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1984 CLC 2025

ABDUL MAJID vs Mst. JAMILA KHATOON

Citation1984 CLC 2025
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.First Rent Appeal No, 81 of 1982
Date1983-11-16
Judge(s)Nasir Aslam Zahid
ResultAppeal dismissed

' The Ejectment Application No, 3 of 1978 was filed by the respondent/ landlady on 2-1-1978 for the ejectment of the appellant/tenant from the shops in question on the ground of personal requirement. The case of the respondent/landlady is given in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the ejectment application, which are reproduced hereinbelow "(3) That at the time when the shops were let out to the opponent, the children of the applicant were minors. The applicant herself is a widow and, therefore, the shops were not required by the applicant and the same were let out to the opponent.

(4)That now the only son of the applicant, Syed Khalid Hussain Zaidi has become major and intends to start his own business.

(5)That the applicant has no other shop in her occupation nor the son of the applicant is in occupation of any shop wherein be may carry on his business."

' The ejectment application was resisted on behalf of the appellant. Only the son of the respondent Khalid Hussain Zaidi, who was also her attorney, gave evidence on behalf of the respondent. The appellant gave the evidence on his behalf. By Order dated 6-1-1982, the Rent Controller granted the ejectment application. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed this first rent appeal. I have heard Mr. Azhar Ali Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S. H. Rizvi, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. In support of the present appeal it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that a case for ejectment of the appellant on the ground of personal requirement of the son of the respondent had not been established on the basis of the evidence on record. Two contentions were raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. It was firstly argued that there was no specific mention about the precise business to be started and carried on by the son of the respondent in the shops in question and secondly it was argued that it had not been established that the premises in question were suitable for starting a coaching centre.

3. In so far as the first contention is concerned, in my view, the ejectment application filed by a landlord is not liable to be dismissed on the sole ground that the specific business, which is intended to be started and carried on in the premises required, is not specified in the memo of the ejectment application. In this case, the respondent, widow, had stated that at the time the shops had been let out to the appellant the children of the respondent were minors and as the shops were not required by the respondent the same were let out to the appellant but at the time of filing of the ejectment application the only son of the widen/respondent had become a major and wanted to start his own business. The precise business which was intended to be started and carried on in the premises in question has been mentioned in the evidence of the son Khalid Hussain Zaidi, who was also the attorney of the respondent. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the eject mint application was not liable to be dismissed on the ground that the business about starting a coaching centre has not specifically been mentioned in the ejectment application.

' In support of the other contention about the suitability of starting a coaching centre in the premises in question, it was contended by the learned cow sell for the appellant that the evidence on behalf of the respondent did not prove that the premises in question were suitable for running a coaching centre. According to the learned counsel the entire area was hardly 58 square yards and in such a small covered area no coaching centre could be started. It was further contended that in the premises which were built as shops, no coaching centre could be started and generally coaching centres are located and run in residential buildings. I find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The evidence of the son of the respondent was that there were several coaching centers in the locality, although no coaching centre was being run in the premises which were built like shops. However, he stated that in commercial areas a man can do business and running a coaching centre is a business activity and there is no restriction under the law on a person to run a coaching centre in a commercial area. If the contention of the learned counsel is accepted then no business activity except shops can be run in commercial areas. It is a .Matter of common knowledge that in Karachi in commercial areas business offices including clinics are located.

' The other leg of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the premises measuring about 58 square yards are insufficient for starting and running coaching centers has also no substance. Evidence has been brought on record that the only son of the respondent (a widow) after qualifying as B. Com. Wanted to start a coaching centre in the premises in question to supplement the income of the family. The evidence on record' has been believed by the learned Rent. Controller and in my view the evidence on record has made out a case for personal requirement.

' Learned counsel for the appellant had relied upon 1981 CLC 1223, 1979 CLC 805, PLD 964 Pesh.

278 and PLD 1963 Kar. 695 for the propositions that burden of establishing that the premises required bona fide by the landlord himself was on him and that the need of a landlord must not only be bona fide but also reasonable and that in a given case a bare statement of the landlord may not be sufficient to establish a case of bona fide requirement. None of these reported decisions supports the case of the appellant in this first rent appeal. In my view the burden of establishing her case had been discharged by the respondent through the evidence of her son and in the facts of this case the evidence of the son was sufficient to prove the case of personal requirement.

4. I find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed but with n order as to costs. The appellant is, ho Never, granted time, with the consent of Mr. S. H. Rizvi, learned counsel for the respondent, till 30-6-

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