1. ' ABDUL HAYEB KURESHI, C J.-The learned Single Judge bad disposed of, dealt with ten applications vide the impugned order. The first of these applications, bearing C. M. A. No, 371/1983 is the subject- matter of the present appeal.
2. ' The brief facts are that the appellants, who were plaintiffs in Suit No, 764/1979, had obtained an injunction against the seven defendants in the suit. It may straightaway be stated that none of these defendants is a respondent in the present appeal. A copy of the injunction order has been placed on the record (Annexure A/1), and the same clearly shows that an interim injunction was granted to restrain the "defendants" in the suit from delineatiag, allotting, or, leasing the land to any one. The position is thus clear that the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge, granting the inunjction, did not bind the three respondents in the present appeal.
3. ' It seems that respondent No, 1, Mirza M. Fazal Ali Baig, made an application under Order XXXI, rule 4, C. P. C., seeking variation of the interim injunction granted on 12th December, 1982. An affidavit was also filed in support of this application. During the pendency of this application, the plaintiffs made an application for punishment of Mirza M. Fazal All Baig, and the two other respondents for contempt of Court. A copy of this application is on the record as Annexure 'X' of the file. An affidavit in support of this application is Annexure `X/6'. I t is stated in the affidavit, that, in spite of the fact that injunction order had been granted by the Court, a publicity campaign in newspapers, or, on T.
4. V. For disposal of the plots, which was the subject-matter of the suit, was being carried on his was termed to be in disregard and disobedience of the Court order. What we could infer from the record that has been placed before us, the grievance of the plaintiffs/appellants was that, in spite of an injunction having been granted by the learned Single Judge, the three respondents in the present appeal were attempting to sell the land. The learned of Single Judge repelled such contention on the short ground that the alleged contemnors (respondents) were not parties to the suit, and were not bound by the injunction. Holding the application for contempt as a misconceived application, the same was dismissed, and hence the present appeal.
5. ' A few dates deserve mention. Injunction was granted on 12th December, 1982, and respondent No, 1 herein made an application for variation of the terms of injunction on 21st December, 1982. This respondent had made an application for joinder as a party, and this application was granted by consent on 10th April, 1983. Mr. G. A. Brohi, the learned Advocate for the appellants, has also invited our attention to .a counter-affidavit, which has been filed by respondent No, 1 in this Court, and he seems to rely on the factual averments in this counter-affidavit for the purpose of showing that the respondent had disobeyed the order of injunction by selling the land. To that extent, paragraph 5 in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court clearly states that the respondent had executed the final sale-deed on 28th August, 1982, viz. About three and a half months earlier than the grant of injunction by the learned Single Judge.
6. ' The other question, that arises in this case, was in regard to order of injunction, binding the respondents. Admittedly, the respondents were not defendants in the suit. The learned Advocate has, however, relied on a judgment from the Dacca High Court in the case of Dr. A. N. M. Mahmood v. Dr. M.O. Ghani, Vice-Chancellor (1). The learned Advocate has invited our attention to a para. That starts at page 91 of the said Report. It reads as follows :- "It has been next urged on behalf of the opposite parties that the prohibitory order was not personally served on the defendants. Personal service of an injunction is, for obvious reasons, the normal requirement of law. But, to make a fetish of it is unwarranted either on authority or on principle. The import of the general rule is frequently misunderstood. It is clear that if a person is required to carry out an order, he must be acquainted with it. In the vast majority of cases the normal defence is that the answering defendant is unaware of the order. In such cases service of the order is the only means by which knowledge can be effectively brought home to parties affected by the injunction. Personal service of the order, in such eventualities, is the only effective mode of proving knowledge of the order. One cannot be fixed with a liability for breach of an order about which he has no knowledge. But, if it is proved that the person bound by
(1) PLD 1967 Dacca 67 ' the injunction had, in fact, actual notice thereof, he cannot take the defence that the order was not personally served on him. This proposition cannot be contested."
7. ' We have re-produced this paragraph for the main reason that this paragraph has persuaded us to take the view that we are taking in this appeal, and not for the reason that it, in any manner, supports the contention of the learned Advocate, that an injunction granted can even bind strangers to the suit. A plethora of authorities could be found on the proposition that an injunction order does not affect rights of persons, who are strangers to the suit and cannot bind them. Taking of a contrary view would lead to enormous mischief. To illustrate a case in point, 'A' may file a suit against '13' to restrain him from selling a house. 'B', in fact, is not even the owner of the house. Nor has he any interest therein. But `C', who is the real owner of the house having the full right to sell it, does sell the house during the pendency of the suit. Now could 'C', who is a stranger to the suit, be punished for contempt. It would completely invert the scales of justice. Numerous such illustrations could be marshalled to support the proposition that an injunction cannot bind such persons, who are not parties to the suit. Even the Dacca case would appear to lay down the same proposition, although, in the head notes of the Editor, a sentence has appeared, which seems to put the proposition conversely. Very often, the head notes are misleading and sometimes even incorrect.
8. ' The upshot of the above discussion is that the respondents, not being parties to the suit, could not be punished for contempt, and moreso as on the averment relied upon by the learned Advocate for the appellant from out of the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No, 1, the land in the suit was sold much earlier than the grant of grant injunction.
9. ' We see no substance in this appeal, which we dismiss in limine.