1. REASONS ' This second appeal has arisen from a rent dispute between the parties who admittedly have the relationship of tenant/landlord in respect of the residential Bungalow No, B-27, Block-10 situating in Federal 'B' Area, Karachi. The respondent Israrul Hag who is the landlord sought ejectment of the appellant, the tenant, from the aforesaid bungalow on the grounds of default in payment of rent and personal requirement. The learned Rent Controller after considering the evidence produced by both the parties found both the above issues in favour of the respondent and as prayed by the latter, ordered ejectment of the appellant within one month of his order, dated 30-5-1979. The first appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of the Rent Controller was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Karachi by his4order, dated 13-10-1980. The present appeal is directed against the last mentioned order.
2. ' After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and going through the relevant written material available on record, the appeal was dismissed by short order, dated 26-3-1984 with no order as to costs. However, at the request of the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant was allowed six months' period for vacating the demised premises subject to his depositing in Court monthly rent regularly and in case of default in this behalf, it was directed that he would be ejected without any notice. Following are the reasons in support the said short order.
3. ' Whether that the appellant made default in payment of rent and that the respondent needed the disputed premises for his personal use and requirement are questions of fact to be proved by factual evidence. Admittedly there are concurrent findings of the two Courts below on the both issues. The learned counsel for the appellant was therefore invited to point out any illegality in the lower Courts' findings because it was only on that ground that this Court can intervene in the second appeal. Confronted with the above situation the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Judgment of the learned Rent Controller was based on "misreading". In support of his argument he referred to the discussion made by the learned Rent Controller on issue No,2.
4. Beginning the discussion it is stated "the applicant has alleged that he is residing in a rented house with his family". At another place in the same discussion the learned Rent Controller has observed.
5. "He (appellant) bas nowhere stated if the applicant is not residing in a rented house." On perusal of the ejectment application as well as the evidence led by the respondent it would appear that it is not the case of the respondent that he is residing in a rented house. The plea taken by him is that he and his family are residing in the factory premises. Thus, the learned Rent Controller has, no doubt, misread the evidence to the above extent.
6. ' The question however is whether the conclusions recorded by the lower Courts with regard to the personal requirement of the respondent are based on said misreading of the evidence. The answer to this question is obviously in the negative. It is nowhere stated in the impugned order of the first appellate Court that the respondent/ landlord is presently residing in a rented house. The respondent's case as stated in the said order is that he along with his family is residing in the factory premises and now that his children have grower up the needs for the accommodation have increased and that even otherwise he needs to shift to heal their accommodation free from noise and other ill effects of factory life. The learned lower appellate Court has also taken note of the fact that due to the respondent's occupying some portion of the factory premises, there is no enough space to keep the factory material which is lying on footpath. Even the learned Rent Controller has referred to the respondent's living in the factory premises, while describing his case in the earlier part of his order. It is only the stage discussing the issue of personal requirement that he obviously through negligence has shown the respondent to be living in a rented house. After careful consideration of the material on record. I an of the view that the findings on the issue relating to personal requirement of the respondent are based on reliable evidence and not on misreading of the evidence as referred to above.
7. ' Even if the ground of personal requirement is excluded from consideration, the appellant would still be liable for ejectment on the basis of default in payment of rent on which the lower Courts have expressed unanimous opinion. According to the written agreement between the parties the monthly rent was payable in advance. That is to say that the appellant was to pay rent before the commencement of the month. The .allegation of the respondent is that the appellant has made default in payment of rent for May and June, 1976. As per agreement the rent for these months was due for payment by 30th April and 31st May respectively. If statutory allowance of 15 days is added to the above dates the payment became due on 15th May and 15th June respectively. However, it is an admitted position that the rent for these months was paid together on 7-7-1976 after the filing of the ejectment application on 30-6-1976. Thus the default made by the appellant in respect of May and June 1976 is hereby established, and the concurrent findings of the Courts below in this regard are unexceptionable, hardly admitting any scope for interference.
8. ' Accordingly the appeal having no merit is dismissed as mentioned above.