1. ' The respondent filed an ejectment application against the appellant alleging that after the allotment of the property bearing No, 16 in Block No, 92 of Unit No, 3 in Settlement Town Mirpur Khas he constructed a house which was rented out to the appellant on 4-3-1974, on a monthly rent of Rs,200 payable in advance on the first of every calendar month. The appellant has failed to pay the rent for four months. The appellant filed written statement in which he denied the allegations. He further pleaded that no relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. According to the appellant, the respondent has agreed to sell the plot to him, and after taking possession he has constructed a house on it, and obtained electricity and water connection at his own cost. He further stated that he has paid Rs,3,000 in installments from time to time through cheque and by cash whenever needed by the respondent. The learned Controller framed six issues and held that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, and as default in payment of rent has been committed by the appellant he is liable to be ejected.
2. ' Mr. Muhammad Sharif the learned' counsel while assailing the order of the learned Controller contended that the application for ejectment was not maintainable as the respondent had rented out an open plot of land and not a house. The learned counsel further contended that the learned Controller has found that the construction was raised by the appellant. On the other hand Mr. S.Inayat Ali the learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that the allegation of para. 1 of the application, where it was clearly asserted that after obtaining the plot, the respondent raised construction and rented out to the appellant, has not been denied. In the written statement the appellant stated that, it is denied for want of knowledge. In the additional pleas the appellant pleaded that he was in need of a house for purchasing it and the respondent agreed to sell his plot in future and allowed the appellant to raise construction on the plot. It was also averred that whenever the respondent sold the plot, the amount invested by the appellant was to be adjusted in the sale price. From the pleading it seems that the appellant has not specifically denied that the respondent had rented out the premises which consisted of a construction. In this regard Mr. Sharif has referred to the evidence of the witnesses at length and contended that the conduct of the respondent disproves that he had constructed the house and had inducted the appellant as tenant. According to the learned counsel the respondent's income was so meagre that neither he could construct a house, nor he could wait for a period of about 5 years for demanding rent for taking any action against the appellant. These contentions are based merely on conjectures and surmises. There is no definite evidence on record to support this contention. Merely because a person has a meagre income does not lead to a presumption that he cannot raise construction of any nature. Apart from the fact that the respondent had raised construction, from the evidence, it is also clear that the appellant had also made some additions. But to start with the appellant was rented out plot with construction thereon and not merely an open plot of land.
3. ' The appellant's plea to purchase the plot of land is vague. The respondent is the lessee of the plot of land granted by 'Administrator Municipal Committee Mirpur Khas. If the respondent would have agreed to sell this property to the appellant, then at least some document of this nature would have been executed and at least the original lease deed would have been delivered to the appellant to establish some relationship with the property. The respondent's witnesses have stated that the house was constructed by him. It seems that the dispute between the parties was pending since long, and the respondent had been seeking relief against the appellants from the Military Authorities. In this dispute at one stage one Muhammad Iqbal had acted as a mediator and both the parties had appointed him to settle the dispute between them. He had made an award also, but the appellant did not abide by it. From the fact that both the parties had agreed to appoint him as an arbitrator it appears that his integrity, honesty, and impartiality cannot be questioned. The learned Controller had summoned and examined him as a Court witness. He has stated that the appellant had taken the house in question on rent from the respondent. He further confirmed that he had acted as an arbitrator and ruled that the appellant should deliver vacant possession of the house to the respondent within 40 days and the respondent was directed to pay Rs,7,000 to the appellant. This amount was deposited by the respondent with the said witness, but the appellant expressed his inability to deliver possession. From his evidence, it seems that the appellant had made some additional construction, for which he was being compensated. The appellant in his cross-examination admitted that Muhammad Iqbal was appointed as an arbitrator. His evidence conclusively proves that open plot was not rented' out to the appellant.
4. ' The appellant produced Saghir to establish that in the year 1976 he had constructed one room, at the cost of Rs,7,000 on the orders placed by him. The premises according to the appellant was rented out in March, 1974 but the construction according to the appellant's witness was made in the year 1976. As the appellant had taken the premises for his residence it is unbelievable that he resided on open plot for about two years without any construction. A bill from Saghir Ahmed for Rs,7,081.50 has been produced on behalf of the appellant to prove that the construction was made by him. The bill relates to the construction of one room and repairs, This shows that apart from construction of one room Saghir was also required to carry out repairs and white-washing which cannot be in respect of a new construction. It would relate only to an old construction. This document by itself establishes that before a room was constructed by the appellant, there existed some construction which required repairs, It is not the case of the appellant that there is only one room in the plot and no other construction exists.
5. ' Mr. Sharif the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent had filed an application before the Police authorities in which he had complained that he had given the house to the appellant out of sympathy for few days, but he has refused to vacate it, and is in unauthorized occupation. On this basis the learned counsel says that the appellant is not a tenant of the premises. This is a report made to the Police with a view to obtain emergent relief. The main complaint was that in spite of promise to vacate the premises in presence of elders of the locality the appellant has refused to do so, and on demand to vacate it he has abused and threatened him to kill. If the contents of this application are read as a whole, it seems that this was made for obtaining possession through the police. The appellant himself does not say he is in unauthorized possession. It is clear from this document, that the respondent has been claiming that he had a house in Satellite Town which was given to the appellant.
6. Mr. Muhammad Sharif then contended that as an award has been made by Iqbal Hussain, the parties should have proceeded as provided by the Arbitration Act, and ejectment application is, therefore, not maintainable. This contention of the learned counsel is without any foundation and when it was pointed out that in view of the provision of section 13(1) of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance except the Controller no Court or Arbitrator has jurisdiction to eject a tenant from the premises and such dispute could not have been referred to the Arbitrator, Mr. Muhammad Sharif did not press this objection. However, it would be proper to refer to Commissioner of Income- tax v. Mst. Sakina Karim 1979 CLC 644 where referring to section 13(1) of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 it was observed that:-- "There is, thus, no manner of doubt that a tenant cannot be ejected except in accordance with the provisions of section 13, and since these provisions do not permit a Rent Controller to order or disallow ejectment of a tenant in terms of an award given in pursuance of an arbitration agreement, clause 12 of the agreement of tenancy relied upon by the appellant is of no consequence. Even if the respondent had referred the matter in dispute to arbitration before it was brought before the learned Rent Controller and had obtained an award in his favour and also a decree in pursuance of the award, it would not have affected the ejectment proceedings taken out against him because, according to subsection (1) of section 13 of the Ordinance, a tenant cannot be evicted in terms of a decree whether passed before or after the coming into force of the Ordinance. By incorporating the word 'otherwise' in subsection (1) the framers of law made it amply clear that a tenant shall not be ejected in any manner except the one provided in section 13. In this view of the matter, the learned Rent Controller was not right in staying the ejectment proceedings on the basis of the arbitration clause relied upon by the appellant."
7. The provisions of Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, provide a procedure for ejectment of a tenant and do not recognize ejectment by referring the dispute to Arbitrators, Any award made granting ejectment cannot be enforced but it can be used as a corroborative piece of evidence. The relationship between the parties has been established and there being no substantial evidence to prove that the rent was regularly paid by the appellant he was rightly held to be a defaulter.
8. ' The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.