' This order' will dispose of S. A. Os. Nos. 376/78, 377/78 and Civil Revision No, 378/82 because they involve the same parties and dispute with respect to the same property.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the house in Block No, 43, Sargodha was in dispute between the contending parties. It was divided by an order of the A. S. C. Dated 4-1-1962. He ordered the division of the property into two portions. The net result of this division was that on the one hand a portion of the house was given over to Siraj Din revision petitioner in C.R. No, 378/82 and respondent in S.A. Os. Nos. 376/78 and 377j78. The other portion went to Abdul Shakoor. The appeal and revision against this order failed before the Settlement Authorities. Thereafter, the matter was agitated by way of Writ Petition No, 880/R-65 by Abdul Shakoor decided, on 21-7-1965. The view taken by the High Court was that substantial justice had been done between the parties and, therefore, there was no ground for interference made out. The High Court in para. 2 of the judgment in the aforesaid writ petition specifically held-"All that the Settlement Authorities have done is to demarcate the property transferred to the two parties namely, the petitioner (Abdul Shakoor) and the respondent (Siraj Din) and if they interpret the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner of vertical division to mean that the two rooms on the ground floor in possession of Siraj Din with the chaubara above had to go to him, no exception can be taken to this equitable order.
Substantial justice has been done between the parties." The matter went up in Letters Patent Appeal No, 96/65 which was dismissed on 23-11-1965.
3. The matter did not come to an end but the chapter was now opened on the eviction side before the Rent Controller. Abdul Shakoor filed an eviction application against Siraj Din in respect of a room on the ground floor on the plea that this constituted the third room whereas he was transferee of two rooms. On the contrary, Siraj Din filed an eviction application against Abdul Shakoor in respect of the Chaubara on the ground that he was the transferee of it and that Abdul Shakoor was in possession of it since before the transfer. Both these eviction matters were decided by the Rent Controller in favour of Abdul Shakoor. Siraj Din thereupon filed two separate appeals in both these cases. The Additional District Judge as appellate authority by his order dated 12-5-1977 held that a perusal of the various orders by the Settlement Authorities did not make it clear as to who was the owner of the two upper rooms. On this view, it was further observed that the relationship of landlord and tenant had not been clearly established and the parties should get their title settled from the Settlement Department or the Civil Court if so advised. Both the appeals of Siraj Din were thus accepted, the net result of which was that the eviction proceedings came to an end and the parties were referred to Civil Court. The two S.A. Os. Are directed against the impugned orders of the Additional District Judge, dated 12-5-1977 in the two connected appeals.
4. Civil Revision No, 378/82 arises out of the proceedings taken before the Civil Court pursuant to the observations made by the Additional District Judge as Appellate authority under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. Insofar as these proceedings culminating in the civil revision are concerned, a suit was filed by Siraj Din for a declaration that he was also the transferee of the chaubara on the first floor of the property in dispute. This was dismissed by a Civil Judge vide judgment/ decree dated 5-3-1981. A further appeal also failed before the District Judge who dismissed the same vide order, dated 9-3-1982.
5. All these cases have been consolidated for being disposed of together because the determination of the question of the entitlement of all parties, as adjudicated by the High Court in the previous litigation, would be conclusive and binding between the parties. The question which calls for proper determination is as to what is the true scope and import of the orders of the Settlement Authorities regarding the transfer of the property seen in the light of the interpretation placed on it by the High Court in W. P. No,/880/R-65 which order was not interfered with by the L P.A.
Bench, the matter not having been assailed any further before the Supreme Court thus became final.
6. I have carefully examined the order of Mr. Justice A.R. Sheikh (as his Lordship then was) dated 21- 7-1965. It appears to me from a bare reading of the same that the order of the A.S.C. As upheld by the Additional Settlement Commissioner and finally by the Chief Settlement Commissioner had been interpreted to mean that Siraj Din was the transferee of the two rooms on the ground floor as well as the chaubara on the first floor. This order was interpreted to be an equitable order.
7. Mr. A. H. Najafi, however, would like to argue that the High Court has merely made observations and interpreted the orders of the Settlement Authorities for the purpose of deciding the question whether the same called for interference or not and there was no determination on the High Court's own part. He, therefore, urged that the import of the orders of the A.S.C. As well as the other Settlement Authorities should be determined independently in the light of the present controversy.
8. I am sorry to say that such a course cannot be adopted. The first litigation arose out of the transfer of the property on the Settlement side. The High Court was properly called upon to resolve the dispute between the litigating parties. It was in this context that the decision of the High Court in W.P. No, 880/R-65 resolved the controversy on the Settlement side. Both the parties are bound by that interpretation of the High Court. It will be rather anomalous that an interpretation made by a superior Court in respect of the orders of Settlement Authorities during the Settlement phase should be interpreted in one manner while the same set of orders should receive an interpretation on a subsequent petition in eviction proceedings in another manner. In my view, the interpretation placed on the orders of the Settlement Authorities and the entitlement of the parties would be conclusive as a result of the proceedings culminating A in the orders of the High Court in the matter of Settlement dispute and there is no need for a 'fresh interpretation or adjudication regarding a dispute which had become final. Seen in this light, it is apparent that the High Court was in no manner of doubt as regards the import of the orders of the A.S.C. As well as the Additional Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner insofar as the chaubara is concerned.
