' This appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 has been preferred against the order, dated 5th August, 1982 passed by the learned Xlth Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller Karachi in Rent Case No,3889/1981. Which was filed under section 14 of the aforementioned Ordinance. The said application was allowed by the learned Rent Controller and the appellant/tenant was directed to vacate and hand over the premises within 90 days to the respondent/landlord.
' The facts briefly stated are that the appellant was the tenant of the respondent in respect of the bungalow in question at a monthly rent of Rs,450. The respondent, who was an employee in the State Bank of Pakistan, on attaining the age of 60 years retired with effect from February,1974. After his retirement from service he served a notice on the appellant to vacate the premises in question as according to him it was required by him for his own personal use and occupation. As the tenant failed to vacate the said premises, the above-mentioned ejectment case under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was filed on the ground that the required he said premises for his own personal use and occupation and that he is not in occupation of any other building owned by him in the locality.
' The tenant/appellant contested the matter. He inter alia pleaded that the respondent/landlord is residing in his own building in P.E.C.H.S. Karachi and that the application had been filed with mala fide intention and is based upon false grounds.
2. The learned Rent Controller after recording evidence and hearing the learned Advocates by the impugned order, passed on 5th August,1982 allowed the said application and directed the appellant/tenant to vacate the premises in dispute and hand over its vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent/landlord within 90 days from the date of the order.
3. Aggrieved by the above order the tenant filed this appeal under section 21 of the above- mentioned Ordinance of 1979. Mr. A. Aziz Shaikh, the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal contended as follows:-
(i) That the house in which the respondent/landlord at the time of filing of the application was residing though owned by his wife, in law shall be deemed to be house of respondent/landlord as the requirement of wife is the requirement of the husband and vice versa, as both have to live together. ##TE ##
(ii) That the Rent Controller failed to consider that the premises was not required by the respondent/landlord bona fide.
4. As regards the first contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the case of Shaikh Fazal Din v. Noor Muhammad 1982 CLC 2595. It was a case filed by the landlord for ejectment of his tenant on the ground of personal requirement. In support of the application he examined his attorney, one Suleman Poorani, and also examined Mst.Zubaida, his own wife. An objection was taken on behalf of the tenant/ appellant in that case that the landlord had himself not come into the witness-box in order to prove the personal requirements. Repelling the contention thus raised, as devoid of any force the learned Judge, who deposed of the said appeal, observed that Mst. Zubaida is the wife of the respondent and she being present in Pakistan had entered into the witness-box supported the contents of the application. In view of these circumstances the learned Judge made the observation to the effect that the requirement of a wife is requirement of the husband and vice versa since both have to live together. It may also be noted here that the said case before the Rent Controller had been filed under section 15 of the Ordinance of 1979. The above observation made in the said case, therefore, have to be appreciated in the light of the facts of the said particular case and the same cannot be stretched so as to mean that a house owned by a wife can be treated or considered as the house of the husband within the meaning of section 14 of the Ordinance, 1979. The first objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant thus fails.
5. As regards the second objection, reliance was sought to be .Placed on the case of Syed Israr Alam v. S. M. Hussain 1983 CLC 468, wherein a learned Judge of this Court held that the mere use of the word "need" in section 14 of the Ordinance, 1979 envelop the concept of bona fide and that a person who needs the premises has to establish the same in an inquiry to be held by the Rent Controller and that it can never be said that the word has to be interpreted as if it were divorced from the concept of bona fide or mala fides.
The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand referred to the cases in Mumtazuddin Ahmed v. Sultan Jehan PLD 1981 Kar. 329, Wali Mohammad v. Mst. Hameeda PLD 1981 Kar. 794, Ulfat Hameed v. Birjis Khatoon P L 0 1982 Kar. 823 and Younus v. Mrs. Hameeda 1982 CLC 580 in support of his contention that in an application moved under section 14 of the Ordinance of 1979 in view of the difference in the language implied in sections 14 and 15(2) (viii) no burden of proof to establish his bona fide is cast on a person applying for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement under section 14. Mr. H. A. Rehmani, the learned counsel for the appellant informed me that the opinion expressed by Mr. C Justice Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui in the case of Mst. Ulfat Hameed v. Mst. Birjis Khatoon (ibid) to the effect that provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance do not contemplate an inquiry by the Rent Controller into the genuineness or otherwise of the needs expressed by a landlord, was challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court in C.P.S.L.A. No K- 28/1982 but the said petition was dismissed summarily.
6. Mr. H. A. Rehmani, the learned counsel has further stated that the appellant has already been ejected from the premises in dispute and is now living in his own house situated in Karachi Administration Co-operative Housing Society.
I am in respectful agreement with the principles as to the scope of inquiry in cases filed under section 14 laid down in the above cases referred by Mr. H. A. Rehmani, the learned counsel for the respondent.
7. In the circumstances finding that the respondent/landlord on attaining the age of superannuation (60 years) retired from the service of State Bank of Pakistan, and is not in occupation of a building owned by him in Karachi, was rightly held to be entitled to an order of ejectment against the respondent and that no valid reasons have been made out for interfering with the order passed by the learned Rent Controller on the application filed under section 14 of the Ordinance of 1979.
' The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.