' The two appeals captioned above arise from the decision, dated 31st March, 1982 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 9, Multan, whereby Muhammad Hasil (hereinafter mentioned as the respondent) was directed to be re-instated in service without back benefits. Punjab Highway Department (hereinafter described as the appellant) has in its appeal challenged the direction of re-instatement, whereas the respondent has in his appeal claimed back benefits. Both the appeals ate being disposed of together through this single judgment.
2. The allegation for which the respondent was dismissed from service was of shortage of concrete (bajri). Enquiry was not properly made. Instead of recording the prosecution evidence first, straightaway the respondent was examined and cross-examined and thereafter, prosecution evidence was recorded. Thereafter, no opportunity was afforded to the respondent to explain the material brought against him by the prosecution evidence. This fact highly prejudiced the respondent. No opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses was given. Rather the proceedings do not show that the respondent had at all joined in the enquiry and that in his presence the evidence was recorded. He was not given opportunity to lead defence evidence. The Enquiry Officer, no doubt is not a judicial officer, but this is a matter of common sense that a person under enquiry has to be afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to produce defence.
3. It has been argued that the respondent was a civil servant. According to the definition of civil servant, the persons covered by the definition of workman given in section 2 (n) read with Schedule-II of the Workmen's Compensation Act, are excluded from the definition. According to clause (viii) of Schedule-II, persons employed in the construction and maintenance of roads are workmen. The respondent being a Road Inspector had concern with the construction and repair of highways. This suffice to say that he was a workman. Not being a civil servant, he was not governed by the Civil Servants Rules and Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 would apply to him.
4. It has also been said that the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 does not apply as the respondent was employed in the administration of State as he was concerned with the removal of encroachments upon highways and could prosecute the encroachers. Removal of encroachment is not the function of the Government alone. Same may be said about the prosecution of culprits.
Any person can set the criminal law in motion. Prosecution too is not the function of the Government alone. Likewise construction and repair of roads is not regal function of the Government but every member of the public can do these functions.
5. This argument is also devoid of force that the respondent being employed in the supervisory capacity was excluded from the definition of workman as defined by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. No doubt, his duty was to supervise and take work from the workers working on the highway but it has not been proved that his wages were more than Rs, 800 per mensem. He, therefore, is covered by the definition of workman as defined in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
6. However, the respondent has failed to prove that he is covered by the definition of workman given in Standing Orders Ordinance. His duties were neither manual nor clerical. No doubt, he used to inspect the roads by travelling upto some miles daily, but he had not to do any manual work.
'Manual work' means work to be done with hands. He cannot be believed to be working personally with the labour class on the roads. His duty was of checking and supervising the work of the labour.
He had no clerical duties. Preparation of report was not the main duty but ancillary to his main duties. Of supervisor. Patrolling is not a manual work. Since he is not a workman as defined in Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, the said Ordinance did not guarantee any right to him. It has not been shown if any other law has guaranteed any right to him and the same may have been infringed. He had thus no guaranteed right for which he could apply under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
7. As upshot of the observations made above, I accept the appeal of the appellant and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court, dismiss the grievance petition of the respondent. As the very order of re-instatement stands vacated, no question of back benefits arises and thus the appeal of the respondent is dismissed.