9. Mr. Najafi then argued in a different light. He drew a distinction between the discretion vested in the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction to decide to interfere or not to interfere in any proceedings and a right of the litigant to have an adjudication made in the present proceedings through S.A.Os. And civil revision. The argument is valid in so far as it goes on principle. But when applied to the facts of the present case, it is obvious that the interpretation placed by the High Court in a Settlement dispute would bind the civil Court before whom the matte may be taken during the second phase and there arises no question of B a right or discretion. The order of the High Court delivered in the course of decision of Writ Petition No, 880/R-65 has concluded the matter in so far as the import of the orders and the entitlement of both the parties is concerned. It is not open for me nor it was open for the subordinate Courts to have gone behind that interpretation placed by the High Court in the previous round of litigation which had become final.
10. Mr. Najafi put the same argument in rather a different way by stating that this interpretation of the situation by me would tantamount to controlling the jurisdiction under section 115, C. P. C. By virtue of Article 199 of the Constitution. The argument is misconceived. No matter in exercise of what jurisdiction the High Court decides a dispute, it is final qua those parties in respect of the subsequent disputes though they may arise under any colour. It may be added that the Civil Procedure Code applies even to proceedings arising under the constitutional jurisdiction as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Hussai Bakhsh (1). So, really it is not the nature of jurisdiction in which a dispute is decided which has to be looked at but the substance of the decision and its effect on the parties as a result of that pronouncement or adjudication. Seen in this light, therefore, the decision of the High Court resolving the Settlement dispute between the litigating parties is a binding decision and the subsequent agitation of the same matter before a civil Court or Tribunal of limited jurisdiction for canvassing a different proposition after placing a different interpretation on the same set of orders or decisions would hardly be available to any party. This principle would apply with full force when the decision of the High Court in the previous litigation is admitted to be one with jurisdiction as is the position in the present case.
11. Mr. Najafi then tried to place reliance on the order of the L. P. A. Bench dismissing his client's L. P. A.
In limine and upholding the order of the learned Single Judge. It is being objected to by the learned counsel for the opposite side that the order of the learned L. P. A. Bench dated 23-11-1965 had never been produced before the Courts below and it ought not to be taken into consideration. However, be that as it may, as I read the order of the L. P. A. Bench it did not bring about a change in the import of the order of the learned Single Judge. The L. P. A. Bench took the view that the expression used in the order of the A. S. C. That "two rooms on the outer side of the house" was not quite appropriate. The L. P. A. Bench also took notice of the further fact that the same Officer verified that he had divided the whole house vertically into two portions and marked it in the presence of the parties. It is in this light that the L. P. A. Bench while dismissing the appeal repelled the contention being raised by Abdul Shakoor that the matter did not involve the case of enlarging the transfer of Siraj Din from two to four rooms. Therefore, nothing turns on the appellant's reliance on the observations of the L.P. A. Bench dismissing the appeal in limine.
12. I have perused the grounds of Writ Petition No, 880/R-65 which was filed by Abdul Shakoor to assail the validity of the orders of the
(1) PLD 1970 SC 1 ' Settlement Authorities including that of Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Ahmad, Settlement Commissioner dated 1-4-1965. Together with this writ petition, the plain showing two rooms in red had also been filed to substantiate the plea that the opposite side had been transferred two rooms on the ground floor through the vertical division and not three rooms. Referrence may be made to para. 13 (g) (i) of this writ petition. A perusal thereof would show that the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 1-4-1965 was attacked by the petitioner in the previous writ petition on the ground that it was based on misreading of the record as he had laboured under the misapprehension that the D. S. C. Had transferred three rooms in lower portion to Siraj Din, The matter coming up before the High Court, the learned Single Judge refused to interfere with the order of the Settlement Commissioner which was the main order under attack. Abdul Shakoor also failed before the L. P. A. Bench.
