1. This is an appeal under section 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the Ordinance The appeal is directed against the order of the Second We Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi, dated 6th January 196 on an application under section 30 of the Ordinance. The facts briefly put are these.
2. Amanullah Qureshi, the respondent No. 1, is a Conduct in the Government Transport Service, Hyderabad. It is alleged that he had failed to issue tickets to 34 passengers and that be h realised Rs. 1.85 and Rs. 1.60, from two passengers' while had issued tickets for 0.25 paisas to each one of them. Amanull Qureshi was charge-sheeted and found guilty.
3. Amanullah Qureshi was an Executive of the Registered Trade Union and as the Industrial Dispute bearing No. 63/64, a No. 81/64, were pending adjudication before the Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi, the appellant made application under section 30 of the Ordinance for permission dismiss the respondent from service.
4. The learned Chairman of the Industrial Court came the conclusion, in the first place, that the Enquiry Officer partial and that the explanation given by Amanullah Qureshi respect of the charges was plausible. He, therefore, refused grant permission to dismiss Amanullah Qureshi from service.
5. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, the Representative for respondent Amanullah Qureshi raised a preliminary objection. He contended that the appeal was not maintainable inasmuch as no appeal lay against the decision under section 30 of the Ordinance.
6. In order to appreciate the contention of the Representative for Amanullah Qureshi, it will be useful to reproduce relevant provision of section 12 of the Ordinance. It runs under
(4) Any decision of the Court other than an award shall be final and shall not be questioned in any manner by before any judicial or other authority.
(5) Any award published under subsection (2) or sub- section (2) (b) may be appealed against to the High Court any party to the dispute within 30 days of the publication of the award; and the decision of the High Court in such app shall be final."
7. The Representative for the appellant, Mr. Nasirul Hasa did not challenge before me that the order of the learn Chairman of the Court under section 30 of the Ordinance v& not a decision within the meaning of. section 12 (4) of t Ordinance.
8. Mr. Nasirul two points before me in reply to the contention of the other side. I propose to deal with these two contentions separately. He contended, in the first place, that section 12 (4) of the Ordinance, did not bar the right of the appellant to appeal to the High Court. In this connection, ha relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation v. Labour Union (1). The Supreme Court in that case had granted Special Leave to Appeal against the order of a Division Bench of the High Court, whereby it had dismissed the writ petition of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation for quashment of an order passed by the First Industrial Court at Karachi up, n an application presented to it by the Labour Union of the said Corporation. By the said application the Union had sought an interpretation of a settlement which had been arrived at between the Corporation and the Union. The High Court in the writ petition against the order passed by the Industrial Court approved the interpreta--tion given by it, and held that the interpretation given by Court was not devoid of lawful authority and consequently, the jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution was not attracted.
9. My Lord Cornelius, C. J., who delivered the Judgment of the Sup7eme Court, while considering the scope of sub---clause (2) of section 35 of the Ordinance of 1959, came to the conclusion that an appeal against an award must be deemed to include an appeal against an interpretation given to any part of an award by the Industrial Court. The proposition laid down in the case of K. E. S. C.
10. Limited has no application to the circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the application was under section 30 of the Ordinance seeking permission to dismiss Amanullah Qureshi. It cannot be said that the decision of the learned Chairman dismissing the application was in any way connected with any other matter that was appealable and, therefore, section 12 (4) of the Ordinance did not apply as in the case of K. E. S. C. Limited.
11. Right of appeal is the creation of statute. No litigant has vested right in appeal unless so provided by the statute. In the present case, section 12 (4) of the Ordinance clearly bars a right of appeal.
12. In the second place, the Representative of the appellant submitted that the Ordinance having been repealed by the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, which came into effect on the 8th of March 1968, and the latter Ordinance confers right of appeal against such a decision, and appeal is maintain--able. The submission of the Representative for the appel--lant has no force. In the first place, the decision in question became final on the date it was communicated by the Provincial Government to the appellant. Under Rule 27 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1960, the decision of the Court shall be deemed to have been given on the date on which it is communicated to the parties under Rule 26. It wasi
(1) 1967 PLC 691 admittedly communicated to appellant on 29th February 1968.The decision became final within the meaning of section 12 (4) of the Ordinance, which could not be questioned before any judicial authority on that date. It is true that a decision under Section 30 of the Ordinance, which is equivalent to section 37 of the new Ordinance, is appealable.The right of appeal is a vested right, which can be exercised under the law prevailing at the date when the order is passed. There was no right of appeal on the date when the order was communicated to the appellant. If the right of appeal is given fur the first time after a final order has been passed, such a provision in the enactment, if applied retrospectively, would deprive a party of the advantages of a final order.
13. Section 16 of the new Ordinance, which makes provision for appeal against an order on an application of permission to dismiss an employee, has not been given retrospec--tive effect. It is prospective. It does not, therefore, destroy the finality of the order, which is under appeal before me. 1 would, for the reasons given above, hold that the appeal is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed.