3-1969. It was provided thereby that henceforth interest given to the land-owners would be 'compound interest' at the rate of 8% per annum on the compensation awarded to them for the compulsory acquisition of their lands. The respondents/land-owners, approached the Collector through an application, who passed an order allowing them compound interest at the enhanced rate vide his order dated 10-4-1975. But after about a week, on 23-4-1975, he recalled the above-noted order. The respondents challenged this order (dated 23-4-1975) through a writ petition which was allowed vide the impugned judgment.
2. The petitioner thereupon applied for leave which was granted to them on 27-10-1979, to consider whether the High Court had not erred in omitting to take notice of the provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
2. It was contended on behalf of the State that the respondent's had already received the amount of compensation awarded to them and had not sought the remedy provided by section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. That is indeed so but it is not denied that on 15-5-1969 when the award was announced the respondents/land-owners were already entitled to the compound interest at 8%.
3. Although the question of law raised in the appeal needs to be decided but the needful can be done in some other appropriate case because, we feel that in the present case substantial justice had been done and even if it could be said that strictly speaking the writ petition did not lie, the impugned order has only resulted in requiring the appellant to comply with the law as applicable on the date of announcement of the award.
4. ' The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.