13. Mr. A. H. Najafi, the learned counsel for Abdul Shakoor has sought to argue before me the whole matter as it ought to have been argued when it came up before the High Court in the first round through Writ Petition No, 880/R-65. I am afraid I am unable to go behind the order of the High Court in the previous round passed in Writ Petition No, 880/R-65. A perusal of the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 1-4-1965 would indeed show that his interpretation of the orders of the Settlement Authorities while demarcating the property clearly was that the intention of the orders of the Settlement Authorities was not to deprive Siraj Din of the three rooms in his possession on the ground floor. Rather the intention was to bring about a vertical division and also give him the chaubara above. The mere fact that in the order of the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition of Abdul Shakoor an observation has been made regarding two rooms is a wholly insufficient circumstance to change the nature of the order of the Settlement Commissioner. The sum and substance of the previous order of this Court is that substantial justice had been done between the parties and to find out as to what was the mode and extent of the property transferred to the parties, one has to refer to the order of the highest tribunal in the hierarchy of Settlement Department, i,e, the order of Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Ahmad, Settlement Commissioner dated 1-4-1965. I think there is little scope for hair-splitting. When construing an order, the order has to be read as a whole and the intention of the author has to be gathered on somewhat sound principles rather than catching words here and there G and trying to take benefit of omissions. Having read all these orders carefully, I have little doubt in my mind that the intention of the order of "Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Ahmad left no room for doubt in the mind of even Abdul Shakoor that what had been transferred to the opposite-party was three rooms on the ground floor in, addition to the chaubara above. That is the reason why a specific grievance was made on that score and a ground was raised before the High Court in the course of W. P. 880/R-65 but the High Court refused to come to the aid of the writ petitioner and to interfere.
14. In the course of dictation of this order, the learned counsel for Abdul Shakoor has also produced an affidavit of one Ataullah showing the Siraj. Din has sublet one of the disputed rooms to another person. I '.Am sorry I am in no position to entertain affidavit as evidence of this nature submitted in the course of hearing of the civil revision or the second appeals.
15. In order to conclude, Mr. Najafi argued that the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 1- 4-1965 in para. 8 has again mentioned two rooms. According to him, this was the operative part of the order and therefore that ought to prevail. I am unable to subscrible to this view because on no rule of interpretation I can obliterate from the body of this order the three lines which have carefully been devoted to describe and to remove the so-called anomaly in the order of the D. S. C. That Siraj Din had been transferred three rooms and not two rooms. Therefore, the true import and the intention of the order of the Settlement Commissioner was that Siraj Din shall not be deprived of the portion on the ground floor in his possession. The learned counsel, therefore, cannot gain much by taking advantage of misdescription of two or three because this aspect of the matter stands concluded by a specific finding adverted to by the Settlement Commissioner.
16. Pressing the matter further, Mr. Najafi points out that the order of the learned Single Judge passed in the course of previous Writ Petition No, 880/R-65 also happens to mention two rooms. As I read the order of the learned Single Judge, I find its true import to be that the Settlement Authorities had done substantial justice between the parties which called for no interference in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. As regards what had been transferred, it has already been pointed out that the last word on the subject was uttered in this regard by the Settlement Commissioner Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Ahmad in his order dated 1-4-1965. The effect of the refusal of the High Court to interfere in the constitutional jurisdiction at the instance of the client of Mr. Najafi in this case was that the order of the Settlement Commissioner, dated 1-4-1965 would be operative with full force.
17. The learned counsel wanted to refer to the plan filed for the purpose of eviction. As I have already noticed in the course of Writ Petition No, 880/R-65 this plan had been relied upon as a circumstance favouring Mr. Najafi's client. Despite that circumstance, the High Court still felt that this was not a fit case for interference and this ground did not succeed. The same ground therefore cannot be re-agitated in the subsequent proceedings.
18. Mr. Najafi would spin the argument further by sticking on to the stand of two rooms as the same was mentioned in the grounds of appeal by Siraj Din before the learned Additional District Judge arising out of the civil suit. Enough has been said on the subject and at the cost of repetition I have again to refer to the final order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 1-4-1965 which can leave little doubt in the mind of a reasonable person as regards the true scope and import of that order..
19. The chief argument at this stage of Mr. Najafi is that the transfer documents if looked at only mention two rooms and, therefore, the documents also speak of only two rooms. I think I have already dealt with this aspect of the matter by pointing out that the transfer documents are to be read with the order on which they are based and as elaborated and clarified by the Settlement Authorities and upheld by the High Court in the previous writ petition. It would be treading a dangerous path to interpret the transfer documents in isolation from the transfer orders on which they are based and to Which reference has-been made and upon which reliance has been placed.
In case of any anomaly as to the true effect and scope of those orders, the orders passed by the competent Settlement Authorities are the best proof of their own intent.
' Having considered the overall circumstances of the case, I find the learned Additional District Judge in appeal misdirected himself in law and acted without jurisdiction in ignoring from consideration the orders of the Settlement Authorities which as already pointed out had been upheld by the High Court in the previous round of litigation. The net result of the previous litigation was that Siraj Din was held to be transferee of three rooms on the ground floor and the chaubara above. The revision petition, therefore, would succeed and the orders of the two Courts below are reversed. The natural result of this would be that the S. A. Os. Filed by Abdul Shakoor would fail.
There shall be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.