' ANWARUL HAQ, C. J:-This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court dated the 19th of February, 1978, whereby an appeal presented by the petitioner Bashir Hussain against an order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court was dismissed.
2. The relevant facts are that the respondent Mst. Fatima Bi had filed a suit for pre-emption, in which she was directed to deposit 1/5th of the preemption money amounting to Rs, 6,000 before the 22nd of June, 1976. On the 18th of June, 1976, an application for extension of time was, made by the counsel for the respondent, but the same was rejected, and on the 22nd of June, 1976, the trial Court rejected the plaint on the ground that the 1/5th of the pre-emption money had not been deposited in time.
3. In appeal the learned District Judge remanded the case for decision on merits on the ground that the plaintiff had paid Rs, 6,000 to her counsel before instituting the suit, and that the default in making the deposit in time was on the part of her counsel, and she should not be made to suffer on that account.
4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that there was evidence to show that the entire amount of Rs, 6,000 had, in fact, not been paid by the plaintiff respondent in time to her counsel, as she was contradicted in this behalf by the affidavit of Lambardar Fazal Hussain; and that in any case the plate tiff had to suffer for the negligence of her counsel. These contentions were repelled by the learned District Judge, and these findings have been endorsed by the High Court, and it has been found, as a matter of fact, that the plaintiff had, indeed, deposited Rs, 6,000 which her counsel in time, and, therefore, she could not be made to suffer on account of the default committed by her lawyer. In taking this view the Courts below were obviously influenced by the fact that the plaintiff/respondent was a lady, who had done her duty under the law, but she had no control over the, conduct of her counsel.
5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the stand taken by the plaintiff/respondent was contradicted by the affidavit of her own witness Lambardar Fazal Hussain who spoke of the payment of only Rs, 4,000 instead of the required amount of Rs, 6,000 bit the Courts below had not given sufficient attention to this aspect of the matter. He also argued that if the council was negligent; then remedy for the respondent was to seek damages against him, but she could not obtain an extension of time under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
6. There is no merit in these submissions. We have ourselves perused the affidavit of Lambardar Fazal Hussain and we are satisfied that its contents have been correctly interpreted. He does not in any manner contradict the plaintiff/respondent but only supports her in regard to the payment of the sum of Rs, 4,000, whereas she had paid the remaining amount of Rs, 2,000 at an earlier occasion to her counsel, at a time when the Lambardar was not present. In any case, it is difficult for us to reverse a concurrent finding of fact on the question whether the plaintiff/respondent had indeed, paid a sum of Rs, 6,000 to her counsel or only Rs, 4,000.
Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives discretion to the Court, including the appellate Court, to extend time for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. All that is necessary is that the discretion should be exercised in a judicious manner and not arbitrarily. Now, in the present case, both the Courts below are satisfied that the default on the part of the plaintiff/respondent was not intentional or Wilful, and, therefore, it was a fit case where extension of time ought to have been granted. We see no illegalit in the view they have taken, and accordingly there is no justification for us to interfere in the matter.
' The petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.